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Abstract
In the cumulative doctoral thesis, four papers are presented that deal with the impact
of the Basel II and Basel III frameworks on financial market stability. With an empirical
analysis and two heterogeneous agent models, we analyze the impact of such aspects
as the choice of the VaR model within the framework, the influence of backtesting
exceptions and the new proposed changes in the Basel III framework.
As a general result, we determine that too strict regulation may lead to the opposite de-
sired effect. The Basel III framework in particular constitutes a severe intervention in the
financial market, but responsible regulation may lead here to stabilization. Regulations
aiming at a direct target, such as the choice of the Value-at-Risk model or the calculation
of the level of regulatory capital for market risk, prove to be more effective than general
rules, such as a general increase in the minimum capital requirements for all risk types
of the frameworks.
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This thesis deals with the analysis of the influence of the Basel II and III frame-
works on financial market stability. The challenges and drawbacks of the regulations de-
termined by these frameworks are elaborated in four papers. Since financial institutions
have to connect their trading decisions with the regulatory capital which, in turn, is de-
pendent on the risk resulting from assets they buy and sell, price movements on financial
markets can be influenced by those regulations. These papers focus in identifying and
measuring the possible consequences of the impact of these regulations.
We proceed as follows. First, we qualify the research context by sketching crucial
aspects of the Basel II and III frameworks. We then present the methodology and (novel)
research results of the four papers contained in this thesis. Finally, we draw a general
conclusion by connecting the main aspects of the papers’ results and highlight challenges
for further research based on these results.
1 Qualifying the research context of the four publications
For the calculation of capital requirements, the Basel II framework (International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards) differentiates between three risk
types: market risk, credit risk and operational risk (BCBS 2006). For each of these risk
types, regulatory capital is calculated subject to the positions the financial institutions
holds in its portfolio and has in its balance sheet. In summary, these three risk types con-
stitute the level of regulatory capital according to Basel II. The old Basel I framework was
enhanced to cope with the challenges of (financial) globalization that arose over the last
two decades (Crouhy et al. 2006). Adoption of the framework depends on national leg-
islation. In most countries, including in Germany, Basel II came into force in 2007; in the
US, however, the adoption process only began in 2008 and has not yet been completed
(BCBS 2011c).
With the onset of the severe financial crisis in 2007 it became apparent that Basel II
was not able to cope with the challenges posed by the whole host of new financial prod-
ucts. Financial institutions assessed as ”too big to fail” collapsed or had to be rescued by
bail-out (Acharya et al. 2009). It was obvious that the regulatory capital was insufficient
to sustain the problems that came to light in the course of the 2007 crisis. Facing these new
problems, the Basel Board on Banking Supervision (BCBS) decided to revise the Basel II
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framework - and launched in an enduring process regulations that constitute the Basel
III framework (BCBS 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b).
In this context, we focus on the influence of these regulations on financial markets
for which market risk is decisive. Market risk is defined as ”the risk of change in the value
of a financial position due to changes in the value of the underlying components on which
that position depends,” McNeil et al. (2005, p. 2). To assess the level of regulatory capital
of market risk, the formulae of both Basel II and Basel III frameworks use Value-at-Risk
models. In an economic sense, the Value-at-Risk of an asset portfolio held by a financial
institution is the maximum loss which is not exceeded on α% of n consecutive trading
days. In the Basel II framework, these are 10 trading days where α = 99%. It is calculated
for at least the last 250 trading days (BCBS 2006, 2009). The formula is as follows:
crt = max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 VaR0.99(10|t− i), VaR0.99(10|t)
)
, (1)
where crt is the capital requirements on day t, VaR0.99(10|t) the ten-step-VaR and
h/60 ∑60i=1 VaR0.99(10|t − i) the 60-day average of the last 60 ten-step-VaR estimators
weighted with a factor h. The BCBS does not prescribe any special model for the de-
termination of regulatory capital. Value-at-Risk models differ strongly concerning the
assumptions used for its calculation. Common Value-at-Risk models differ mainly with
regard to two characteristics: which distribution shall be used for the distribution of re-
turns and how (recent) observations should be weighted.
Concerning the first assumption, Fama (1965) and Mandelbrot (1963) found that
the distribution of returns is leptokurtic, meaning the existence of more probability mass
close to the mean and at the distributions´ tails (heavy-tailed distributions). Concerning
the assumption of the return distribution, one may assume a specific distribution (para-
metric approaches), using the empirical distribution of returns (empirical approaches), or
using Monte Carlo simulations or bootstrap approaches (semi-parametric approaches).
Concerning the second assumption, it is important to know how recent observations are
weighted. The volatility of a financial market tends to change in clusters, meaning that
times with high volatility alternate with calm periods characterized by low volatility.
During a change of regimes, especially during a change from a calm period to a highly
fluctuating period, it is important that a Value-at-Risk model is quite quick at capturing
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the increase in market risk to force the financial institution to hold more regulatory capi-
tal, preparing it for higher or extraordinary losses. For this purpose, many Value-at-Risk
models, such as GARCH models or the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
approach, weight recent observation higher than observations at the beginning of the
considered time period (Alexander 2001; Crouhy et al. 2001; Mc Neil et al. 2005).
In practice, financial institutions mainly use Value-at-Risk models with very simple
assumptions (Homburg & Scherpereel 2005; McNeil et al. 2005). Here, the first paper of
the thesis, entitled The impact of choice of VaR models on the level of regulatory capital according
to Basel II1, discusses possible reasons for this behavior.
Returning to the formula of calculating the level of regulatory capital (cp. Formula
(1)), the decisive term of the maximum expression is the 60-day-average of the 10-step
Value-at-Risk multiplied by factor h. This factor h ranges between 3 and 4. It rises above
an amount of 3 if a backtesting exception occurs, which happens on average 2.5 times a
year. The reason for this is that the loss associated with the Value-at-Risk measure is not
exceeded on 99% trading days. Hence it is exceeded on 1% of 250 trading days per year.
The BCBS assumes the model does not work well if the 1-step Value-at-Risk is exceeded
more than 4 times a year. Hence, more backtesting exceptions cause a higher level of
regulatory capital (Stahl 1997; BCBS 2006, 2009). This criteria is used in the second paper
of the thesis, entitled Does Basel II destablize financial markets? - An agent-based financial
market perspective2, to test the impact of such a sudden increase in the level of regulatory
capital on fiancial market stability.
In the Basel III framework, an additional term is added to the formula of the Basel
II framework: the stressed Value-at-Risk. It is calculated in the same way as the usual
Value-at-Risk measure. The only difference is the period used for its determination. This
period is a ”12-month period of significant financial stress” (BCBS 2009) for the stressed
Value-at-Risk. Hence, it is a renunciation of the principle of assessing the risk situation of
the last couple of trading days and calculating the level of regulatory capital for market
risk based upon it. It requires effort to give periods that cause significant problems to
financial institutions more weight in the calculation of the level of regulatory capital for
1published in Quantitative Finance, Vol. 10, No. 10, December 2010, pp. 1215-1224
2published in the European Physical Journal B, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2010), pp. 29-40
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market risk. The new formula is as follows
crt = max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 VaR0.99(10|t− i), VaR0.99(10|t)
)
+
max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 sVaR0.99(10|t− i), sVaR0.99(10|t)
)
,
(2)
where sVaR is the stressed Value-at-Risk (the terms are interpreted in the same way as in
Formula (1), albeit here for the stressed Value-at-Risk). However, the Basel III framework
does not only change the level of regulatory capital for market risk associated with the
assets held by a financial institute. It additionally raises the level of minimum capital re-
quirements a financial institute has to hold independently of its actual assets. Although
the increase in minimum capital requirements especially leads to a better capitalization
of banks to sustain threats of credit risk, it is coordinated to all risk types. As described
above, the overall level of regulatory capital consists of the sum of the regulatory capital
of credit, market, and operational risk (BCBS 2006, 2010a/b, 2011a/b). Hence, we have
to incorporate this increase in the minimum level of regulatory capital into a model jux-
taposing the effects of the Basel II and Basel III framework, as undertaken in the third
paper of the thesis, entitled Does Basel III improve financial market stability? - A comparison
with the Basel II framework.
Four instruments introduced by the BCBS with the Basel III framework strengthen
the capitalization of banks to help them survive in a critical financial environment. In
addition to the previously mentioned stressed Value-at-Risk which is directly connected
to market risk, there are two instruments suggested to raise the minimum level of regu-
latory capital. The first instrument is the capital conservation buffer, which is a constant
that raises the actual level of regulatory capital step by step between 2013 and 2019 by
35%. On top of this increase, a countercyclical buffer can be built up in good times and
released in bad times by the national regulatory authority. The countercyclical buffer can
be no higher than the capital conservation buffer. It should guarantee that financial insti-
tution have enough minimum capital requirements to keep interbank lending up in bad
times. Additionally, it is interesting to note how financial market stability is affected by
the stepwise raise between 2013 and 2019. Ultimately, these are sudden changes in the
minimum capital requirements once every year. Will these changes lead to shocks on the
financial market? The Effects of the new capital requirements of Basel III on financial market
stability are finally discussed in the fourth paper.
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2 Methodology, results, and novel aspects of the four
publications
In the following, we discuss the main goals and results of each paper. In addition to
describing which scientific methods are used to obtain our results, we will show how the
results of the papers are interrelated.
2.1 The impact of choice of VaR models on the level of regulatory capital
according to Basel II
This paper deals with the choice of an appropriate Value-at-Risk model by a financial
institution. A recent strand of academic (especially statistics-oriented) research is to de-
velop methods which improve the estimation of the 1-step Value-at-Risk. For this pur-
pose, different variations of GARCH models, neural networks or a wide range of dis-
tributions which can replicate fat tails are used (Alexander 2001). However, empirical
studies reveal that financial institutions still use Value-at-Risk models with questionable
assumptions (Homburg & Scherpereel 2005). One reason for this could be that they are
easy to comprehend and implement (McNeil et al. 2005). However, does this prevent a
financial institution from using a more sophisticated model if it can save funds due to
a lower level of regulatory capital with their use? Without doubt, a financial institution
saves funds with a lower level of regulatory capital since regulatory capital, especially
common equity, is more expensive for them than loan capital (Holton 2003). The ques-
tion is therefore: which Value-at-Risk model leads to a low level of regulatory capital.
In our empirical analysis, we have to face another problem which is often neglected
when new Value-at-Risk estimators are proposed for use in the Basel II framework. We
need the 1-step Value-at-Risk for the backtesting procedure. To calculate the level of reg-
ulatory capital for market risk, we need the 10-step Value-at-Risk (cp. Formula (1)) for
which the 10-step return and loss distribution is required. For this purpose, we have to
face the problem that the additivity property for i.i.d. distributed returns is necessary.
The additivity property is only fulfilled for normal (due to the central limit theorem)
and stable (due to the generalized central limit theorem) i.i.d. random variates (Rachev
et al. 2003, 2007). We test for time series based on given underlying return distributions
how accurate the Value-at-Risk estimators are for different Value-at-Risk models. Here,
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we choose both Value-at-Risk models with simple and more sophisticated underlying as-
sumptions. Thereafter, we calculate the level of regulatory capital of market risk for these
models.
The analysis reveals that a precise working model and a low level of regulatory
capital are trade-offs. Models with questionable assumptions assuming the normal dis-
tribution for the return distribution and an equal weighting of past observations lead to
significantly lower regulatory capital. Hence, financial institutions have no incentive to
implement more sophisticated models in line with actual academic research since they
would incur greater expenditure.
2.2 Does Basel II destabilize financial markets? - An agent-based financial
market perspective
In this paper, we focus on the consequences of the Basel II framework for a financial
market. Since Basel II has not been implemented for long or not at all in many countries,
there is no empirical data available to answer this question. We have to come up with
other solutions.
One possibility is to use heterogeneous agent models. These models have proven
to be a powerful tool in many areas of economic policy, such as the analysis of the Tobin
tax or central bank interventions (Westerhoff/Dieci 2006; Mannaro et al. 2008; Westerhoff
2003). Jean-Claude Trichet also assesses them as a reasonable alternative to existing eco-
nomic and financial models. ”Policy-makers need to have input from various theoretical
perspectives and from a range of empirical approaches. Open debate and a diversity of
views must be cultivated - admittedly not always an easy task in an institution such as a
central bank. We do not need to throw out our DSGE [dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium] and asset-pricing models: rather we need to develop complementary tools to
improve the robustness of our overall framework. [...] First, we have to think about how
to characterise the homo economicus at the heart of any model. The atomistic, optimis-
ing agents underlying existing models do not capture behaviour during a crisis period.
We need to deal better with heterogeneity across agents and the interaction among those
heterogeneous agents. We need to entertain alternative motivations for economic choices.
Behavioural economics draws on psychology to explain decisions made in crisis circum-
stances. Agent-based modelling dispenses with the optimisation assumption and allows
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for more complex interactions between agents. Such approaches are worthy of our atten-
tion,” Trichet 2010.
We use a heterogeneous agent model developed by Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000),
in which we implement the regulations of the Basel II framework. In Lux and Marchesi’s
model, we have different traders interacting with one another who use different trading
rules. Expressed in simplified terms, some rely more on the current price trend (chartists)
whilst others expect the price to revert to its fundamental value (fundamentalists). To
these groups, we add a group of regulated traders that only becomes active if regulations
force them to do so. To be more precise, the agents in the model always believe in the
chartists’ and fundamentalists’ trading rules, and only become forced to be active if a
backtesting exception occurs.
When a backtesting exception occurs, the Value-at-Risk measure increases, as does
multiplier h often, too (cp. Formula (1)). This leads to higher regulatory capital above
the minimum required level of regulatory capital for the financial institution. To avoid
additional expenditure by acquiring new regulatory capital, a financial institution sells
risky assets. The higher the loss associated with the present Value-at-Risk level, the more
risky assets are sold. Since we aim to draw a realistic picture of a financial institution’s
activities, we use the three Value-at-Risk models mainly used in practice. As we know
from the first paper of this dissertation, financial institutions have strong intentions to
behave in this way.
We find that the financial market is destabilized by the presence of regulations. The
more agents are regulated, the higher the degree of destabilization is measured by volatil-
ity, distortion and the Hill tail index. In particular, the presence of extraordinary profits
and losses increases. This is the opposite of what the BCBS wanted to achieve with the
Basel II framework. The BCBS’s intention was for financial institutions to withstand pe-
riods with extraordinary losses. But these very losses increase in the analysis conducted
by our model.
2.3 Does Basel III improve financial market stability? - A comparison with
the Basel II framework
After analyzing the Basel II framework, it stands to reason to analyze whether the
changes undertaken in the Basel III framework lead to stabilization. For this purpose,
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we use a heterogeneous agent model based on the Discrete Choice Approach of Brock
and Hommes (1998) and the adjustments of Franke and Westerhoff (2011). This is also a
model with interacting chartists and fundamentalists.
Again, we incorporate regulated traders into this model. However, unlike in the
previous paper, we do not use backtesting exceptions for the trading signal for three rea-
sons. Firstly, it is more straightforward to use the level of regulatory capital directly: a
financial institution will link its trading behavior more to the direct outcome of the cal-
culation, hence the level of regulatory capital, than to the different terms included in its
calculation. Secondly, the new formula for calculating regulatory capital for market risk
within the Basel III framework does not rely completely on the most recent period – the
period in which the backtesting exception occurred. The reason for this is the additional
period used to calculate the stressed Value-at-Risk (cp. Formula (2)). Whereas in the pre-
vious formula an increase in h was in line with an increase in the VaR in Basel II, in
Basel III a backtesting exception does not necessarily – or rather quite seldom – causes
an increase in the sVaR due to the different periods considered for calculating VaR and
sVaR. Thirdly, we have to compare the level of regulatory capital with the other new in-
struments of the Basel III framework, hence the increased minimum level of regulatory
capital. For this purpose, we need a common standard of comparison to incorporate this
change into the model, too. Here, the level of regulatory capital is applicable; backtesting
exceptions are not applicable.
The analysis is carried out for both Basel II and Basel III frameworks. The Basel III
framework has a significantly higher impact on the model’s dynamics than the Basel II
framework. The Basel III framework stabilizes the financial market if the regulations are
used in a moderate manner. If the financial market is regulated too severely, meaning a
high proportion of traders are suddenly affected by regulations, very severe crashes may
occur due to the considerable influence of the regulated traders’ sales.
2.4 Effects of the new capital requirements of Basel III on financial market
stability
After comparing the former Basel II and the new Basel III framework, it is important to
scrutinize the function of the newly proposed instruments in the Basel III framework.
To this end, all changes are implemented in the heterogeneous agent model used in the
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previous paper. By doing so, we can test the influence of each of the proposed instruments
– stressed Value-at-Risk, capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer – and
whether the transition period has an impact on financial market stability. We can explore
these instruments implemented together or we can ”switch off” one or more instruments
to extract the exclusive effect of one instrument.
The increase in the level of regulatory capital for market risk by adjusting the calcu-
lation directly based on assets held by the regulated financial institution is quite promis-
ing, as the Monte Carlo simulation conducted reveals. The stressed Value-at-Risk has
a stabilizing effect. In contrast, the general increase in minimum capital requirements
for all risk types of the framework leads to a destabilization of the financial market for
both the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. The transition period
has no significant effect on financial market stability. Regulations leading directly to the
respective risk type, dependent on the risk coordinated to assets held by the financial
institution, seem to be more promising than a general increase in minimum capital re-
quirements for financial market regulation.
The next section concludes by comparing the results of the four papers and sug-
gesting possibilities for further research.
3 Lessons from the four papers
The goal was to identify, measure and draw possible consequences from the impact of
Basel II/III regulations. For the Basel II framework, we identified that accurate Value-at-
Risk estimators cause a significantly higher level of regulatory capital. This might prevent
financial institutions from implementing them.
Incorporating the Basel II regulations into heterogenous agent models gives us an
impression of their impact. We find that the higher the proportion of regulated agents in
the financial market, the more extraordinary profits and losses occur and the higher the
volatility – destabilization occurs. This problem seems to be solved by implementing the
Basel III framework. For low and medium proportions of regulated traders, we obtain
a stabilization of the financial market. However, special situations and conditions may
lead to severe crashes for high fractions of regulated traders which are even worse than
those identified in the previous analysis of the Basel II framework. Both analyses reveal
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that only responsible use to a moderate extent leads to the regulations having a positive
effect. Excess regulation may cause the opposite of the regulation’s intent to occur. This
aspect is reinforced by the next paper. The precisely defined stressed Value-at-Risk clearly
aiming at the regulation of financial markets due to its influence on market risk has a
stabilizing effect, whereas general regulations, such as the capital conservation buffer
and the countercyclical buffer, fail to increase financial market stability.
The challenges for further research are widespread. One aspect could be to im-
prove the models’ accuracy by undertaking additional empirical work. Better knowledge
of how many traders are affected by regulations on every trading day and the amount
of their respective excess demand would improve the models. It would help to identify
critical moments at which agents are regulated too strongly to avoid crashes, as identi-
fied in the second and third paper, especially for large proportions of regulated traders
generating high absolute excess demand.
In this thesis, we focused on a financial market context. If the capital conservation
buffer and the countercyclical buffer are able to maintain interbank lending, it may be
acceptable for them to have a (slight) destabilizing impact on financial market stability.
Here, we need models that can connect credit to market risk to obtain a comprehen-
sive impression of the whole impact of the Basel frameworks. Another approach could
be to test whether regulations aiming directly at credit risk are perhaps a better way of
stabilizing markets than increasing minimum capital requirements. A similar procedure
comparable to the stabilizing influence of the stressed Value-at-Risk in the fourth paper
might be a solution.
The next approach concerns Value-at-Risk models and the implementation of more
sophisticated models. Here, adjustments to the calculation formula may create financial
incentives for their use. If more sophisticated models lead to a low level of regulatory cap-
ital, financial institutions may promote their implementation. A new definition of factor
h could achieve this goal. It could increased if the Value-at-Risk model fails to meet spe-
cific stylized facts of financial time series, instead of using the backtesting method. In this
context, it could also be tested whether sophisticated models do indeed lead to greater
financial stability in an agent-based financial market.
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may use simple models with questionable assumptions concerning their underlying
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to show that capital requirements for market risk according to
the Basel II regulatory framework may be higher for models that estimate the VaR more
precisely than others. If this is the case, banks may be prevented from implementing
models that capture risk more accurately.
The ”International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”
(Basel II) allows the calculation of the capital requirements for market risk by means of
a Value-at-Risk (VaR) model when performing the Internal Models Approach. However,
the Basel Committee for Banking and Supervision (BCBS) does not prescribe banks a
special type of model (BCBS, 2006, D.4.(f)). In the literature, many models that determine
the VaR and, thus, the capital requirements for market risk are described. These VaR
models differ mainly in how carefully they model stylized facts of return series.
In this paper we consider five VaR approaches with different distributional as-
sumptions. Many VaR approaches frequently used in practice, such as the historical
volatility and Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) approach, still assume
normal distribution (Pafka et al. (2001) and Bormetti et al. (2007)), although Fama (1965)
and Mandelbrot (1963) questioned this assumption long ago. One argument for the use
of these models is often that they are easy to understand and implement. Other models
try to characterize the distribution of returns with more realistic distributions, such as the
student-t distribution, the Generalized Error Distribution (GED) or the stable distribution
(to comprehend potential distributions to model fat tails see Paolella (1999), Alexander
(2001), Mattedi et al. (2004), Rachev et al. (2005) and Bormetti et al. (2007)), since these
distributions are able to match the fat tail property of the return distribution quite well.
With the stable parameters and Stable Exponential Weighted Moving Average
(SEWMA) approach we therefore also incorporate VaR methods where the normal distri-
bution is replaced by the stable distribution, unlike in the historical volatility and EWMA
approach (Ortobelli et al. (2004) and Rachev et al. (2005)). The advantage of being able
to comprehend and implement these models easily, essential in practice, is not impaired
substantially by this modification.
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The fifth VaR approach that is also sometimes used in practice is the historical sim-
ulation. Here, we use the quite realistic empirical distribution of equally weighted his-
torical price changes to determine the VaR. The problems involved in this approach are
dependence on the history of data and a higher computational complexity (Bormetti et
al., 2007).
Up to now, it is not known which of these assumptions describe the ”right” un-
conditional return and loss function (Bradley and Taquu, 2003). An additional problem
is that Basel II stipulates the one-step distribution for daily returns or losses and the ten-
step distribution for cumulative returns or losses for a time horizon of ten days. Both
aspects should therefore be determined adequately by the VaR approach.
Volatility clusters and time dependence in return series are the next problems that
hamper determination of the unconditional return distribution. It is therefore difficult
to test which distributional assumptions concerning the unconditional distribution fit
best. Such an unconditional return distribution more or less presumes that volatility is
constant over time (Alexander, 2001).
Which model will a bank choose to determine its capital requirements? Banks strive
to keep capital requirements low, since it is more expensive to acquire regulatory capi-
tal compared to loan capital. A bank may thus prefer models that involve low capital
requirements and that are accepted by the supervisory authority at the same time.
In contrast to these aims, the supervisory authority strives to reach a high level
of capital requirements. Some reasons for this are that a bank suffering from difficulties
due to low capital requirements may cast a damning light on the whole financial sector.
This can create a domino effect, causing the whole financial sector to get into difficulties
(Crouhy et al., 2006). In fact, the current financial crisis shows us quite plainly how the
world economy can be negatively influenced by bank troubles or even bank failure.
In this paper, we numerically investigate how the different VaR models perform in
determining quantiles of unconditional return and loss distributions, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the consequences of these results for the determination of regulatory capital
are explored. From the point of view of the regulatory authority, it would be desirable
for the models to capture the risk adequately, causing a lower level of regulatory capital
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compared to these models that perform badly, so that there is an incentive for banks to
implement well-performing models. In this case, the targets of not only the banks but
also the supervisory authority would be achieved. The novel aspect of this paper is that
the numerical analysis provides evidence that the opposite seems to hold true. We find
that banks benefit from the use of poor performing models, although backtesting should
ascertain the adequacy of VaR models, causing the incentives of the regulatory authority
to be undermined.
The next section highlights important aspects of determining the level of regulatory
capital for market risk (lrc) and provides a brief description of the investigated VaR mod-
els. Subsequently, the numerical analysis procedure is introduced. The findings of the
analysis and their consequences are then discussed in detail. The final section concludes
the paper and offers suggestions for future research.
2 Value-at-Risk models
The next section is organized as follows. In the first subsection, we define the VaR. We
then explain how the level of regulatory capital for the market risk is determined accord-
ing to the BCBS and illuminate the implications connected with this formula. Finally, we
briefly describe the chosen VaR models.
2.1 Definition of VaR
Before presenting the models, we will first explain how the VaR is defined in this paper.
The loss distribution for period τ is defined as
Lτ|t := − (V(t + τ)−V(t)) , (1)
where V(t) is the value of the portfolio at time t. Accordingly, the loss function indicates
the change in the value of the portfolio between period t and t + τ.
The VaR for a level of significance 1 − α is then defined as the smallest number
l1−α(τ|t) for which the probability of exceeding l1−α(τ|t) is not higher than 1− α. Ac-
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cording to McNeil et al. (2005) and Jorion (2007), we can write:
P
(
Lτ|t ≤ l1−α(τ|t)
)
= 1− α ↔
P
(
Lτ|t ≤ VaRα(τ|t)
)
= 1− α ↔
P (V(t)−V(t + τ) ≤ VaRα(τ|t)) = 1− α.
(2)
Often, the VaR is calculated via the return distribution Yτ|t, which is defined as
Yτ|t = ln
(
V(t + τ)
V(t)
)
= Yt+1 +Yt+2 + . . . +Yt+τ (3)
with Yt = ln (V(t)/V(t− 1)) = ln(V(t))− ln(V(t− 1)). The τ-step return distribution
Yτ|t depends on the information known at time t. From (3), it follows for the portfolio
value V(t + τ), according to Reiss and Thomas (2007),
V(t + τ) = V(t) exp(Yτ|t). (4)
The determination of VaRα(τ|t) with Yτ|t can then be realized as follows. When we de-
scribe the α-quantile of Yτ|t with Qα(τ|t), we obtain
P
(
Yτ|t ≤ Qα(τ|t)
)
= α ↔
P
(
ln
(
V(t + τ)
V(t)
)
≤ Qα(τ|t)
)
= α ↔
P (V(t + τ) ≤ V(t) exp(Qα(τ|t))) = α.
(5)
Now, from equations (2) and (5) it follows that V(t) − VaRα(τ|t) = V(t) exp(Qα(τ|t))
and hence:
VaRα(τ|t) = V(t) (1− exp ((Qα(τ|t))) . (6)
The aim of the VaR approaches in this paper is to determine Qα(τ|t) to calculate the VaR
via (6).
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2.2 The level of regulatory capital
The BCBS (2006, 718 (LXXVI) (i)) prescribes the following formula for the calculation of
regulatory capital for market risk:
lrc1|t = max
(
h
60
60
∑
i=1
VaR0.01(10|t− i), VaR0.01(10|t)
)
, (7)
where lrc1|t is the level of regulatory capital in the next period, VaR0.01(10|t − i) is the
VaR with α = 0.01 of the loss distribution 10 periods (days) ahead (which can easily
be calculated with (6) from the return distribution), and h is a multiplication factor or
multiplier. The multiplier ranges between h = 3 and h = 4. The bank or supervisory
authority has to evaluate whether a VaR model is applicable to capture risk by means
of a backtesting procedure based on VaR0.01(1|t). If there are problems concerning the
adequacy of the model, the factor h is raised up to a level of h = 4. At this level, the
supervisory authority can force the bank to change its approach of calculating VaR (it is
then assigned to the red zone (rz)).
At this point, Danielsson et al. (1998) recognized the problem that an accurate es-
timation of the one-step VaR, and hence having no complaints concerning the model in
the backtesting procedure, do not necessarily lead to an accurate ten-step VaR estimator.
The square root of time rule might lead to an underestimation of VaR0.01(10|t) in this
context and thus to an underestimation of lrc1|t. The multiplication factor aims to correct
this problem.
However, it is quite difficult to test whether the ten-step distribution is determined
correctly. Due to the central limit theorem, it is not possible to determine the correct the-
oretical ten-step distribution for any distribution with a finite mean and variance (except
for the normal distribution, of course). In recent years, the stable distribution has been
put forward as a solution to this problem by many researchers (e.g. Rachev et al., 2007;
Nolan, 2003; Mittnik et al., 2002). The advantage, besides its ability to match the observed
fat tails of unconditional return distributions, is that it fulfills the additivity property since
its variance is infinite for 1 < α < 2, and therefore the generalized central limit theorem
applies (Nolan, 2003).
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The stable distribution can be characterized by stability parameter α ∈ (0, 2], skew-
ness parameter β ∈ [−1, 1], scaling parameter δ > 0 and location parameter µ ∈ R. The
additivity property implies that a sum of i.i.d. stable distributed returns is also stable dis-
tributed. This makes this distribution especially interesting for its application in the VaR
models presented below, since the accurate modelling of the ten-step distribution is of
major importance to determine an adequate estimator for the level of regulatory capital
(cp. (7)).
In the following, we describe and juxtapose the VaR approaches used for numer-
ical analysis. They differ mainly in two aspects. The first aspect is the distribution of
the residuals. Here we assume a normal distribution for the historical volatility and the
EWMA approach (later referred to as ”normal approaches”), which are frequently used
in practice. In the stable parameters and SEWMA approaches (later referred to as ”stable
approaches”), we replace the normal distribution by the above-described stable distri-
bution. For the historical simulation approach we use the empirical distribution of the
residuals.
The second aspect is the weighting of historical observations for the variance es-
timation. Here, historical volatility, historical simulation and stable parameters weight
every observation the same, whereas EWMA and SEWMA weight recent observations
higher.
Table 1 provides a formal description of these VaR approaches with one- and
τ-step quantile estimators and literature stating where more detailed descriptions can
be found. In the following analysis of the next subchapters, we focus on the different
underlying residual distribution of the VaR approaches, which can be found in column
3 of this table. Using this residual distribution, we can easily suggest the return or loss
distribution with the model defined in column 2.
Table 1 comes about here
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3 Methodology
The underlying return distribution is a factor that significantly influences the estimation
of extraordinary losses or gains, since they are determined by the distributions’ 1% quan-
tile. Remember that these quantiles are the basis for calculating the level of regulatory
capital (see (7)). It is therefore quite important to investigate and juxtapose the differ-
ences in the lrc resulting from varying underlying distributions in the approaches and
connected with this point from an under- or overestimation of the corresponding 1%
quantile by choosing a special VaR approach.
Studies exploring real data often conclude that normal approaches do not capture
the risk as adequately as models based on fat tailed distributions, such as the stable ap-
proaches (cp. e.g. Nolan, 2003; Mittnik et al., 2002). Since real data shows stylized facts
such as volatility clustering, it is problematic to assume a special distribution for the con-
sidered time horizon. In this numerical analysis, we focus especially on the consequences
of a problematic distributional assumption in the VaR model. We choose i.i.d. random
variables and exclude volatility clusters to test whether the quantile of the unconditional
return distribution is accurately determined by the VaR model and to explore the con-
sequences for the determination of the level of regulatory capital. Thus, it is possible to
analyze the impact of the underlying distribution.
We start our numerical analysis by simulating time series with i.i.d. random
variables. The i.i.d. random variables have four different underlying given distributions
for the return distribution, namely the normal, stable, skewed student-t, and GED distri-
bution (as previously stated, an adaption from Qα(τ|t) to VaRα(τ|t) can easily be carried
out by (6)). The parameters of the normal distribution (µ, σ), the stable distribution (α, β,
δ, µ), the skewed student-t distribution (µ, σ, ν and ξ) and the GED (µ, b2, γ), which can
be found in Table 2, are estimated from the DAX series from 08-20-1995 to 06-29-2007.
The maximum likelihood estimator for every distribution is chosen. By carrying out the
analysis, the theoretical quantile (Qtheoα,τ ) of the unconditional time series is known and
can be compared with the estimates of the VaR models (Qα). Note that the theoretical
1%-quantile of the different distributions differs significantly from Qtheo0.01,1 = −0.0535 for
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the stable distribution to Qtheo0.01,1 = −0.0362 for the normal distribution (see Table 2).
Table 2 comes about here
There is an additional advantage choosing this approach, referring to the afore-
mentioned properties of stable distributions. Whereas the backtesting exceptions are de-
termined by the one-step VaR, the regulatory capital is determined by the ten-step VaR in
the Basel II framework. Both the normal and the stable distribution are the only distribu-
tions that fulfill the additivity property (Rachev et al., 2003; Rachev et al., 2007). Due to
this property, the 1%-quantile of the ten-step return distribution can also be determined
exactly with Qtheo0.01,10 = −0.2150 for the stable and Qtheo0.01,10 = −0.1132 for the normal dis-
tribution. It can also be tested whether the VaR models determine it adequately.
Since it is obvious that the historical volatility approach will determine the theoret-
ical quantile for the time series with normal random variables, and vice versa, the stable
parameters approach will determine it for the time series with stable random variables
(hereinafter referred to as normal and stable time series), we also consider two other al-
ternatives with the skewed student-t distribution and GED. This way, the performance
of the VaR approaches can be determined without implying one of the distributional as-
sumptions (normal or stable distribution) in advance. Of course, no exact determination
of the ten-step distribution for these distributions is possible, since they do not have the
additivity property.
The gap between the theoretical and estimated quantile estimator should be as
small as possible. With a p-test it is tested to a significance level of a = 0.1 (with the
critical niveau of pcrit,1−a=0.9) and a = 0.01 (with the critical niveau pcrit,0.99), respec-
tively, if the estimator predicts the theoretical estimator acceptably. The results of the
different simulated time series are presented in the next sections. The above-mentioned
problems, which may occur if banks do not hold an adequate level of regulatory capital,
make allowances for adopting a one-sided test, which denounce an overestimation of the
1%-quantile of the return distribution 1. Since n = 1705 values are incorporated, the test
1The hypothesis p ≤ Qtheoα is tested against the alternative hypothesis p > Qtheoα . The hypothesis is rejected,
if T = Qα−Q
theo
α√
Qα(1−Qα)
√
n ∈ [pcrit;1−a; ∞).
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performance is acceptable - apart from the usual problems that occur when testing for
small probabilities.
We obtain the 1705 values by executing the following procedure, called rolling anal-
ysis. It is assumed we have 3000 ordered data values. With the first w = 1000 values
(which will be called window length w from now on), we obtain a first one-step VaR esti-
mator. The first data value is then excluded and the 1001st is included in the analysis for
the second one-step VaR estimate. This procedure continues until the 1001st and 3000th
data value provide an estimation. With these 2000 one-step VaR estimates we obviously
obtain 1990 ten-step VaR estimates. Since the BCBS postulates carrying out the backtest-
ing procedure (and hence the determination of h in (7)) with estimates from one year
(these are four complete quarters), the number of values shrinks to 1705.
Depending on the VaR method, the length of w provides different results. E.g. a
longer window length has the consequence that the estimators of the parameters of the
stable distribution in the SEWMA model differ slightly. In turn, this also leads to minor
discrepancies concerning the quantile estimators of both the one- and ten-step distribu-
tion.
Before presenting the results of this analysis, it is necessary to add a remark. Of
course, the EWMA and SEWMA models are especially designed to capture clustered
volatility. It can therefore be assumed before commencing this analysis that they perform
worse than other models, since there are no volatility clusters in the time series consid-
ered. However, comparing their estimators is quite relevant for two reasons.
First, a model should also perform well if the risk situation is relatively stable for
a certain time period (e.g. w = 250) and no volatility clusters occur. Recent research
shows that the assumption of periods with stable mean and variance is quite realistic.
Some models work explicitly with this assumption to assume a normal distribution with
varying parameters for each of those stable periods (Bormetti et al., 2008). Secondly, the
underlying distributions are the normal and stable distribution, respectively. This way, it
is possible to juxtapose and compare the results in another context other than that taken
by the historical volatility and stable parameters approach.
To achieve a high degree of generalization, the analysis is performed 1000 times for
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each model and window length.
4 Results
Our results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 of this section. Note that ”area B” specifies
how many of the estimators exceed the critical value of pcrit,0.90. Analogously, ”area A”
states the percentile exceeding even a critical niveau of pcrit,0.99. If too many estimators are
located in these two areas, the reliability of average potential good results declines. This
means in fact that the method provides good results on average, but that in many cases
the risk situation is underestimated. A model predicting the theoretical quantile that is
appropriate in the mean but often underestimates it for only small deviations remains
problematic.
Table 3 proceeds with the same results for the ten-step distribution. The last three
columns show the ratio of how often the supervisory authority would have the right to
reject the model, since the red zone was reached (rz). Then the average of the multipli-
cation factor h is given (∅ multi). The last column shows the average level of regulatory
capital (∅ lrc).
4.1 Time series with the additivity property
As previously mentioned for normal and stable time series, it is possible to juxtapose
not only the estimators of the one-step-quantile with the theoretical quantile. Due to the
additivity property, we can also determine the ten-step-quantile estimator with the re-
spective theoretical quantile of the ten-step distribution. We identify severe weaknesses
of the considered VaR approaches, especially for the quantile estimators of the ten-step
distribution.
First, we analyze the normal time series (upper part of Table 3). Whereas the
one-step quantile estimators are quite accurate without strong deviations (apart from the
historical simulation approach), there are higher deviations for the quantile estimators
of the 10-step distribution. Here the historical volatility (for both window lengths) and
again the historical simulation provide bad results. This is puzzling since especially the
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assumptions of the historical volatility fit perfectly to the simulated time series. The level
of capital requirements is quite similar for the historical simulation, historical volatility,
and EWMA approach.
Table 3 comes about here
The stable approaches overestimate the theoretical quantile in most cases (cp. the
four bottom lines of the upper part of Table 3). It is therefore not surprising that the lrc is
higher for those two approaches, although the average level of the multiplication factor
is lower. The ten-step distribution seems to be more relevant here for the calculation of
the lrc.
We now compare these results with those for the stable time series from the bot-
tom part of Table 3. Remember that this return distribution has fat tails, in contrast to the
previously considered normal time series. With the implementation of this more realistic
assumption concerning the underlying return distribution, the performance of most con-
sidered VaR approaches declines dramatically. Surprisingly, this leads to quite low levels
of regulatory capital for badly performing approaches. In the following, we will have a
closer look at some of the results in Table 3 that support this observation.
Comparing the average level of regulatory capital (last column of Table 3) of the
various methods, the discrepancy becomes much higher. The lowest level is achieved for
the EWMA approach - the approach that performs the worst concerning the accuracy of
the quantile estimators. Table 3 (row three of the bottom part) reveals the following facts:
the approach can be rejected by the supervisory authority for only 27% of the simulated
time series (rz), although 51.2% of the estimators are in area B. The problem becomes ap-
parent when we look at the ten-step distribution (remember: this distribution is relevant
when calculating the level of regulatory capital). 88.6% of the estimators are in area B
and even 80.5% are in area A. This problem does not only occur in the EWMA approach.
All methods, with the exception of the stable parameters approach, underestimate the
quantile of the ten-step distribution noticeably. Here, it is remarkable that the regulation
authority can only reject a significantly smaller proportion (cp. Table 3 for the exact val-
ues). The lrc is only half as high as in the good performing stable parameters approach,
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especially for the historical volatility and historical simulation. So far, it seems that a low
lrc does not necessarily correspond to a good performing method.
The approach that corresponds best to the risk situation is the stable parameters
approach, which is not surprising, since its properties exactly fit the properties of this
time series. For both window lengths, on average, the quantile estimator is accurate for
the one- and ten-step distribution. Despite these facts, the lrc reaches a level of 62.48% -
about 30% more than for the badly performing historical volatility approach. It becomes
apparent that a higher level of the multiplication factor of the normal approaches cannot
correct the underestimation of the quantiles occurring in these approaches.
Similar results can be observed in the other approaches or window lengths, as
shown in Table 3. It seems that the use of the ten-step distribution and the manner of
increasing the multiplication factor by calculating the lrc leads to a lower level of the lrc
for badly performing models, when the underlying unconditional return distribution is
fat tailed and skewed. In the next subsection, this is observed for i.i.d. time series with
random variables from a skewed student-t and GED distribution.
4.2 Time series without the additivity property
For the skewed student-t and GED time series we can only perform the analysis for
the one-step distribution, due to the lack of the additivity property. As with the stable
distribution, both unconditional return distributions exhibit fat tails. For this situation,
some of the above-mentioned effects are emphasized. Mention must first be made of the
fact that using badly performing models leads to a lower lrc for this setting again. Table
4 summarizes the results in the same way as demonstrated before.
Table 4 comes about here
What is most significant in Table 4 is the very bad performance of the VaR ap-
proaches, with an underlying normal distribution indicated by more than 75% of the
estimators located in area A. For these, we reveal a quite low lrc of about 37% for the
skewed student-t time series and 32% for the GED time series. These values seem to be
too low when juxtaposed with the result for the normal distribution in the upper part
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of Table 3, where we obtain similar values. For the normal time series, these values are
reliable on average, since the estimators for the 10-step quantiles are accurate on average,
too. However, the theoretical quantiles for the one-step distribution of the unconditional
return distributions of the skewed student-t and GED are considerably higher (see Table
2) indicating a higher risk of extraordinary profits and losses. This fact should result in a
smaller quantile, not only for the one- but also for the ten-step distribution. The reason
for these low values for the lrc might be an underestimation of the unknown quantile
of the ten-step distribution in this context, as with the stable distribution in the previous
subsection. The proportion of estimators located in A and B (see the bottom part of Table
3) increases considerably for the ten-step distribution, especially for historical volatility,
EWMA and also for the historical simulation approach. This is probably also the rea-
son for the low lrc for the historical simulation approach for the student-t and GED time
series.
When looking at the skewed student-t time series, the other model that estimates
the theoretical quantile quite well beside the historical simulation is the SEWMA ap-
proach. But the level of regulatory capital, at about 56%, is much higher for this. In con-
nection with the results for the i.i.d. stable distributed time series (here, a similar result
was obtained for the well-performing stable parameters approach), this result seems to
be more realistic as the estimates here for the one- and ten-step distribution are compara-
bly good. Again, for this scenario, it can be stated that badly performing models lead to
a lower level of regulatory capital.
A closer look at the results for the GED time series (bottom parts of Table 4) clarifies
that the stable approaches overestimate the quantile here, which leads to a very high
level of regulatory capital. Since the lrc is even higher than for the stable distribution (see
bottom part of Table 3), this seems to be as unrealistic as the underestimation for the other
approaches. With regard to this result, it is important to mention that a considerably too
high lrc also implicates negative consequences. If the lrc is significantly too high, there is
more money is in the financial system. Accordingly, this increases the chance for bubbles
and crashes to occur in financial markets.
We can therefore conclude that none of the considered approaches seem to estimate
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the lrc appropriately here. But again it is obvious that the use of badly performing models
leads to a lower lrc.
Recapitulating the facts of this subsection, the normal approaches in particular per-
form quite badly, especially when the time series are generated from random variables of
fat tailed and skewed distributions. Paradoxically, this does not lead to a higher level of
regulatory capital compared to the stable approaches. These approaches adequately esti-
mate the relevant 1%-quantile, especially for the ten-step distribution, which is decisive
for the more precise calculation of regulatory capital. The second effect might be that the
multiplier does not discriminate between well and badly performing models.
5 Conclusions
Several studies conclude that the unconditional return distribution is not normal dis-
tributed, and that volatility tends to cluster. However, the BCBS does not stipulate that
banks use models in which these stylized facts are integrated. In this paper, we focused
on the consequences of different ways of modeling the underlying return distribution.
All approaches are easy to implement, so it is possible to use them in practice. It was
revealed that the models with a poor predictive quality are those where there is no inte-
gration of realistic distributional assumptions. Models that try to characterize the fat tails
of the unconditional return distribution provide much better results. However, banks still
use models with unrealistic assumptions.
The sole reason might not only be the fact that they are easier to implement. The
simulation study makes apparent that the spread of the multiplier between 3 and 4, as
prescribed by the BCBS, does not separate adequately between well and badly perform-
ing models. A good predictive quality of the model and a low level of regulatory capital
are trade offs - which cannot be the aim of the regulatory authority. It is understandable
that banks strive to keep regulatory capital levels low. If it is possible to realize this aim
with badly performing models they will do so or - expressed more drastically - the use
of models with more realistic underlying distributional assumptions seems to be ”pun-
ished” with a higher level of regulatory capital. The consequence seems to be that banks
14
have little interest in implementing better performing approaches.
Adjusting the expression for calculating regulatory capital (equation (7)) might be
a possible solution. Hereby, we should bear in mind that the lrc is calculated adequately
for the respective risk situation, meaning it should be not too low and not not high. A
modification of the equation, which leads to a considerably higher lrc, may have nega-
tive implications for financial market stability, because more money in the system would
increase the risk of financial bubbles and - of course - also crashes.
The first problem of the actual expression that became apparent in the results of the
numerical analysis is the multiplication factor. This plays a decisive role in determining
the regulatory capital, as it is iteratively raised up to a maximum of 4. First it is set to
h = 3, even for models that consider stylized facts. If the backtesting procedure brings
weaknesses forward, it will be raised. But it seems that this procedure favors badly per-
forming methods over methods that estimate the quantile accurately. Bringing the aims
of the BCBS and the supervisory authorities back to mind, this cannot be their target,
since they are interested in an adequate estimation of risk. In contrast, the actual rule
incentives the banks to apply methods with obvious drawbacks.
At this point, it is important to mention that the idea of using such a multiplier is
not bad. Many smaller institutions may have problems in implementing sophisticated
models, such as GARCH models. However, the spread of the multiplier might be raised
so that the implementation of more sophisticated models is honored, whereas banks with
simple models have to suffer from a higher level of regulatory capital. Determining an
adequate spread to reach this goal could be the subject of further research. The models
presented in this paper as alternatives to the normal approaches are not very difficult to
implement, since only one distribution is changed. For this reason, smaller institutions
should also be able to take advantage of them, meaning that an alignment of the multi-
plication factor could also lead to the implementation of more reliable models in smaller
institutes.
The second problem of (7) is that the VaR is calculated based on the ten-step VaR
distribution. As shown in the simulation study, a VaR model that performs well in esti-
mating the theoretical quantile of the one-step distribution, might predict the theoretical
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quantile of the ten-step distribution very inadequately (cp. Tables 3 and 4). The backtest-
ing procedure is based on the one-step distribution, which means that the judgement of
whether a method is acceptable or not is based on another distribution than that one ulti-
mately determining the level of regulatory capital. So this result is quite precarious, since
an underestimation of the theoretical quantile in the ten-step distribution need not nec-
essarily be identified by the backtesting procedure that should guarantee the adequacy
of the method. This problem cannot be solved as easily as the determination of the mul-
tiplication factor. However, due to diversification, it might diminish when performing a
multivariate analysis. The realization of the multivariate analysis in this context could
also be the subject of further research.
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VaR Approach Model Description Residual Distribution Quantile Estimation Literature
Normal approaches
Historical Volatility yi = µ + ui ui = σei Qα(τ|t) = τµ̂ + zα
√
τσ̂ BCBS (2006,
ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1) 718 (LXXVI) (c) and (f))
Danielsson et al. (1998)
EWMA yi = µ + ui ui = σiei; Qα(τ|t) = zα
√
τĥ1|t Zangari (1996)
ht+1 = (1− λ)u2t + λht Holton (2003)
ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1); λ = 0.94
Simulation approach
Historical Simulation One-step: {yi}ni=1 Empirical One-step: Qα(1|t) = q̂α({yi}) McNeil et al. (2004)
τ-step: y˜j,t+τ = ∑τk=1 y˜j,t+k, τ-step: Qα(τ|t) = q̂α({y˜i})
with τ series of {y˜i}ni=1
j = 1, . . . , 5000
Stable approaches
Stable Parameters z˜i = ui ui = δei Qα(τ|t) = κα,βτ 1α δ̂ Mittnik et al. (2002)
ei
i.i.d.∼ S(α, β, 1, 0) Rachev et al. (2003)
SEWMA z˜i = ui ui = δiei Qα(τ|t) = κατ 1α δ̂1|t Ortobelli et al. (2004)
δνt+1 = (1− λ)|z˜t|ν A(ν) + λδνt Lamantia et al. (2004)
ei
i.i.d.∼ S(α, 0, 1, 0); λ = 0.97
zα: α-quantile of the normal distribution; κα;(β): α-quantile of the (asymmetric) stable distribution; Qα(τ|t): α-quantile of the τ-step return distribution; {yi}ni=1: series
of returns; {y˜i}ni=1: series of randomized one step-returns; q̂α({y˜i})(q̂α({yi})): quantile of the (randomized drawn) returns; z˜: centered returns; ht+1/δt+1: Forcast for
t + 1 of the conditional variance/conditional scaling parameter
Table 1: Survey of Value-at-Risk approaches
Additional remarks: The calculation of VaR is realized with (6). For the quantile estimator of the EWMA approach, we assume the usual simplification µ = 0. There
is A(ν) =
Γ(1− ν2 )
√
pi
2νΓ(1− ν2 )Γ( ν+12 )
and ν ∈ (0, α]. For the estimation of ν see Samorodnidsky and Taquu (1994) or Ortobelli et al. (2004). We assume λ = 0.97 according to
Lamantia et al. (2004)
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Distribution Parameters Estimators
Distributions with additivity property
Normal one-step N (µ, σ) µ = 0.00021; σ = 0.01567
Qtheo0.01,1 = −0.0362
Normal ten-step N (µ′ = 10 · µ, σ′ = √10σ) µ′ = 0.00211; σ′ = 0.04954
Qtheo0.01,10 = −0.1132
Stable one-step S(α, β, δ, µ) α = 1.65725; β = −0.18135; δ = 0.00881; µ = −0.00007
Qtheo0.01,1 = −0.0535
Stable ten-step S(α, β, δ′ = 101/α · δ, µ′ = 10 · µ) α = 1.65725; β = −0.18135; δ′ = 0.03535; µ′ = −0.00068
Qtheo0.01,10 = −0.2150
Distributions without additivity property
Skewed student(t) one-step SkS(µ, σ, ν, ξ) µ = 0.00012; σ = 0.01659, ν = 3.54679, ξ = 0.93552
Qtheo0.01,1 = −0.463
Skewed student (t) ten-step - -
GED one-step GED(µ, σ, ν) µ = 0.00087, σ = 0.01563, ν = 1.03591
Qtheo0.01,1 = −0.420
GED ten-step - -
Qtheoα,τ : α-quantile of the theoretical τ-step distribution
Table 2: Parameter estimation of the considered distributions for DAX 30 (08-20-1995 to 06-29-2007)
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Model w −Q0.01(1|t) Area B Area A −Q0.01(10 | t) Area B Area A rz ∅multi. ∅ lrc
Normal time series
Theoretical X 0.0362 0.1132
Hist. Vol. 250 0.0363 0.016 0.000 0.1133 0.110 0.019 0.006 3.05767 0.3258
1000 0.0361 0.012 0.000 0.1133 0.091 0.017 0.004 3.05737 0.3262
EWMA 250 0.0363 0.003 0.000 0.1147 0.000 0.000 0.001 3.0959 0.3339
Hist. Sim. 250 0.0361 0.107 0.011 0.1130 0.127 0.025 0.003 3.0711 0.3267
1000 0.0362 0.094 0.008 0.1132 0.097 0.009 0.006 3.0622 0.3257
St. Parameters 250 0.0408 0.000 0.000 0.1381 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.0119 0.3886
1000 0.0382 0.000 0.000 0.1236 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.0225 0.3576
SEWMA 250 0.0387 0.000 0.000 0.1305 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.0287 0.3675
1000 0.0374 0.000 0.000 0.1209 0.000 0.000 0.006 3.0469 0.3506
Stable time series
Theoretical X 0.0535 0.2150
Hist. Vol. 250 0.0519 0.269 0.071 0.1648 0.712 0.576 0.082 3.1539 0.4790
1000 0.0558 0.174 0.035 0.1774 0.591 0.449 0.047 3.0840 0.5002
EWMA 250 0.0463 0.512 0.210 0.1463 0.886 0.805 0.270 3.3541 0.4540
Hist. Sim. 250 0.0562 0.052 0.006 0.1908 0.468 0.318 0.005 3.0705 0.5278
1000 0.0537 0.078 0.006 0.2354 0.248 0.155 0.010 3.0608 0.6398
St. Parameters 250 0.0540 0.064 0.008 0.2235 0.095 0.031 0.087 3.1197 0.6248
1000 0.0537 0.075 0.017 0.2366 0.151 0.053 0.026 3.0721 0.6037
SEWMA 250 0.0478 0.348 0.042 0.1968 0.319 0.104 0.051 3.1619 0.5638
1000 0.0483 0.295 0.044 0.1860 0.341 0.110 0.027 3.1308 0.5574
w: window length; Qα(τ|t): α-quantile of the τ-step distribution; Area B/Area A: proportion of time series with rejected hypothesis p ≤ Qα(τ|t) to a significance
level of a = 0.1/a = 0.01; rz: proportion of time series, where h = 4 is reached; ∅multi.: average level of the multiplicator; ∅ lrc: average level of regulatory capital
Table 3: Results for the normal and stable time series
Quantile estimators, results for the critical areas, ratio of red zone estimators, average multiplication factor, and average level of
regulatory capital for the time series with normal (upper part) and stable (bottom part) distributed random values
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Model w −Q0.01(1|t) Area B Area A rz ∅multi. ∅ lrc
GED time series
Theoretical X 0.0463
Hist. Vol. 250 0.0379 0.967 0.821 0.251 3.2930 0.3716
1000 0.0380 0.953 0.798 0.254 3.2597 0.3690
EWMA 250 0.0371 0.998 0.951 0.482 3.3687 0.3810
Hist. Sim. 250 0.0469 0.080 0.011 0.002 3.0697 0.3738
1000 0.0464 0.074 0.011 0.006 3.0608 0.3838
St. Parameters 250 0.0605 0.000 0.000 0.011 3.0313 0.6984
1000 0.0602 0.000 0.000 0.001 3.0068 0.6843
SEWMA 250 0.0462 0.05 0.003 0.029 3.0899 0.5596
1000 0.0469 0.022 0.001 0.006 3.0628 0.5579
Skewed student-t time series
Theoretical X 0.0420
Hist. Vol. 250 0.0354 1.000 0.966 0.264 3.3000 0.3251
1000 0.0355 1.000 0.968 0.281 3.2840 0.3237
EWMA 250 0.0358 1.000 0.935 0.313 3.3687 0.3521
Hist. Sim. 250 0.0420 0.094 0.017 0.006 3.0706 0.3089
1000 0.0420 0.098 0.010 0.010 3.060 0.3091
St. Parameters 250 0.0672 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.0021 0.8046
1000 0.0680 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.0001 0.8226
SEWMA 250 0.0489 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.0081 0.6386
1000 0.0498 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.0047 0.6269
w: window length; Qα(τ|t): α-quantile of the τ-step distribution; Area B/Area A: proportion of time series with rejected hypothesis p ≤ Qα(τ|t) to a significance
level of a = 0.1/a = 0.01; rz: proportion of time series, where h = 4 is reached; ∅multi.: average level of the multiplicator; ∅ lrc: average level of regulatory capital
Table 4: Results for the GED and skewed student-t time series
Quantile estimators, results for the critical areas, ratio of red zone estimators, average multiplication factor, and average level of
regulatory capital for the time series with skewed student-t (upper part) and GED (bottom part) distributed random values
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Does Basel II destabilize financial markets?
An agent-based financial market perspective
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We use a financial market model that is able to replicate stylized facts of financial markets
quite successfully. We adjust this model by integrating regulations of Basel II concerning
market risk. The result is a considerable destabilization of the regulated financial market
with a significant increase of extreme events (extraordinary profits and losses). Since
the intention of Basel II regulations is to ensure banks have enough regulatory capital to
withstand periods involving extraordinary losses, it is alarming that - on the contrary -
these regulations may provoke an increase in precisely such extraordinary events.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we use a financial market model with heterogeneous interacting agents to
show that the regulations of Basel II may lead to a destabilization of financial markets.
This is obviously the direct opposite of what the regulatory authority aims to achieve.
In the last two decades, many current topics on economics and finance were illu-
minated with behavioral, agent-based approaches such as heterogeneous agent models
(HAMs) (Hommes, 2006; LeBaron, 2006).1 For instance, economic phenomena such as
the effects of Tobin taxes, central bank interventions, or price limiters on financial mar-
kets were explored with HAMs (Mannaro et al., 2008; Westerhoff & Dieci, 2006; He &
Westerhoff, 2005; Westerhoff, 2003). In this paper, a novel field of broad public interest is
explored using an interacting agent-based approach - the Basel II regulations for market
risk and their consequences for financial markets.
The Basel II framework was implemented to ascertain whether financial institu-
tions had sufficient capitalization. The framework intends to ensure, for instance, that
banks are able to withstand periods involving extraordinary losses in financial markets
(Crouhy et al., 2006).
The ”International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”
(Basel II) allows the capital requirements for market risk to be calculated by means of
a Value-at-Risk (VaR) model when performing the Internal Models Approach. Here, the
Basel Committee for Banking and Supervision (BCBS) does not stipulate that banks use a
special type of model, but provides a special formula to determine the level of regulatory
1For interesting contributions see, for instance, Kirman (1991), Bornholdt (2001), Brock and Hommes (1998),
Chen & Yeh (2002), Farmer & Joshi (2002), de Grauwe & Grimaldi (2005), LeBaron et al. (1999) and
Raberto et al. (2003).
1
capital. On trading days with sharp price decreases, the loss might be higher than the
VaR, and a so-called ”backtesting exception” occurs. The formula considers the VaR and
a multiplication factor that is raised if many backtesting exceptions occur in a quarter.
Hence, the level of regulatory capital (lrc) increases notably on days with backtesting
exceptions, especially if numerous consecutive backtesting exceptions lead to an increase
of the multiplication factor (BCBS, 2006; Kerkhof & Melenberg, 2004).
In view of this situation, banks have two possibilities. On the one hand, they can
raise their level of regulatory capital, although this is quite an expensive option for banks.
On the other hand, they can sell risky assets from their portfolio to lower the risk (Benink
et al., 2008).
In this paper, we explore the consequences of what happens when banks choose the
selling option. Benink et al. (2008) argue that the Basel II regulations lead to a harmoniza-
tion of bank behavior to maintain a special level of regulatory capital. As a result of the
regulations, banks use quite similar trading rules and - therefore - want to sell the same
assets at the same time. We wish to explore and, to a certain extent, quantify the conse-
quences of this bank behavior governed by Basel II regulations on a financial market in
our HAM.
In this respect, we are faced with at least two problems. First, we do not know the
exact number of institutional traders in the market. Consequently, we do not know the
exact number of market participants who are expected to sell assets. The second problem
is that the Basel II framework has only been implemented in national legislation by many
countries for either a short time or not at all. There is therefore a lack of empirical data
to explore this question. We perform a numerical analysis to shed light on this topic. As
it turns out, we find that the ”selling option” may lead to a destabilization of financial
2
markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the starting
point of the numerical analysis, we describe Lux and Marchesi’s (1999, 2000) heteroge-
neous agent model. This model is able to mimic the stylized facts of financial markets
quite successfully. Subsequently, we adjust this model by integrating regulation aspects
of Basel II. In this way, we are able to compare the behavior of financial markets with
and without the regulations determined by the BCBS. In this analysis, we vary the ratios
of institutional investors concerned by the Basel II regulations. In section 3, the proce-
dure concerning the numerical analysis is introduced. Measuring the destabilization of
financial markets by the volatility, Hill tail index and distortion, the results of section 4
provide strong evidence that destabilization may increase when the regulations of Basel
II are adopted. The last section offers a number of conclusions.
2 The model
2.1 Lux and Marchesi’s basic model
The basic model used in our numerical analysis is that of Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000).
This model was inspired by the work of Weidlich and Haag (1983) and Kirman (1991),
and later extended by Alfarano et al. (2005) and Alfarano and Lux (2007), among others.
Interacting agents generate a dynamic model that is able to mimic the stylized facts of
financial markets remarkably well. The following equations constitute the model2. There
are two types of agents: chartists and fundamentalists. Chartists (c) can switch between
optimistic (+) and pessimistic (−) moods, based on the current price trend and the mind-
2Only a brief outline of the model is given. For a detailed description, cp. Lux & Marchesi (2000)
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set of the majority. The opinion index x
x =
n+ − n−
nc
, x ∈ [−1, 1] (1)
defines whether optimistic (x > 0) or pessimistic (x < 0) chartists hold the majority
where n+ and n− are the the number of agents in the respective group and nc is the
total number of chartists. Transitions rates between these two groups within a small time
period ∆t are given by pi+−∆t and pi−+∆t as
pi+− = ν1
( nc
N exp(U1)
)
pi−+ = ν1
( nc
N exp(−U1)
), U1 = α1x + α2 p˙tν1 . (2)
Here, ν1 marks the frequency of opinion revaluation, α1 and α2 describe the importance
attached by agents to the price trend and majority opinion, respectively, pt determines
the market price at time t, and N is the number of all agents. pi+− determines the tran-
sition rate of switching from the group of pessimistic chartists to the group of optimistic
chartists and pi−+ determines the rate of transition in the opposite direction.
Individuals are not only able to switch between the groups of pessimistic and
optimistic chartists. Depending on the expected gains, agents can also switch between
chartists’ and fundamentalists’ strategies. In so doing,
z =
nc
N
, z ∈ [1, 0] (3)
describes the proportion of chartists. Transition rates for changes between the (sub-)
group/s of chartists and fundamentalists are obtained with
pi+ f = ν2
( n+
N exp(U2,1)
)
pi f+ = ν2
(
n f
N exp(−U2,1)
)
pi− f = ν2
( n−
N exp(U2,2)
)
pi f− = ν2
(
n f
N exp(−U2,2)
)
, U2,1 = α3
(
r+ p˙tν2
pt − R− s
∣∣∣∣ p ft −ptpt
∣∣∣∣)
, U2,2 = α3
(
− r+
p˙t
ν2
pt + R− s
∣∣∣∣ p ft −ptpt
∣∣∣∣) ,
(4)
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where ν2 is the frequency of transition, α3 is the pressure exerted by profit differentials,
s is a discount factor for the expected profits, R are the average real returns from other
investments, r is the nominal dividend of the asset, and p ft describes the fundamental
value of the asset at time t. The associated transition rates can be interpreted in the same
way as in formula (2): within a small time period ∆t a change from state b to a is given
by piab∆t.
The third decisive factor for the dynamics of the model is the price formation pro-
cess. Here, positive [resp., negative] excess demand drives the market price upwards
[resp., downwards] by a fixed amount. Following Hommes’ (2006) notation, the rates of
a price change occurring within ∆t are determined by:
pi↑p = min[max [0, β(ED + µ)], 1]
pi↓p = min [−min[0, β(ED + µ)], 1] ,
(5)
where β is a parameter for the reaction speed of the market-maker that realizes the price
adjustment and µ is a noise term. pi↑p and pi↓p are the transition rates for an increase
or decrease of the market price. ED is the excess demand determined by the different
groups of the model as described in section 2.3 below in more detail.
In short, the change in the proportion of pessimistic and optimistic chartists x˙, the
change in the proportion of chartists z˙, and the change in market price p˙t over time are
the driving forces for the dynamics of the model.
This model is the starting point for our further analysis. We would like to explore
how regulations of the BCBS can affect a financial market, as characterized by this model.
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2.2 The Basel II regulations for market risk
Let us now take a closer look at the Basel II regulations concerning market risk. Here, the
BCBS focuses on the cumulative loss distribution of ten trading days. Over a period of at
least 250 trading days (one year) the cumulative loss distribution of a portfolio has to be
estimated by the financial institute. For the determination of the loss distribution, losses
are considered as positive and profits as negative values. The level of regulatory capital
is based on the risk measure Value-at-Risk (VaR).
From a statistical point of view, the VaR is defined as the 1− α quantile of the loss
distribution, where α is a level of significance: 1% for instance. In an economic sense, the
VaR is defined as a threshold or severe loss that is not exceeded at α ∗ 100% of trading
days (Marrison, 2002; McNeil et al., 2005).
However, the loss distribution for ten cumulative losses is difficult to estimate.
When the VaR concerns the loss of investments, the VaR may be obtained from the cor-
responding quantile of the distribution of the returns. This method to calculate VaR is
employed in the numerical analysis of section 3.
According to Reiss and Thomas (2007), we can define the τ-step VaR at time t,
VaRα(τ|t), given the portfolio value at time t with Vt and the quantile of the (cumulative)
τ-step return distribution at time t with Qα(τ|t) with3
VaR1−α(τ|t) = Vt (1− exp ((Qα(τ|t))) . (6)
Since we carry out a univariate analysis, we use Vt = pt. To calculate the VaR there exist
several approaches. The most traditional and employed methods for this calculation are
presented in the Appendix.
The next important aspect is to determine a special VaR model. Since the BCBS
3The bold τ in the formula symbolizes the return distribution for the time period from t to τ days.
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does not prescribe a special model to determine this risk measure, not every bank uses
the same method. VaR models differ mainly with regard to how they characterize the
distribution of the return distribution and how they model volatility. However, it is well
known that institutes mainly use practical VaR methods with simple assumptions rather
than GARCH or related methods proposed by various researchers over the last decade
(Marrison, 2002). Due to this fact, we assume that banks carry out three quite simple VaR
methods - historical volatility, historical simulation, and the EWMA model, which are
described in the appendix. We assume that a third of financial institutes use historical
volatility, the middle third uses historical simulation and the last third uses the EWMA
model. 4
After having defined the VaR, we can present the following formula to determine
the regulatory capital for market risk prescribed by the BCBS (2006, 718 (LXXVI) (i)):
lrc1|t = max
(
h
60
60
∑
i=1
VaR0.99(10|t− i), VaR0.99(10|t)
)
, (7)
where VaR0.99(10|t − i) is the 99%-VaR of the (cumulative) loss distribution of the next
10 periods (days), lrc1|t is the level of regulatory capital in the next period, and h is a
multiplier. The multiplier ranges between h = 3 and h = 4 (Chebyshev’s inequality is
the justification for this range, as described in Stahl (1997) or Danielsson et al. (1998)). It
is a requirement of the bank and supervisory authority to evaluate whether a VaR model
is suitable for capturing risk. For this, a backtesting procedure based on VaR0.99(1|t) has
to be performed. Based on the number of backtesting exceptions, factor h is raised. A
backtesting exception occurs when loss is higher than the VaR in one day. If the multiplier
reaches a level of h = 4, the supervisory authority can force the bank to change its VaR
4However, the results remain quite stable if we assume other combinations of VaR models. An analysis for
the extreme assumption that all financial institutes use the same model clarified this aspect.
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approach. In the Basel II framework, the model is categorized in the green zone for h = 3,
in the yellow zone for 3 < h < 4, and in the red zone for h = 4.
Furthermore, a backtesting exception affects not only h but also VaR0.99(10|t − i).
Hence, both decisive terms in the calculation of the level of regulatory capital are in-
creased when a backtesting exception occurs. How will a bank react to such an incident?
From the point of profit maximization, a bank might strive to keep regulatory cap-
ital low. In contrast to acquiring loan capital, it is much more expensive for a bank to
acquire regulatory capital. Consequently, instead of raising the level of regulatory capi-
tal, a bank might sell risky assets in case of a backtesting exception to maintain regulatory
capital at a moderate level (Benink et al., 2008).
In the next subsection, Lux and Marchesi’s model will be adjusted to explore the
effect of these regulations on financial markets.
2.3 The adjusted model
Our previous considerations are incorporated in the model by introducing a new group
of agents that sells assets on trading days with backtesting exceptions, called ”regulated
traders”. Agents of this group are institutional investors, since Basel II regulations are
only obligatory for them. This does not mean that the group’s market participants re-
nounce their beliefs in the trading rules they previously used. They are more or less
forced by the regulator to behave against their convictions. Benink et al. (2008) allude
here to a ”harmonization” of behavior in this context.
Since Lux and Marchesi’s model is defined in continuous time, it is also important
whether the VaR is exceeded at the beginning or the end of a day. The calculation of
the level of regulatory capital is based on the closing price. Therefore, we define pVaR =
8
pt−1 − VaR0.99(1|t) at integer time steps as the price when an investor suffered a loss
amounting to the VaR. Hereby, pt−1 is the price at the end of the last trading day.5
If the market price falls below the VaR (pVaR > pt) at the beginning of the day,
traders may hope to see a price recovery in the course of the trading day so that no
backtesting exception occurs at the end of the day. In the event of a price recovery above
the VaR level (pVaR < pt), regulated traders will revert to the trading rules in which they
believe, and no traders from the chartist and fundamentalist groups will switch to the
group of regulated traders. The shorter the remaining trading hours are, the higher the
probability that institutional investors will be forced to become regulated and sell risky
assets to prevent a sharp increase in the level of regulatory capital.
The question now is how many institutional investors there are in the market and
how many of them behave in the described manner. This question is impossible to answer
convincingly. For this reason, in the numerical analysis, we vary the proportion of insti-
tutional investors Ninst in the market. In this way, we are able to explore the consequences
if only a small or a larger proportion of the market is regulated by bank supervision.
Due to these preliminary considerations, we add or adjust the following equations.
Only if a backtesting exception occurs (pVaR ≥ pt), institutional chartist/fundamentalist
traders switch from their groups to the group of regulated traders, symbolized by r,
within a small time period ∆t by pir f , pir+ and pir−. If there is no backtesting exception
(pVaR < pt), of course, no agent will switch to the group of regulated traders. After a price
recovery above pVaR (pVaR < pt and pVaR > pt−∆t) they surely switch back to the trading
5Remember that a backtesting exception according to Basel II only occurs when a loss is larger than the
VaR at the end of a trading day. An exceedance of the VaR between two integer time steps is only an
indication that a backtesting exception may occur.
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rules in which they believe according to pi f r, pi+r and pi−r. We obtain
pir f = pir+ = pir− = d
pir f = pir+ = pir− = 0
pi f r = pi+r = pi−r = 1
, if pVaR ≥ pt d ∈ [0, 1]
, if pVaR < pt
, if pVaR < pt and pVaR > pt−∆t,
(8)
where d is the elapsed time from the beginning of a trading day. Here, pVaR is defined at
integer time steps as pVaR = pt−1−VaR0.99(1|t). If price pt is equal to or smaller than pVaR,
the loss associated with VaR0.99(1|t) is realized. pt−∆t symbolizes the price a small time
increment ago. When a backtesting exception diminishes in the course of a trading day all
traders switch back to their respective group. Since they are dependent on the conviction
of traders, the opinion index x and the proportion of chartists z do not change.
With the introduction of the regulated traders, we have to adjust the excess de-
mand function. The reason for this is that regulated traders have to (completely) apply
other trading rules to those of the other groups. In the following, we describe the parts of
the excess demand and especially emphasize the changes compared to Lux and March-
esi’s (1999/2000) basic model for each of the groups of fundamentalists, chartists and
regulated traders.
2.3.1 The fundamentalists’ excess demand
We have to adjust excess demand ED f from Lux and Marchesi’s (1999, 2000) model for
fundamentalists. In this model, the proportion of fundamentalists’ traders 1− z orders
assets when price pt is below the fundamental price p
f
t and sells assets when the price
exceeds the fundamental value. The amount of orders is expressed by Tf . This leads to
ED f = (1− z) Tf (p ft − pt). (9)
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When considering the regulated traders to explore the consequences of the Basel II regu-
lations, equation (9) has to be adjusted. When the price is below the VaR (pt < pVaR), the
expected gains will usually be high for fundamentalists, since the market price is usually
below the fundamental price on trading days with backtesting exceptions. This means
that fundamentalists usually want to buy assets when such a backtesting exception oc-
curs. However, in order to obtain an adequate level of regulation capital, fundamentalist
traders are forced to sell risky assets in such a situation if the Basel II regulations apply to
them. They have to switch to the group of regulated traders v = Nr/N, where Nr is the
total number of traders governed by Basel II regulations. As a part of this group, the pro-
portion of fundamentalists that have to switch groups is denoted v f . Depending on the
occurrence of a backtesting exception, fundamentalists’ excess demand can be formalized
as follows in the adjusted model:
ED f = (1− z) Tf (p ft − pt)
ED f = (1− z− v f ) Tf (p ft − pt)
, if pVaR < pt.
, if pVaR ≥ pt.
(10)
At time steps with backtesting exceptions, the proportion of regulated fundamen-
talists v f has to follow the rules of the regulation authority. This fraction is therefore
subtracted from the total number of traders together with the proportion of chartists z,
so that the proportion shrinks to (1− z− v f ). All other elements of the fundamentalists’
excess demand remain constant, as described in (9). The consequences for the chartists’
excess demand are explored in the next subsection.
2.3.2 Chartists’ excess demand
In Lux and Marchesi’s (1999, 2000) model we find two groups of chartists – optimistic and
pessimistic ones. Chartists chase price trends and – depending on the price development
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– we have either more pessimistic (opinion index x is negative) or optimistic (opinion
index x is positive) chartists. Hence, the excess demand consisting of the opinion index
x, the proportion of chartists z and the number of orders placed by the chartists Tc is
EDc = x z Tc, if pVaR < pt. (11)
When we define the excess demand for the model with regulated traders, we should
bear in mind the behavior of the two different chartist groups. For optimistic chartists, the
same holds true as for the fundamentalists’ group. They want to buy assets and are forced
by the regulation authority to do the opposite at time steps with backtesting exceptions
if pt < pVaR. Hence, we have to subtract the group of regulated optimistic chartists v+
from the group of chartists z when adjusting their excess demand for time steps with
backtesting exceptions:
EDc = x (z− v+) Tc, if pVaR ≥ pt. (12)
Since pessimistic chartists will sell risky assets in any case, they play a special role. If
the pessimistic chartists who are affected by the regulations wish to sell more assets than
they are forced to sell, they will sell them anyway. The excess demand generated by the
regulated pessimistic chartists applying their usual chartists’ rules is given as ED−;c. Pes-
simistic chartists are only affected by the regulations if the regulated pessimistic chartists
are forced to sell more assets than planned. The excess demand generated by the pes-
simistic chartists if forced to apply regulations is given as ED−;r. We only have to subtract
the group of regulated pessimistic chartists v− in addition to v+ if | ED−;r |>| ED−;c |.
Together with (11) and (12), we then obtain the following case distinction for the chartists’
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excess demand:
EDc = x z Tc
EDc = x (z− v+) Tc
EDc = x (z− v+ − v−) Tc
, if pVaR < pt
, if pVaR ≥ pt and | ED−;c |>| ED−;r | .
, if pVaR ≥ pt and | ED−;c |≤| ED−;r |
(13)
Finally, we take a closer look at the excess demand of the newly introduced group
– the regulated traders.
2.3.3 The excess demand of regulated traders
The group of regulated traders consists of institutional investors from the groups of fun-
damentalists, as well as optimistic and pessimistic chartists who are affected by the regu-
lations. However, the different groups are affected by backtesting exceptions in different
ways, as described in the previous subsections.
Of course, when no backtesting exceptions occur, there is no need to apply regula-
tions. We have
EDr = 0 if pVaR < pt. (14)
We use a similar rule for excess demand of the regulated traders EDr as for the
fundamentalists’ excess demand for time steps with backtesting exceptions. Here, we
combine the amount of EDr with the amount by which the VaR is extended. Hence, we
obtain the plausible setting that the higher the VaR is extended, the greater the reaction
of regulated traders. This is conceptually similar to modeling the fundamentalists’ excess
demand. For them, the gap between the market price and the fundamental price is deci-
sive to excess demand. For regulated traders, the gap between the market price and the
VaR is crucial. Tr is the number of units sold by regulated traders.
If only fundamentalists and optimistic chartists are governed by the regulations (v f
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and v+), we obtain
EDr = (v+ + v f ) Tr (pt − pVaR), if pVaR ≥ pt and | ED−;c |>| ED−;r | . (15)
Remember that this occurs if the excess demand of the regulated pessimistic
chartists who apply chartists’ trading rules is higher than the excess demand of the regu-
lated pessimistic chartists who apply regulations.
If the opposite holds true, traders from all groups will be affected by the regula-
tions. Therefore, it follows that
EDr = (v f + v+ + v−) Tr (pt − pVaR), if pVaR ≥ pt and | ED−;c |≤| ED−;r | . (16)
When we combine equations (14), (15) and (16), we obtain the following case dis-
tinction for the excess demand of regulated traders
EDr = 0
EDr = (v+ + v f ) Tr (pt − pVaR)
EDr = (v f + v+ + v−) Tr (pt − pVaR)
, if pVaR < pt.
, if pVaR ≥ pt and | ED−;c |>| ED−;r | .
, if pVaR ≥ pt and | ED−;c |≤| ED−;r | .
(17)
According to the excess demand of Lux and Marchesi’s model, the total excess de-
mand of the adjusted model is the excess demand of chartists and fundamentalists plus
the excess demand of regulated traders:
ED = EDc + ED f + EDr. (18)
The remaining question is how market stability is measured.
2.4 Measuring market stability
With regard to measures for market stability, it is useful to focus on extraordinary events.
As previously mentioned, the BCBS identifies extraordinary losses as being especially
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problematic for financial institutes, meaning that an increase in such losses is one of the
main reasons why financial stability is compromised. In the following, we introduce three
measures that give us an idea of the amount of extraordinary losses and the risk of them
occurring6.
Extraordinary losses mainly occur in relation to volatility clusters. If more volatility
clusters occur, the average volatility usually increases. Hence, the average volatility is a
useful measure of market stability. The smaller its value, the higher the stability of the
financial market. We define volatility simply as the standard deviation of the returns:
V =
√√√√ 1
T
T
∑
t=1
(
Yt −Y
)2
. (19)
The returns Yt are defined as Yt = ln pt − ln pt−1 at integer time steps. In the nu-
merical analysis of chapter 4, we consider time series with T = 7000 observations.
However, BCBS’ incentives in choosing the VaR as the relevant risk measure for
internal models are to capture the extreme events and be prepared for their occurrence
(McNeil et al., 2005). In this context, the Hill tail index is a crucial additional measure
to report the incidence of these extreme events. To calculate the index, the returns of a
sample are first arranged in descending order YT > YT−1 > · · · > Yt−k > · · · > Y1. Here,
k denotes the number of observations in the tail of the sample. The Hill tail index can be
then estimated via
αH =
(
1
k
k
∑
i=1
(ln | YT−i+1 | − ln | YT−k |)
)−1
. (20)
According to Lux and Ausloos (2002), 2.5% and 5% are often used as tail fractions. Inter-
preting the tail index αH, we can estimate the number of existing moments. For instance,
6These measures are also used in other surveys to describe financial market stability, such as in Westerhoff
(2008).
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an αH below 2 indicates that no second moment (hence, no variance) exists. Thus, a Hill
index below 3.5 indicates three existing moments. Therefore, the Hill index is quite ap-
propriate here to measure the change in the number of extremal events as a consequence
of the regulations. The lower the Hill index, the lower the stability of the financial market,
since more extraordinary losses occur.
Additionally, we consider the distortion of the financial market. A short explana-
tion is necessary with regard to its definition. Since we know the fundamental value for
every time step, we can calculate the mean absolute deviation between the realized log
price and the log fundamental price. Distortion D is therefore defined as:
D =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
| ln pt − ln p ft | (21)
with t at integer time steps. If the financial market is highly distorted, there is a
higher risk of the emergence of bubbles and crashes. If the price greatly exceeds the fun-
damental value, there is a high risk that many agents will become fundamentalists. If this
happens, the price reverts to the fundamental value quite rapidly increasing the risk of
extraordinary losses. Distortion is therefore also quite a relevant measure of the stability
of the financial market.
After introducing a model and measures of stability that are able to shed light on
the consequences of the Basel II regulations for financial markets, we will now focus
on how the numerical analysis is performed in the following section to obtain reliable
results.
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3 The numerical analysis
The procedure concerning the numerical analysis is the same as described in Lux and
Marchesi (2000). The technical details of the simulation procedure are described in de-
tail in their work7. However, for a better understanding of the results, it is necessary to
describe how the small time period ∆t of the transition rates is chosen in the numerical
analysis. Although the dynamics of the model is continuous in time, we discretize time
in the simulations. For this, it is important choosing ∆t sufficient small to obtain reliable
results. Lux and Marchesi (2000) carried out the following approach inspired by micro
simulations in the area of mean field approximations.
They distinguish between normal times and high volatility times during volatility
outbursts. In normal times the small time period ∆t that is necessary to determine the
transition rates in the simulation is set to 0.01. During volatility outbursts the simula-
tions’ precision is increased by a factor 5 by fixing ∆t to 0.002. The consequence of this is
a division of the rates given in formulae (2) and (4) by 100 or 500, respectively, in the nu-
merical analysis. Then, we obtain the probability for a change of the trading rule within
the time interval [t, t + ∆t] for any single agent. Consequently, there are 100 to 500 possi-
bilities for any agent to switch to another (sub-)group depending on the precision of the
simulation.8
7One additional aspect has to be considered in connection with the regulated traders. Lux and Marchesi
(2000) identify two absorbing states: z = 0 and z = 1. They avoid these absorbing states in the numerical
analysis by preventing agents from changing their strategy when less than four members remain in the
respective groups. Furthermore, concerning the adjusted model we assume that these remaining mem-
bers are not institutional investors, since they would be forced to change groups at the end of a trading
day if a backtesting exception occurs. By doing so, a breakdown of the simulation in the absorbing states
can be prevented.
8The further proceeding is the same like in Lux and Marchesi’s simulations. The actual value of the transi-
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Lux and Marchesi mention the lack of empirical observations concerning the pa-
rameters of their model. Since no empirical data is available yet, we use the same pa-
rameter setting as the two authors.9 For a financial market without regulated traders,
if Ninst = 0, we confirmed the results of Lux and Marchesi and received typical styl-
ized facts of financial markets. Besides the appearance of volatility clusters, we observe
leptokurtic or heavy-tailed return series. Furthermore, the returns appear symmetrical
around zero, and the absolute and squared returns time series exhibit considerable serial
correlation, whereas the time series of the returns show only little correlation.
In the next section, we will present our results for varying proportions of institu-
tional investors of 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% (thus, Ninst = 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250).
Regarding Tr, we assume Tr = Tf . This is a conservative assumption for the orders placed
in the market by regulated traders. For the parameter sets I - IV proposed by Lux and
Marchesi, chartists place at least as many orders as fundamentalists. If we raise Tr to
the level Tc of chartists, the (negative) excess demand of the regulated traders is even
stronger on days with backtesting exceptions. Hence, even more assets would be sold by
the regulated traders. This causes an even higher price decay.
In the following, we test how the artificial financial market (thus, how the stylized
facts and three market stability parameters) reacts to Basel II regulations for the different
situations.
tion rate is compared with a random number obtained from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. If the random
number is smaller than the transition rate, the transition into the respective group occurs. If it is greater,
no change occurs.
9Lux and Marchesi confirm the results of their model for four different parameter sets. Here we use set II.
Its results are assessed as very realistic by Lux/Marchesi (2000): ν1 = 4, ν2 = 1, β = 4, Tc = 7.5, Tf = 5,
α1 = 0.9, α2 = 0.25, α3 = 1, p
f
t = 10, r = 0.004, R = 0.0004, and s = 0.75. We obtain very similar results
for the other three sets, as for the chosen set II.
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4 Results
We first analyze the results for one selective time series. We juxtapose the results for
volatility, distortion, and the Hill index (with a tail sample of 5%). The results are pre-
sented in Figure 1. The left panels show the dynamics for the financial market without
regulations. In the middle panels, 10% of traders are institutional investors who have to
follow regulations. In the right panels this proportion increases to 40%.
Figure 1 comes about here
Comparing the return time series, we observe a profound increase of destabilization con-
cerning volatility, as Table 1 shows. In the return time series of the financial market with a
10% proportion of institutional investors (mid upper panel of Figure 1), we identify more
pronounced and more frequently emerging volatility clusters than in the basic situation,
where no Basel II regulations are integrated in the model (left upper panel). However,
severe profits and losses of approximately over 8% do not occur very frequently. This as-
pect changes significantly for the financial market with a proportion of 40% institutional
investors (right upper panel of Figure 1). Here, very high profits and losses up to 12% can
be realized much more frequently with unaltered significant volatility clusters.
Table 1 comes about here
The middle panels of Figure 1 present a considerable increase in extreme events. Com-
paring the histograms’ tails of the return series, we can identify more returns larger than
6% for a proportion of 10% institutional investors (mid bottom panels) and - of course -
also for a proportion of 40% institutional investors. Table 1 underlines these results with
considerably decreasing values for the Hill tail index. With regard to distortion, we are
unable to identify significant differences between the regulated time series and the basic
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model.
The BCBS chose the VaR as a risk measure to determine the level of regulatory
capital to ascertain whether banks are prepared for extreme events. Paradoxically, the
extreme events were able to increase due to the BCBS’s own regulations.
Before exploring the results for the market stability parameters more generally, we
would like to analyze the newly introduced group of regulated traders in further detail.
Figure 2 aims to shed light on this topic.
Again, the upper panels present the return time series - the left represents a propor-
tion of 10% institutional investors whereas the right shows the situation for a proportion
of 40%. The three panels below present the proportion of agents that had to explore the
regulations during one trading day or - in other words - the proportion of agents that use
regulations against their convictions during one trading day. Remember that - depen-
dent on the volatility - there are 100 to 500 time steps on each trading days considered
in the numerical analysis. At each time step there are 500 agents using either chartists’
(optimistic or pessimistic) or fundamentalists’ strategies (cp. section 3). If a backtesting
exception occurs, some of the institutional traders have to apply the regulations deter-
mined by the BCBS. The mid upper panel presents the proportion of regulated traders
that believe in optimistic chartists’ trading rules (inst+). The other two panels are inter-
preted in the same way as the mid-upper panels for a proportion of regulated traders
that believe in pessimistic chartists’ trading rules (inst−; mid-bottom panel), and funda-
mentalists’ trading rules (inst f ; bottom panel), respectively.10
Figure 2 comes about here
10Remember that only at the end of the day all institutional investors apply regulations. Therefore, the
proportion never sums up to the number of institutional investors in the market
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At time steps with significant volatility clusters, this proportion increases with re-
gard to both quantity and maximum value, especially for the groups of chartists. We
conclude that backtesting exceptions occur more frequently in these time periods. As
the chartists’ proportions are higher during the volatility clusters (cp. Lux & Marchesi
(2000)), it is obvious that their proportion will increase more significantly here compared
to the fundamentalist proportion. In the fundamentalist group, on the other hand, we
recognize an increase in frequency of backtesting exceptions rather than in maximum
values connected with volatility clusters. However, we can also say that the proportion
of regulated traders and, consequently, the number of agents applying regulation rules
is quite low on average. This rate rarely increases above 2% for the chartist groups (for a
proportion of 10% and 40% institutional investors) and 10% for the fundamentalist group
(for 40% institutional investors).
Note, that a change in the group of regulated traders does not necessarily mean
a higher number of orders or absolute excess demand placed in the market. The panels
merely presents the proportion of chartists and fundamentalists who are forced to apply
other trading rules. The number of orders can even decrease when applying this rule if a
regulated trader sells few assets as a regulated trader (represented by a slightly negative
excess demand) instead of buying many assets as a fundamentalist (represented by a
highly positive excess demand).
However, it becomes apparent that, on average, especially for 10% institutional
investors (left panels of Figure 2) low proportions of traders forced to apply regulations
as ”trading rules” cause the significant destabilization of the financial market described
above (cp. Figure 1).
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The results analyzed at the beginning of this section (cp. Figure 2) for the market
stability parameters are confirmed in a broader simulation study with 200 time series.
Indeed, as the upper panel of Figure 3 emphasizes, a significant increase in volatility can
be observed. The boxplots visualize the results for varying proportions of institutional
investors governed by regulations (from top to bottom 50%, 40%, 30% 20%, and 10%).
We identify that the average volatility (black disk of the boxplots of Figure 3) increases
constantly over 10% with increasing proportions of institutional investors. The boxplots
visualize how the average volatility of each of the 200 time series is distributed. Not
only the mean but also the median and quantiles increase considerably with increasing
proportions of institutional investors. However, we can also identify larger variations
from the mean - probably due to the clustered volatility. There are more severe outliers
on the right-hand side than on the left-hand side of the boxplots. This can be interpreted
by the fact that unanticipated risky times (represented by the T = 7000 days of each time
series) with an average volatility of up to 1.6% seem to be more likely to occur than calm
times with volatility below 1.0%.
The results concerning the Hill index in the middle panel of Figure 4 are quite
significant. For this measure, we identify a constant and considerable decrease with in-
creasing proportions of institutional investors. The median and quantiles of the boxplots
also decrease relatively constantly, albeit, as with volatility, often with larger variations
from the mean. This decrease can be interpreted as a severe increase in extraordinary
profits and losses in the market, which - as already mentioned above - is contrary to the
intention of the BCBS when it issued the regulations. By contrast, for the results concern-
ing distortion (bottom panel), we are unable to identify a clear increase or decrease. The
positions of the mean, median and quantiles are relatively constant.
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Figure 3 comes about here
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the impacts of Basel II regulations concerning market risk. For this
purpose, we integrated crucial regulations into a model with interacting agents that are
able to replicate stylized facts of financial markets very realistically.
The main result of the numerical analysis is a destabilization of the artificial finan-
cial market if some agents have to follow regulations. We can interpret this as follows:
if banks wish to keep regulatory capital low and sell assets to reach this target, the fi-
nancial market may be destabilized compared to a situation in which regulations are
applied. Even for small proportions of traders who are affected by the regulations, this re-
sult is highly significant. Since the Basel II regulations intend to ascertain whether banks
have sufficient regulatory capital to withstand periods involving extraordinary losses, it
is alarming that - on the contrary - these regulations may cause an increase in precisely
these extraordinary events.
Regarding the account for new regulation rules in view of the present financial
market crises, it may be a good idea to force banks to maintain higher financial security
in calm times with low volatility. Although the VaR is lower and less backtesting excep-
tions occur in calm times, it is important for financial institutes to get prepared for more
turbulent times by means of a higher lrc. In combination with a relaxation of regulations
concerning regulatory capital in turbulent times, this may lead to a stabilization of finan-
cial markets. It could be an interesting challenge for further research to explore the con-
sequences of regulations in more detail - especially in times with sharp price decreases -
in order to find adequate regulations to achieve greater market stability.
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Appendix: Value-at-Risk approaches
In the numerical analysis, we use three VaR approaches commonly used in practice11
(Holton, 2003). The formal description can be found in Table 2, together with a number
of references.
Table 2 comes about here.
The first approach – the historical volatility approach – works with quite simple
underlying assumptions of a normal distribution for the returns and equally weighted
historical observations for the returns. This approach was proposed indirectly by the
BCBS (2006, 718 (LXXVI) (c) and (f)). The reason for the simple distributional assump-
tion is substantiated by the use of the ten-step loss distribution to calculate the level of
regulatory capital (cp. formula (7)). Here, the normal distribution fulfills the additivity
property. It is therefore applied, although it is unrealistic to assume the normal distribu-
tion for return distributions (Danı´elsson et al. (1998)). Due to its importance, the τ-step
quantile estimator is also depicted in Table 2.
The second approach, the exponential weighted moving average model (EWMA),
also assumes a normal distribution for the returns of the historical time series. However,
contrary to historical volatility, it weights recent returns higher by a decay factor λ. Thus,
it is possible to capture the typical volatility clusters for financial time series.
The historical simulation focuses on the distributional assumption to predict the
VaR more realistically than the historical volatility. It uses the empirical distribution of
11A survey study conducted among German banks clarified that these VaR are mainly applied in practice
(Homburg & Scherpereel (2005))
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the historically observed returns and predicts the ten-step return distribution by means
of a bootstrap procedure. However, these historical observations are equally weighted as
for historical volatility.
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.Market Stability 0% inst. 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Parameters investors
Volatility 0.01139 0.01271 0.01206 0.01326 0.01331 0.01392
Distortion 0.00824 0.00932 0.00842 0.00922 0.00920 0.00914
Hill Index 4.36776 4.05135 3.55399 3.31062 2.97629 2.55314
Table 1: Estimates for the selected time series
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VaR Approach Model Description Residual Distribution Quantile Estimation Literature
Normal approaches
Historical Volatility yi = µ + ui ui = σei Qα(τ|t) = τµ̂ + zα
√
τσ̂ BCBS (2006,
ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1) 718 (LXXVI) (c) and (f))
Danielsson et al. (1998)
EWMA yi = µ + ui ui = σiei; Qα(τ|t) = zα
√
τĥ1|t Zangari (1996)
ht+1 = (1− λ)u2t + λht Holton (2003)
ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1); λ = 0.94
Simulation approach
Historical Simulation One-step: {yi}ni=1 Empirical One-step: Qα(1|t) = q̂α({yi}) McNeil et al. (2004)
τ-step: y˜j,t+τ = ∑τk=1 y˜j,t+k, τ-step: Qα(τ|t) = q̂α({y˜i})
with τ series of {y˜i}ni=1
j = 1, . . . , 5000
zα: α-quantile of the normal distribution; Qα(τ|t): α-quantile of the τ-step return distribution; {yi}ni=1: series of returns; {y˜i}ni=1: series of randomized one-step
returns; q̂α({y˜i}) and q̂α({yi}): quantiles of the respective series; ht+1: forecast for t + 1 of the conditional variance. For the quantile estimator of the EWMA
approach, we assume the usual simplification µ = 0.
Table 1: Survey of Value-at-Risk approaches
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Figure 1: Destabilization of the financial market with an increase of the fraction of insti-
tutional investors
Left panels: the top panel presents the return series, whereas the middle panel shows
the tails of the histogram of returns, and the bottom panel presents the volatility of the
regulated situation for the basic model without regulations.
Middle panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left panels, albeit for
a 10% proportion of institutional investors.
Right panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left and middle panels,
albeit for a 40% proportion of institutional investors.
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Figure 2: Analysis of transactions by institutional investors
Left panels: the top panel presents the return series for the regulated financial market
with a proportion of 10% institutional investors. The following three panels show, from
top to bottom, the proportion of optimistic chartists, pessimistic chartists and fundamen-
talists.
Right panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the middle panels, albeit
for a 40% proportion of institutional investors.
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Figure 3: Results for the market stability measures
From top to bottom: results for the market stability parameters volatility, Hill index, and
distortion
Top panel: the volatility for a proportion of 50% (top), 40%, 30%, 30% 10%, and 0% (bot-
tom) institutional investors. The left side of the box represents the 25% quantile, the right
the 75% quantile of the average volatility of the simulated time series. The horizontal line
represents the range of the the minimum and maximum of all the 200 time series. The
mid vertical line represents the median, whereas the black dot is the mean of the average
volatility.
Mid and bottom panels: the same setup for the Hill index and distortion.
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Using a financial market model with heterogeneous interacting agents, we compare the
Basel II framework with the new Basel III framework. We find that the Basel III frame-
work has a greater influence on financial market stability than the Basel II regulations.
The reason is a renunciation of the strict concept of using the most recent observations
to calculate the level of regulatory capital for market risk with the introduction of the
stressed Value-at-Risk. Under usual conditions the Basel III framework leads to a stabi-
lization of the financial market whereas more extreme events sometimes are possible.
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1 Introduction
In 2007, the subprime crisis led to one of the most dramatic financial crises in recent
decades. The breakdown of financial institutions (Lehman and Kaupthing) and bailouts
(Bear Stearns, AIG and Northern Rock) followed. Many decision makers in politics, eco-
nomics and in the scientific community believe that funding problems or too low levels
of regulatory capital could have been the driving force behind these financial institutions’
financial problems (Portes 2008, Brunnermeier 2009, Shin 2009, Wellink 2011).
At the start of the financial crisis, the “International Convergence of Capital Mea-
surement and Capital Standards” (Basel II) announced by the “Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision” (BCBS) governed the calculation of regulatory capital (BCBS 2006). The
Basel II framework was criticized for many reasons both prior to and especially during
the financial crisis (Danielsson et al. 2001). The BCBS (2009) therefore raised the level of
regulatory capital for market risk for financial institutions using an internal model (as
most financial institutions do) by adding an additive term called the ”stressed Value-
at-Risk” (sVaR). Additionally, in the Basel III framework the overall level of regulatory
capital was raised to achieve greater financial stability (BCBS 2010).
The effects of these changes are hard to analyze. There is no or little empirical data
available since the changes will only become stepwise valid by 2013. Initial results with
general equilibrium models indicate an improvement of key macroeconomic variables
(Angelini et al. 2011).
However, many researchers have challenged the reliability of these models regard-
ing the analysis of financial markets (Lux/Westerhoff 2009). It is virtually impossible to
analyze the effects on financial markets by general equilibrium models due to the dy-
namic behavior of return time series provoking typical stylized facts of financial markets
such as volatility clustering and heavy-tailed return distributions (McNeil et al. 2006,
Chen et al. 2008). However, it is extremely important to analyze the Basel III framework
with an instrument that is capable of replicating these specific attributes. We therefore
use a heterogeneous agent model (HAM) introduced by Brock/Hommes (1998) and ad-
justed by Franke/Westerhoff (2011) to evaluate the possible effects caused by the above-
mentioned adjustments of the Basel II framework.
Over the last decade, many issues of economic policy that greatly influence finan-
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cial market stability such as the Tobin tax (Westerhoff/Dieci 2006; Mannaro et al. 2008),
central bank interventions (Westerhoff 2003), shortselling issues (Anufriev/Tuinstra
2010) and the Basel II framework (Hermsen 2010b) have been investigated by HAMs. An
overview about this strand of research can be found in Chiarella et al. (2009), Hommes
(2006), LeBaron (2006), Lux (2009) and Westerhoff (2008).
Without doubt, the Basel frameworks have had a strong impact on financial mar-
kets. Financial institutions aim to have regulatory capital just above the minimum capital
requirements, since regulatory capital is more expensive than loan capital. This effect will
become even more marked because an additional new aspect of the Basel III framework
is a strengthened capital base, which means that more (expensive) common equity must
be part of the regulatory capital (Wellink 2011). If the necessary regulatory capital is too
high above the minimal required regulatory capital, it might be the best way for finan-
cial institutions to sell risky assets to reduce the necessary regulatory capital. In other
words, the Basel frameworks influence the demand of financial markets because some
market participants are forced to trade on account of these regulations (Hermsen 2010b).
The interesting question is whether the newly introduced instruments are able to stabi-
lize financial markets more effectively than the Basel II framework, which was unable to
cope with the challenges of the financial crisis. To be precise, in this paper we explore
how financial market stability is influenced by the Basel III framework compared to the
previously valid Basel II framework.
The remainder of the the paper is as follows. First, we include Basel II and III reg-
ulations into a heterogeneous agent mode by Franke and Westerhoff (2011). Section 3
explains how specific details of these frameworks are incorporated into this model and
describes how the simulations were conducted. Sections 4 and 5 deal with the results
of these simulations. Here, Section 4 takes one representative time series into account,
whereas a Monte Carlo simulation with results for 100 time series is highlighted in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 discusses the results of the two previous sections, and Section 7 concludes
the paper.
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2 The model
The basic model used in this paper introduced by Franke/Westerhoff (2011) uses the
Discrete Choice Approach of Brock/Hommes’ model (1998). Franke/Westerhoff (2011)
compare many heterogeneous agent models in their paper. Here, it was evaluated best
regarding many stylized facts of financial markets, such as capturing volatility clustering,
declining autocorrelation of squared returns, fat tails of the return distribution and a lack
of autocorrelation of raw returns. Therefore, we choose this model for an implemention
of the Basel II/III regulations. The procedure is similar as in Hermsen (2010b), although
there the model by Lux/Marchesi was adjusted for the Basel II regulations in a similar
way.
In Franke/Westerhoff’s approach the price formation is modeled by a market
maker balancing the weighted excess demand and supply of agents in the previous pe-
riod dt−1. We obtain
pt = pt−1 + µ · dt−1 (1)
with pt as the logarithmic price on day t. Furthermore, it is dependent on the price of the
previous day pt−1 and a constant factor µ. Excess demand dt is defined as
dt = n
f
t z
f
t + n
c
t z
c
t + n
reg
t z
reg
t . (2)
We see that dt is determined by the trading signals of the groups of fundamental-
ists and chartists z ft and z
c
t , respectively, weighted by group shares n
f
t and n
c
t , as in
Franke/Westerhoff (2011). Additionally, the last term is necessary to add traders affected
by regulations, called ”regulated traders” (reg). If there is no need for regulation, the last
term is omitted and formula (1) appears as in Franke/Westerhoff (2011). Their trading
signal and weight is simultaneously modeled and denoted by zregt and n
reg
t . We require
the weighted demand in Section 5.1 to analyze the impact of regulated traders on the
model dynamics. Hence, we additionally define the weighted demand for each group by
d f ;c,regt = n
f ;c,reg
t · z f ;c;regt . (3)
Sales by regulated traders are “forced” sales. The regulatory authority forces agents who
are actually convinced of fundamentalists’ or chartists’ trading strategies to sell assets.
3
Formulae for the chartists’ and fundamentalists’ trading signals remain the same
as in the basic model, hence, we obtain
z ft = φ(p
∗ − pt) + σ ft e ft with e ft ∼ N(0, 1) (4)
zct = χ(pt − pt−1) + σct ect with ect ∼ N(0, 1). (5)
As in Franke/Westerhoff (2011), the fundamentalists’ trading signal is positive/negative
if the price is below/above the fundamental value p∗ of the asset. The chartists’ trading
signal is positive/negative if the price trend increases/decreases. φ and χ are reaction
parameters of the demand of fundamentalists and chartists. The noise terms capture de-
viations from the basic trading rules caused by individual divergences from the above
trading rules, as substantiated in detail in Franke/Westerhoff (2011).
It is well known in the literature that both regulatory authorities and financial in-
stitutions define minimum limits lrcmin for their level of regulatory capital. The Basel III
framework, in particular, as an extension of the Basel II framework, uses an increase of
these minimum limits as a method to extend the overall level of regulatory capital to
avoid further financial crises such as those that occurred over the last five years. The
formula of the trading signal of regulated traders is similar to the modeling of funda-
mentalists’ demand. The demand generated by fundamentalists and regulated traders
is dependent on the extent to which a certain threshold – fundamental price p∗ for fun-
damentalists and the minimum level of regulatory capital lrcmin – is exceeded. We then
compare them with the reference values – the price p for the fundamentalists and the
level of regulatory capital lrcmr for regulated traders – to model the trading signal.
zregt =− ρ
lrcmrt−1 − lrcmin
lrcmin
if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin
zregt =0 if lrc
mr
t−1 < lrcmin
(6)
Figure 1 explains how the trading signal of regulated traders functions. If the minimum
level of regulatory capital lrcmin is exceeded by the level of regulatory capital lrcmr,
calculated based on the portfolio held by the financial institution (lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin), a
fraction Nreg of regulated traders are not allowed to apply their usual trading rules,
but have to sell risky assets from their portfolio. During time periods 7600 to 7900 and
4
8000 to 8250 in Figure 1, the gray shaded area marks the exceedance of lrcmin in the
top panel. The consequence is that riskier assets are sold, shown in the bottom panel
by the negative excess demand zreg of regulated traders. Otherwise, regulated traders
would be forced to generate more regulatory capital, which is quite expensive for a finan-
cial institution, especially in times of financial crises as we have seen (liquidity problems).
Figure 1 comes about here.
The more the limit is exceeded, the more riskier assets have to be sold to avoid an
extensively high level of regulatory capital way above the minimum level of regulatory
capital. In Figure 1, we recognize at the peaks for the time series of lrcmr around time
steps 7800 and 8100 in the top panel, the lowest values for the time series of zreg in the
bottom panel. Hence, the most risky assets are sold by regulated traders here.
If the level of regulatory capital is below the minimum capital requirements
(lrcmrt−1 < lrcmin) agents of the groups of fundamentalists and chartists follow the trad-
ing rules in which they believe and no legal restrictions have to be applied, since the
necessary level of regulatory capital is below the minimum level of regulatory capital
and, therefore, there is no tendency for banks to keep regulatory capital low. These pe-
riods are not marked in the top panel in Figure 1. Therefore, zreg in the bottom panel is
zero in periods without legal restrictions. We assume that at least the minimum level of
regulatory capital is always held by a financial institution.
ρ in Formula (6) is chosen such that the overall absolute excess demand approxi-
mates a situation without regulation and is – due to the similarity of the fundamentalists’
trading rules – in the simulations chosen with ρ = θ (cp. Formula (4)). Furthermore,
we assume the proportion of chartists and fundamentalists affected by regulations to be
equal.
According to Franke and Westerhoff’s (2001) model, the weights of fundamental-
ism/chartism are determined by
n f ,belt =
1
1+ exp(−βat−1)
nc,belt =1− n f ,belt
(7)
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where β is the intensity of choice (Brock/Hommes 1998; Franke/Westerhoff 2011). In this
formula, at is defined as
at =αn(n
f ,bel
t − nc,belt ) + α0 + αp(pt − p∗)2. (8)
Franke and Westerhoff (2001) call this formula the attractiveness index. In the HPM varia-
tion of their model chosen here, attractiveness is determined by agents’ herding behavior
of the agents (first term), predisposition of the former strategy (second term) and the
misalignment of the price (third term). αn ≥ 0 and αp ≥ 0 are strictly positive constants1.
It is only important to know which trading rule the agents believe in (for this pur-
pose, we add the suffix ”bel” to n f /ct ). If the risk of the portfolio is low and if only the
minimum regulatory capital requirements are necessary (lrct−1 < lrcmin), the agents be-
have according to the trading rules of which they are convinced. If they use regulations,
they are not convinced of this trading rule but have to apply regulations since the mini-
mum level of regulatory capital lrcmin is exceeded by the level of regulatory capital lrcmrt ,
so there is lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin. A special maximum proportion of regulated traders Nreg will
sell risky assets to prevent a too high level of (expensive) regulatory capital. Why do we
call this proportion the ”maximum proportion”?
In this context, we have to be aware of one situation: if the agents want to sell
more assets with the respective fundamentalists’ or chartists’ trading rules than with the
regulated traders’ trading rule or regulation (z f ,ct < z
f ,c
t ), they behave according to their
conviction and apply the “usual” trading rule, anyway. If fundamentalists/chartists wish
to sell more assets, only a fraction nregt = n
c/ f
t ·Nreg have to apply regulations. If both
groups generate more excess demand than determined by regulated traders’ rules, no
regulations have to be applied (nregt = 0). This leads to the following case distinction for
1Model modifications also explored in their paper led to relatively similar results for the Basel II/III reg-
ulations. Interesting contributions concerning herding behavior in agent-based models can be found in
Irle et al. (2011) and Alfarano/Milakovic´ (2009)
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the weight of regulated traders nregt :
nregt = N
reg if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and zct > z
reg
t and z
f
t > z
reg
t
nregt = n
c
t ·Nreg if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and zct > zregt and z ft < zregt
nregt = n
f
t ·Nreg if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and zct < zregt and z ft > zregt
nregt = 0 if lrc
mr
t−1 < lrcmin or
if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and zct < z
reg
t and z
f
t < z
reg
t .
(9)
To obtain the weights of the respective groups, we have to subtract the regulated
traders from the other groups using the same distinction of cases as in Formula (9). We
obtain
n f ,ct = n
f ,c,bel
t (1− nregt ) if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and z f ,ct > zregt
n ft = n
f ,bel
t (1− nregt ); nct = nc,belt if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and z ft > zregt and zct < zregt
nct = n
c,bel
t (1− nregt ); n ft = n f ,belt if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and z ft < zregt and zct > zregt
n f ;ct = 0 if lrc
mr
t−1 < lrcmin or
if lrcmrt−1 > lrcmin and zct < z
reg
t and z
f
t < z
reg
t .
(10)
The model described here was also used in Hermsen (2011) to analyze specific aspects
of Basel III which are not considered in the model comparison of this paper. In a syn-
chronous manner, the model’s equations of the Lux/Marchesi model (1999/2000) were
extended by Basel II regulations in Hermsen (2010b).
Comparing the model used in this paper with that of Hermsen (2010b), we find a
similar approach in both papers. However, the modeling of regulated traders’ demand
differs. This required a revision, due to the changes implemented from the Basel II to the
Basel III framework, such as the stressed Value-at-Risk. How these changes are incorpo-
rated into the model described in this section and what differentiates them from Hermsen
(2010b) is explained in the next section.
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3 Consideration of the Basel II/III regulations and measurement
of financial market stability
This section explains the changes that took place between the Basel II and the Basel III
Capital Accord and how they are incorporated in the model presented in Section 2. Fur-
thermore, an explanation is given of which Value-at-Risk models are used, why they
were chosen, and how they have been integrated in the model. Finally, financial market
stability is defined.
3.1 Changes in the Basel III Capital Accord concerning market risk
With a new construct called ”stressed Value-at-Risk” (sVaR), the BCBS (2009, 718 LXXVi
(k)) has reacted on the problems of financial market stability that occurred in 2007/8. It
aims to compel financial institutions to hold a capital base and provide enough liquidity
to enable them to balance their extraordinary losses in the event of a crash. The new
formula for capital requirements for market risk cmr is:
crmrt = max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 VaR0.99(10|t− i), VaR0.99(10|t)
)
+
max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 sVaR0.99(10|t− i), sVaR0.99(10|t)
)
,
(11)
where VaR0.99(10|t − i) is the 99%-VaR of the (cumulative) loss distribution of the next
10 periods (days), sVaR0.99(10|t− i) is the 99%-sVaR of the (cumulative) loss distribution
of the next 10 periods (days), crmrt is the level of regulatory capital for market risk in
the next period, and h is a multiplier. The multiplier is chosen from a range between
h = 3 and h = 4. Financial institutions and the supervisory authority have to backtest
that the VaR model used is suitable for capturing market risk. The backtesting procedure
is performed for the 1-step-VaR VaR0.99(1|t). h is raised dependent on the number of
backtesting exceptions. A backtesting exception occurs when the loss is higher than the
VaR on one day. In the Basel II and III frameworks, the model is categorized in the green
zone for h = 3, in the yellow zone for 3 < h < 4, and in the red zone for h = 4. Factor h is
valid for both the first VaR part and the second sVaR part of (11) (BCBS 2006, 2009; Stahl
1998).
The second part of Equation (11) causes a significant increase in the level of reg-
ulatory capital for market risk (Bank of America 2010). The calculation for the stressed
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Value-at-Risk (sVaR) is virtually the same as the VaR: only the time span for which the
calculation takes places is different. Here BCBS (2009, p. 14) determines ”historical data
from a continuous 12-month period of significant financial stress relevant to the bank’s
portfolio” for the calculation. ”As an example, for many portfolios, a 12-month period re-
lating to significant losses in 2007/2008 would adequately reflect a period of such stress,”
BCBS 2009 (p. 14).
The stressed Value-at-Risk is one reason why it is necessary to change the modeling
of regulated traders compared to Hermsen (2010b), where regulated traders become ac-
tive at time steps with backtesting exceptions. With the stressed Value-at-Risk – due to the
higher level of regulatory capital — the minimum level of regulatory capital is exceeded
much more frequently than on trading days with extraordinary losses. Furthermore, the
stressed Value-at-Risk is not dependent on the most recent observations. Here, using the
dependence on the level of regulatory capital, we might be able to draw a more realistic
picture of the effects of the Basel frameworks, especially Basel III. Beyond that, we need
a common basis in which the same reference value is used for both frameworks. It made
sense to apply lrcmr and lrcmin which are relevant for each time step of both Basel II and
III frameworks, instead of using backtesting exceptions, which are only relevant to the
most recent observations since the importance of those observations declines in the Basel
III framework.
The next change affecting both market risk and the other types of risk (credit risk
and operational risk) inherent in the Basel II/III framework is the increase in the capital
base. By 2019, the minimum level of regulatory capital or the minimum total capital ratio
(lrcmin) will increase from 8% to 10.5%, an increase of 35% (BCBS 2010, Annex 4). Since
it is hard to determine how this increase is apportioned to the particular risk types, we
assume that lrcmin will also be increased by this proportion. The level of regulatory capital
for market risk lrcmr is then calculated by the quotient of the capital requirements for
market risk crmrt and the assets connected to this risk type, here the portfolio value exp(pt)
(recall that pt is the logarithmic price) that is
lrcmrt =
crmrt
exp(pt)
.
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It is easy to incorporate these changes into the model specified in Section 2. In our
first simulation procedure, we employ the Basel II regulations, meaning that crmrt is cal-
culated using the first maximum expression of Equation (11) only. To analyze the changes
in financial market stability defined at the end of this section, the same simulation pro-
cedure is carried out a second time using Equation (11), as defined in the Basel III frame-
work. In the second run, the minimum level of regulatory capital lrcmin is raised by the
respective factor, as determined in the Basel III framework.
3.2 Value-at-Risk models
First, we have to define the risk measure ”Value-at-Risk”. For this purpose, we use
the α-quantile of the (cumulative) τ-step return distribution Qα(τ|t)2. According to
Reiss/Thomas (2007), it is easy to calculate the 1-step or 10-step-Value-at-Risk as required
for Formula (11) with this quantile
VaR1−α(τ|t) = exp (pt) (1− exp ((Qα(τ|t))) . (12)
We use the three Value-at-Risk models predominately used in practice (Homburg
& Scherpereel 2006). These are VaR models with quite different, sometimes sim-
ple assumptions for the (cumulative) τ-step return distribution or the weighting of
historical observations. In its recently revised framework concerning market risk
the BCBS, for instance, still indirectly suggests historical volatility (BCBS 2009, 718
(LXXVI) c)) with the assumption of the normal distribution for the (cumulative) τ-step
return distribution. The appendix provides a brief formal description of the models used.
We use these models because we wish to analyze the impact of regulations under
relatively realistic conditions, in line with actual practice. Since these models were
predominately used before and during the financial crisis we have applied them in this
paper (Homburg & Scherpereel 2006, Marrison 2002). For the Basel II framework it is
shown in Hermsen (2010a) that models with simple assumptions mainly lead to a lower
lrcmr, what could explain why financial institutions choose them.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the characteristics of the return time series of the basic
2The bold τ in the formula symbolizes the return distribution for the time period from t to τ days. In the
case of the Basel II/III framework, the BCBS prescribes τ = 10 days.
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model and the respective level of regulatory capital. The top panels show the time series
for the basic model when no regulated traders are included for the returns and lrcmr. The
lrcmr we identify for the Basel III framework compared to Basel II is over twice as large.
Figure 2 comes about here
The panels below describe these time series for each specific VaR model. The sec-
ond row of panels show the respective series using historical volatility (hv). Compared
to the top, first row of panels, additionally, the VaR estimates are presented by the black
solid line in the right-hand panel. The left panels show the minimum required levels of
regulatory capital for the Basel II framework (solid horizontal line) which is 35% higher
for the Basel III framework (dotted horizontal line). This increase is obviously unable
to compensate for the increase resulting from the additional stressed VaR. Since the
minimum required lrcmin is exceeded much more frequently for the Basel III framework,
regulated traders will attempt to sell risky assets more frequently to lower their lrcmr
down to near lrcmin.
The third respectively forth row of panels show the same as for the second row of panels,
albeit for historical simulation (hs) and the exponential weighted moving average
model (ew). Hereby, we identify a lower level of regulatory capital for banks using
the EWMA model compared to historical volatility and simulation, which is in line
with Hermsen (2010a). We also observe that the ups and downs of the time series are
relatively similar regardless which model is used and although the VaR estimates differ
to a certain extent (cp. left-hand panels). Since we assume that a third of all banks use
each model, the overall lrcmr is calculated by weighting the level of regulatory capital
calculated for each model lrchv;hs;ew by 1/3. This leads to the following specification of
Nreg = Nhv +Nhs +New of Equation (9)
Nhv;hs;ew =
1
3
Nreg if lrchv;hs;ewt−1 > lrcmin
Nhv;hs;ew = 0 if lrchv;hs;ewt−1 < lrcmin.
(13)
In this formula, Nhv denotes regulated traders using historical volatility, whereas Nhs and
New denote the same albeit for historical simulation and the EWMA model. The asso-
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ciated level of regulatory capital for market risk determined by the respective method
is denoted by lrchv;hs;ewt . We see that the assumed maximum proportion of regulated
traders Nreg is only obtained on trading days for which all VaR models exceed lrcmin,
and chartists and fundamentalists do not wish to sell more assets than a regulated trader
is forced to sell.
The impact of using other VaR models on the stability of financial markets when
applying Basel III regulations shall be left as a subject of further research. How financial
market stability is measured will be explained in the next subsection.
3.3 Simulation details
In the Monte Carlo simulations, we use 100 time series. Each time series consists of 11,500
time steps. The first 1320 observations are not considered in the results of the Monte
Carlo simulation, since we need a starting period to calculate the VaR and, especially, the
stressed VaR.3
The constants and parameters of the model are taken from Franke/Westerhoff
(2011), who fitted the model such that it is able to replicate the stylized facts of financial
markets. The only new constant ρ is due to the similarity in construction of the funda-
mentalists’ and regulated traders’ trading rules with the fundamentalists’ trading rule
(cp. Formulae (4) and (9))4. Hence, we assume ρ = θ. Furthermore, we use the same ran-
dom variables to analyze the Basel II and Basel III frameworks to enable the results to be
compared directly. This way, we are able to identify concrete differences and similarities
with regard to how the different frameworks cope in specific situations (sudden crashes,
volatility clusters, or also ”calm” periods).
We use a ”rolling analysis” to calculate the Value-at-Risk, stressed Value-at-Risk
and, hence, also the capital requirements and level of regulatory capital.5 Every day, the
last value of a period of one year is excluded and a new value included. The next values
for VaR, sVaR, and lrcmr are calculated for the new period . The ”period of stress” used
for the calculation of the stressed Value-at-Risk is chosen by determining the standard
3Additionally, we need VaR estimators of one year to be able to calculate the LRC
4These values are p∗ = 0, φ = 0.12, χ = 1.5, α0 = −0.336, αn = 1.839, αp = 19.671, σ f = 0.708, σc = 2.147
and the reaction parameter of the regulated traders ρ = 0.12.
5According to BCBS (2011b), different methods can be used to calculate Value-at-Risk and stressed Value-
at-Risk. In the paper, we always use the same method to calculate both VaR and stressed VaR. Since the
results do not differ considerably regarding stressed Value-at-Risk, this assumption does not affect the
results significantly.
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deviation of one quarter every day. If the new value is higher than the previously used
”period of stress”, the period is taken as the new ”period of stress”. Thus, this period does
not change very often in the simulations of 11,500 time steps which leads to a relatively
constant sVaR over time. This procedure is in line with the description given in BCBS
(2011a, 10.2.).
3.4 Defining financial market stability
We use three key measures to characterize financial market stability similarly applied
in Westerhoff (2008), Demary (2011) and Hermsen et al. (2010): volatility, distortion, and
the Hill index. All three measures are important to gain an overview of some of the key
attributes as described in the following paragraphs.
Volatility is characterized by
V =
√√√√ 1
T
T
∑
t=1
(
Yt −Y
)2
(14)
as the standard deviation of returns with Yt = pt − pt−1. The lower the volatility, the
lower the overall average amplitude of returns. It is obvious that a low degree of volatility
has a stabilizing effect on financial markets.
Distortion is defined as
D =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
| pt − p∗t | . (15)
It is the mean absolute deviation between the realized log price and the log fundamen-
tal price. It can be used as a stabilization measure from the viewpoint of information
efficiency. If the price is considerably above/below the fundamental value that is to rep-
resent all relevant information of the share/index, many agents become fundamentalists
and push the price back quite rapidly to its fundamental value. Hence, a high distortion
indicates a high risk of bubbles/crashes occurring in the financial market.
To determine the Hill tail index H, we have to arrange the absolute returns in an
descending order | YT |>| YT−1 |> · · · >| Yt−k |> · · · >| Y1 | where k is the number of
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returns considered in the tail of the distribution. Then we obtain αH where
αH =
(
1
k
k
∑
i=1
(| YT−i+1 | − | YT−k |)
)−1
. (16)
2.5% or 5% are possible tail factions (Lux/Ausloos 2002). In the simulations, we set k at
5% of the tails’ observations. The floor of the tail index indicates the number of existing
moments. Hence, the tail index is an appropriate measure to determine the existence
of extremal returns indicating extraordinary losses. Extraordinary losses are considered
specifically problematic to financial institutions by the BCBS (2006) and Brunnermeier
(2009) since they often instigate changes in banks’ regulatory capital and, hence, may
cause portfolio adjustments due to higher future volatility.
The three stabilization measures – volatility, distortion, and the Hill tail index – are
used to assess financial market stability for the Monte Carlo simulation in Section 5.
4 Analysis of selected time series
In this section, we illustrate the consequences of the regulations for one representative
time series. This is important to identify specific aspects of the impact of these regula-
tions. A more general analysis is subsequently conducted by means of a Monte Carlo
simulation in Section 5.
Figure 3 compares the Basel II and III frameworks. In the left-hand panels, this
aspect is investigated for a fraction of maximum 2% of transactions by regulated
traders per day; in the right-hand panels, this fraction is raised to 4%. Note that the
effective trade of regulated traders is significantly lower. This is shown in the next section.
Figure 3 comes about here
Even if we allow a relatively low maximum proportion of regulated traders per day
of 2% (left-hand panels), we see a profound change in the time series. Whereas the time
series of the logarithmic prices (top panel) seems to be virtually the same for the Basel
II (solid line) and Basel III (dotted line) frameworks, there are obvious differences in the
returns time series (middle panels). The maximum amplitude of the volatility clusters
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decrease for the Basel III framework between time steps 2000 and 5000. This observation
is even more significant for Nreg = 4% (right-hand panels). Here, the fluctuations in the
logarithmic prices (top panel) are also clearly identifiable6.
However, there are also volatility clusters for which the number of maximum re-
turns increases considerably for the Basel III framework, such as for the volatility clus-
ter around time step 6500 in both the left- and right-hand panels. Furthermore, quite
large negative sporadic extreme returns occur before time steps 4000 and 8000 (right mid-
bottom panel for 4% maximum trades a day).
Comparing the level of regulatory capital according to Basel II/III for market risk
(bottom panels), we identify a clear increase in the Basel III framework due to the stressed
Value-at-Risk. Considering this large change in the lrcmr, we would have expected a more
significant change in the return time series. Furthermore, the higher Nreg does not affect
the lrcmr.
If we increase Nreg to higher levels of 5%, 10% or even 15%, we obtain an even
more stabilized financial market with lower volatility, distortion and extraordinary
events on most trading days. However, in extreme situations, these higher maximum
fractions of regulated traders can cause a very severe crash. In the 100 time series of the
Monte Carlo simulations with 10,000 observations, only 4 exhibit such a severe crash
for Nreg = 15%. One such time series is depicted in Figure 4, which explains how the
weights of the different groups of fundamentalists, chartists and regulated traders must
develop for a crash to occur.
Figure 4 comes about here
Looking at the left-hand panels, we recognize quite normal model dynamics for
Nreg = 5%. The weights of fundamentalists and chartists fluctuate quite normally, which
becomes apparent when comparing the dynamics of the Basel III framework (gray line)
with the dynamics of the Basel II framework which are virtually unaffected by the regu-
lations (cp. Figure 3). Of course, the same is true for Nreg = 2% and 4%, as presented in
Figure 3 above.
Increasing Nreg to 10% means that regulated traders gain more influence (bottom
6Further explanations of economic behavior follow in connection with Figure 4 and for the Monte Carlo
simulation in Figure 5.
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middle panel). We obtain a higher negative excess demand by regulated traders espe-
cially for time series, which cause a high level of regulation capital lrcmr, as depicted
here. This drives the price further away from the fundamental price. The consequence is
that more and more traders who are unaffected by regulations become fundamentalists.
This, in turn, leads to a stabilization of the financial market. However, this stabilization
has an imminent danger, as we will see when considering Nreg = 15%.
For this very high maximum fraction of regulated traders we obtain a severe crash
as visualized in the right-hand panels. This crash is due to the design of the regulations
assessed by the BCBS. We should explore the definition of the level of regulatory capital
as the quotient of capital requirements and the portfolio’s value. Here the numerator
increases due to the price crash (the Value-at-Risk increases due to the crash). At the same
time, the price – hence the assets’ value – decreases on account of the crash. This leads to
a very sharp increase in the level of regulatory capital, enabling regulated traders to sell
more and more assets (bottom right panel). The chartists become crowd out of the market
(mid-bottom panel); the weight and associated excess demand of the fundamentalists is
too weak to compensate for the excess demand of regulated traders7. It is a vicious circle
that ends up in a complete price crash. In extreme situations, we see that a too strictly
regulated financial market may lead to a complete loss of assets for our model, caused by
the regulation rules.
To sum up the results of this section for low to medium fractions of regulated
traders, we identify a low stabilization of the financial market concerning volatility. How-
ever, the amplitude of some volatility clusters increases compared to the Basel II frame-
work. These may even lead to a destabilization in certain situations. These aspects and
the role of extraordinary losses are investigated in the Monte Carlo simulation in the next
section. Furthermore, we must be aware that higher fractions of regulated traders may
cause a strong stabilization of the financial market. The problem is that this can lead to a
very severe crash with a complete price decay in extreme situations.
7The excess demand of the respective group is analyzed in the Monte Carlo simulation in the next section
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5 Monte Carlo simulation
In this section we analyze 100 time series, as described in the previous section. Here, we
first focus on how the dynamics of the model is affected. Then, we analyze financial mar-
ket stability with the market stability measures (cp. Section 3.3). Finally, the risk measures
Value-at-Risk and stressed Value-at-Risk are investigated concerning their influence on
the capital requirements, crmr, and the level of regulatory capital, lrcmr.
5.1 Model analysis
Analyzing the effects of regulations zreg on the model parameters, they have a very dif-
ferent impact, dependent on the framework considered. Recall that we merely integrated
the new term concerning the calculation of regulatory capital for market risk (cp. Equa-
tion (11)) and the increase in overall regulatory capital. Equations that affect our model
are not changed in any sense.
The boxplots of Figure 5 can be interpreted as follow: the left- and right-hand bor-
ders of the box represent the 25% and 75% percentile of the 100 time series. The vertical
line in the box is the median of the stability measures’ values and the point is the mean of
the observations. The horizontal line shows the range of the respective measures’ values.
Figure 5 shows an almost constant weighted excess demand for the Basel II
framework (left-hand panels). The reason is that the higher excess demand of fundamen-
talists is leveled out by the lower excess demand of chartists for the higher maximum
proportion of regulated traders shown in the mid-left panels. The trade of regulated
traders is minimal, and can virtually be neglected.
Figure 5 comes about here
These effects change considering the Basel III regulations in the right-hand panels
of Figure 5. The adjusted calculation of the lrcmr and the higher levels of regulatory capital
have a considerably greater impact on the model. Since results are constant for varying
Nreg for the Basel II framework, this is mainly a result of the new maximum expression
of Equation (11). Its effect on the level of regulatory capital is analyzed in greater detail
in Section 5.3.
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For the Basel III framework, the effect of the lower excess demand of chartists and
regulated traders is greater than the increased excess demand of the fundamentalists
which lead to an overall slight negative excess demand d (cp. Formula (3)). We can con-
clude that the Basel III regulations are a deeper intervention in the mechanism of the
financial market simulated using Franke/Westerhoffs’ model (2011). For the Basel II reg-
ulations, the dynamics of the model balanced the ”unsymmetrical” new regulation rule,
which was not the case for the new regulations of the Basel III framework.
5.2 Market stability
Analyzing Figure 6, we identify a clear difference concerning the Basel II and III
frameworks. For the currently valid Basel II framework (cp. left-hand panels), volatility
and distortion decline marginally (if we can identify a decline at all) with increasing
proportions of transactions by regulated traders. For the Basel III framework, we notice
a clear decline in volatility and distortion levels. This is quite positive. It seems that the
new Basel III regulations do indeed stabilize financial markets
Figure 6 comes about here
However, the bottom panels of Figure 6 offer a different view of the problem. They
show a decline in the Hill index for 1% ≤ Nreg ≤ 7.5%, meaning that there are more ex-
traordinary events with relatively high gains and losses for the new Basel III framework,
whereas no effects can be identified for the Basel II framework. This is a negative aspect,
since these are events that cause financial institutions difficulties. If the maximum pro-
portion of regulated traders increases, this effect is weakened or diminishes completely.
The fact that a destabilization for the Basel III framework is also possible compared
to the basic model or the Basel II regulated model is supported by Table 1. Here we
compare the results for each value of the stability measures for each time series of the
Monte Carlo simulation with three reference values.
The first reference value of the top part of Table 1 is the mean of the basic time se-
ries without any regulation for volatility, distortion, and the Hill tail index. For the Basel
II framework, we cannot identify any pronounced changes concerning the stability mea-
sures (top lines for each stability measure). For the basic time series without regulation
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(meaning 0% of maximum proportion of regulated traders), 48 (volatility), 49 (distortion),
and 46 (Hill tail index) of each of the 100 time series provided higher means than the av-
erage mean of all of the 100 time series. These values do not change significantly. Only
for the distortion, the values of 41 and 36 for Nmax = 7.5% and 10% indicate a slight de-
crease. Together with the boxplots of the left-hand panels in Figure 6, we cannot identify
any clear influence of the Basel II regulations on financial market stability.
In contrast, we recognize a clear stabilization concerning volatility and – even more
significantly – concerning distortion for the Basel III framework (bottom lines for each
stability measure). For instance, assuming Nmax = 4%, only 20% of the time series’ mean
for volatility and 10% for distortion in the Monte Carlo simulation indicate destabiliza-
tion. Concerning the Hill tail index, the result is not that clear. For fractions of Nmax = 2%
to 5%, the Hill tail index decreases, indicating an increase in extraordinary profits or
losses. This observation is not as pronounced as for the Basel II framework. However, for
a higher fraction of maximum transactions by regulated traders, this observation changes
again.
Since we used the same random variables for the different time series, it is also
quite relevant to compare the values for the stability measures for each time series with
the results if the fraction of maximum transactions by regulated traders, Nmax, is raised.
It is interesting to see whether a destabilization of the financial market may occur for
increasing Nmax. We compare each value for the stability measures of Nmax = 1% to
10% with the respective value of the basic time series (Nmax = 0%). This comparison is
presented in the middle part of Table 1. Since it makes no sense to compare the basic time
series with the basic time series there is no value in this part of Table 1.
Even for volatility in the Basel II framework we identify a stabilization, which is
again more profound for the Basel III framework. For the distortion, we see a clear sta-
bilization for both frameworks. To interpret one value for the Basel II framework, the 1
for a proportion of Nmax = 4% means that the distortion for 99 of the 100 time series was
lower in the time series with a maximum proportion of 4% of regulated traders compared
to the basic time series simulated with the same random variables for the noise terms. For
the Hill tail index, we are unable to identify a clear tendency for the Basel II framework.
For the Basel III framework, we can interpret the results in the same way than for the top
part. However, the results are somewhat less profound as for the top part of the table.
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In the bottom part of Table 1, we compare both frameworks directly. For this pur-
pose, we compare the values of the Basel II framework of one time series with the direct
counterpart of the Basel III framework, simulated using the same random variables for
the noise terms. Since we compare both frameworks here, only one row for each stabil-
ity measure is presented. To interpret one value, the 22 for a proportion of Nmax = 4%
means that for 22 of 100 time series, volatility was lower in the Basel II framework than
the respective value for the same maximum proportion of regulated traders in the Basel
III framework. To interpret the results for volatility, there is a tendency especially for low
proportions of Nmax for the Basel III framework to provide lower volatility. However, it
can also be the case that lower values for volatility and, hence, a greater stabilization of
the financial market concerning this stability measure, occur for the Basel II framework.
For higher proportions of Nmax, this possibility is reduced.
For distortion, in turn, the result is unambiguous. For all of the time series for all
proportions of Nmax, Basel III leads to less distortion and, hence, to a stabilization of the
financial market. For the Hill tail index, we identify between 2% and 5% lower values
for the Hill tail index for proportions of Nmax, meaning more extraordinary profits and
losses for the Basel III framework. To interpret this, we recognize even greater volatility
for the Basel III framework for some time series (for instance, exactly 22 for volatility and
32 for the Hill tail index for our previously chosen example of Nmax = 4%). This mainly
happens if one or two volatility clusters become much large in amplitude, whereas other
volatility clusters of the time series shrink or disappear, as seen in Figure 2 in Section 4.
From an economic perspective, this means a stabilization of the financial market for many
time periods. However, a quite severe crisis with a large amount of extraordinary losses
can also happen sometimes with the Basel III framework. However, this effect diminishes
for higher proportions and even changes directions for a proportion of 10%.
However, a further increase of Nmax is not the way to obtain a perfect stabilized fi-
nancial market with the Basel III framework (as seen in Section 4). For higher proportions
of Nmax from 12% and above, the increasing negative average excess demand of regulated
traders (cp. Section 5.1; top panels of Figure 5) leads to a continuous price crash. Then,
the value of the portfolio converts to zero which is, of course, not a desirable target for
regulators. For the stability measures, we obtain very high values for the distortion, zero
volatility and no extraordinary profits and losses. For the Basel II framework, this price
20
behavior can be observed for (unrealistically) high proportions.
5.3 Specific effects of Basel III
Analyzing Figure 7, we first identify a decline in one- and ten-step VaR. We can explain
this by the lower standard deviation for Basel III time series. The extraordinary losses
captured by the Hill tail index are not included because they are losses below the 1%
quantile (here, other risk measures that capture the downsize risk might be necessary, cp.
Yamai/Yoshiba 2002a/b, Artzner et al. 1999).
Another problem becomes apparent when juxtaposing the Value-at-Risk values of
the first three rows of panels of Figure 8 used to calculate crmr (cp. Formula (11)) with
the value of the level of regulatory capital (lrcmr). Although the risk measure indicates a
significant reduction of risk with increasing Nreg, the required level of regulatory capital
remains stable or even increases slightly, as the bottom panels indicate. However, we also
identify a decrease in the capital requirements crmr, as the mid-bottom panels indicate8.
The reason for the comparatively constant level of regulatory capital lrcmr (bottom
panels) for the Basel III framework is that the value of the assets or portfolio, represented
in the paper by price p (cp. top panels of Figure 3), declines. Therefore, the quotient of
the capital requirements and the portfolio value constituting lrcmr (cp. Section 3.1) is quite
constant.
6 Discussion
In this section we link the results and observations for one single time series of Section 4
and for the Monte Carlo simulation of Section 5. It does not matter whether we consider
a single time series (Section 4), parts of the model, the stability parameters or the risk
measure VaR with the level of regulatory capital. The main result is: the Basel III frame-
work is a more severe intervention in the dynamics of the financial market than the Basel
II framework. If the number of financial market transactions by regulated traders which
are affected by regulations remains at an acceptable level, it could be an instrument to
stabilize financial market fluctuations.
8We present results for historical simulation. Results for historical volatility and the EWMA model are quite
similar.
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Then, the distortion of the financial market, in particular, can be reduced. Con-
cerning volatility, all values indicate a reduction for the Basel III framework, on average.
However, an increase in volatility, especially during volatility clusters, is not impossible
in certain situations (cp. Table 1 or Figure 2). This is also supported by the results for the
Hill tail index, which for all comparisons of Table 1 and the boxplots of Figure 6 (Section
5.2) indicates an increase in extraordinary profits and losses for lower maximum propor-
tions by regulated traders.
Section 5.3 reveals that the overall increase in the level of regulatory capital and the
introduction of the stressed Value-at-Risk in addition to the Value-at-Risk leads to a lower
consideration of the most recent values of a time series, hence, to the most recent risk sit-
uation. Both changes work like two constants which are attached to the “old” regulatory
capital according to Basel II. Comparing both frameworks, it becomes apparent that the
reduction in volatility and distortion in the Basel III framework leads additionally to a
reduction in large price movements which may happen, but not that frequently. The con-
sequence is a reduction in the price or portfolio value. Therefore, the level of regulatory
capital is quite the same in the Basel III framework compared to the Basel II framework.
This has both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage might be that the capital
base is strengthend. For the same value of the Value-at-Risk, more than twice the amount
of regulatory capital must be held by the financial institutions. However, neither a realis-
tic picture of the present risk associated with the situation on the financial market can be
deviated by the level of regulatory capital (one possibility for externals to obtain this in-
formation) nor can the financial market be influenced such that a crash can be prevented
if a downturn of the price occurs.
7 Conclusion
We analyzed how financial market stability is influenced by the Basel III framework com-
pared to the previously valid Basel II framework. For this purpose, we integrated crucial
aspects of the Basel III framework regarding market risk in a heterogeneous agent model.
These aspects are primarily the stressed Value-at-Risk, used additionally to determine the
level of regulatory capital for market risk, and the raised minimum level of regulatory
capital. The simulations indicate that the use of the stressed Value-at-Risk is a renun-
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ciation of the strictly Value-at-Risk-based framework, which aims solely to adequately
capture the risk situation of a recent period. Indeed, the denotation of the stressed Value-
at-Risk is similar, but its effect cannot be compared to that associated with the Value-at-
Risk. In principle, the stressed Value-at-Risk works like a constant added to the level of
regulatory capital, due to the generally constant period of stress. This means that the risk
situation of the most recent observations does not affect the regulatory capital for market
risk as much as in the Basel II framework.
The result is that the Basel III framework influences the dynamics of the financial
market of our model much more than the Basel II framework, which was standard during
the financial crisis that started in 2007. The integrated changes are able to reduce volatil-
ity and distortion significantly for low and medium maximum proportions of regulated
traders in the market. For low proportions, however, we find more extraordinary losses
and profits in some time series of the Monte Carlo simulation. One problem is that for
very high proportions of regulated traders, strong price cuts occur for the Basel III frame-
work, whereas the Basel II framework leads to a stable financial market. If regulators
keep the proportion of regulated traders at a considerable level, the Basel III framework
can be quite an adequate instrument to stabilize financial markets more than the Basel II
framework, for which virtually no stabilizing effect could be found in the analysis.
Possible challenges for further research on this topic are widespread. From an em-
pirical point of view, it might be interesting to explore the real proportion of regulated
traders in the market. Then, it might be possible to adjust the model such that the frac-
tions influencing the degree of (de-)stabilization can be modeled in step with actual con-
ditions.
Other interesting questions for future research are to explore whether the transition
period from the Basel II framework to the Basel III framework with constantly increasing
minimum levels of regulatory capital leads to problems with the dynamics. Addition-
ally, the same methodology can be used to explore whether additional proposals, such
as countercyclical buffers, lead to a greater stabilization of financial markets. Another
aspect might be to explore how the interaction of the level of regulatory capital of the dif-
ferent risk types might affect financial market stability. To solve this problem, we have to
find a model that adequately combines credit, market, and operational risk. A third idea
might be to test whether other more sophisticated Value-at-Risk models such as GARCH
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models which are actually not widespread in practice, may lead to greater stabilization
at financial markets.
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Appendix: Value-at-Risk models
Historical volatility approach (hv)
The historical volatility is mentioned in both Basel II and III frameworks. We use
the square root of time rule, which implies the quite simple assumption of ui =
σei with ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1) for the residuals of the return time series (BCBS 2006, 2009,
718 (LXXVI) (c) and (f)); Danielsson et al. 1998). We calculate the returns yi by
yi = µ + ui. (17)
This means an equal treatment or weighting of past time steps with no consideration of
volatility clusters. The additivity property of the normal distribution enables the calcula-
tion of the α-quantile by
Qα(τ|t) = τµ + zα
√
τσ. (18)
where zα is the α-quantile of the standard normal distribution. We estimate µ and σ from
the historical observations. The Value-at-Risk is then calculated using Formula (12).
Historical simulation (hs)
The returns of a time series with historical observations of daily returns are
arranged in descending order, applying historical simulation. The α-quantile of
y(n), y(n−1), . . . , y(n (1−α)), . . . , y(1) where y(n) ≤ . . . ≤ y(1), which we use to determine
VaRα(1|t), is the smallest value y(n (1−α)) not exceeding n (1− α), so that
Qα(1|t) = y(n (1−α)). (19)
We have to determine the 10-step return distribution from the daily returns. For this
purpose, we use a bootstrap approach with τ · 5000 observations to calculate the τ-step
VaR. The quantile Qα(τ|t) of the 10-step return distribution to obtain VaRα(τ|t) can be
determined from the 5000 cumulated ten-step returns in an analogous manner to that in
(19). Then Formula (12) is reapplied.
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Exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) approach (ew)
Zangari (1996) suggested using the exponential weighted moving average model
(EWMA) which is another approach often applied by financial institutions (Holton 2003).
The idea is to place greater weight on the most recent observation. In the basic model
yi = µ + ui with ui = σiei and ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1), i = 1, . . . , t− 1, t, (20)
the conditional volatility at time t is constructed by
E[u2i+1|t] = E[(yi+1 − µ)2|t] = ht with ĥ1|t = (1− λ)u2t + λĥt. (21)
To estimate the one-step VaR, we apply the usual value λ = 0.94. If we replace σ2 by
time-dependent ĥ1|t and assume that µ = 0, we obtain
ŷ1|t ∼ N (0, ĥ1|t) and
ŷ1|t√
ĥ1|t
∼ N (0, 1),
respectively, and further Qα(1|t) = zα
√
ĥ1|t.
ĥ1|t is the best estimation for ut+τ. Hence, for the quantile of the 10-step distribution
we obtain
Qα(τ|t) = zα
√
τĥ1|t.
VaRα(τ|t) is calculated using Formula (12).
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Comparison with the mean of the basic time series
Stability Basel Nreg
measure 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 7.5% 10%
Volatility II 48 48 48 47 45 46 44 44
III 48 41 35 27 20 12 3 0
Distortion II 49 47 45 44 44 43 41 36
III 49 38 26 15 10 7 1 1
Hill tail index II 46 45 45 46 48 47 47 47
III 46 41 32 33 31 25 44 62
Comparison with the respective value of the basic time series
Stability Basel Nreg
measure 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 7.5% 10%
Volatility II xx 33 35 29 27 25 25 31
III xx 27 23 21 20 12 3 1
Distortion II xx 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
III xx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hill tail index II xx 48 49 51 46 47 49 50
III xx 45 35 40 38 37 42 64
Comparison of the respective values of the Basel II and III framework
Stability Basel Nreg
measure 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 7.5% 10%
Volatility xx xx 27 22 23 22 12 3 1
Distortion xx xx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hill tail index xx xx 47 36 36 32 32 42 65
Table 1: Results of the Monte Carlo simulation for the stability measures for Basel II and
III
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Figure 1: Generation of the excess demand of regulated traders zreg
Top panel: Detail of the time series of the level of regulatory capital (lrcmrt ) and the minimum level of
regulatory capital (lrcmin).
Bottom panel: Detail of the time series of regulated traders’ excess demand (zreg) resulting from lrcmin and
lrcmrt from the top panel.
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Figure 2: Return series (right panels) and series of the regulatory capital (left panels) for
the basic model without regulated traders
Top panels: The return series and the respective regulatory capital for Basel II (gray line)
and Basel III (black dotted line).
Mid-top panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left-hand panels.
Additionally, the time series of VaR estimates (black solid line) for regulated traders
using historical volatility is shown in the right-hand panel. The left-hand panel shows
the regulatory capital for regulated traders using historical volatility.
Mid-bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the mid-top panels,
albeit for regulated traders using historical simulation.
Bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the mid-top panels, albeit
for regulated traders using the EWMA approach.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the price, the return time series and the series of the level of
regulatory capital for the Basel II and Basel III framework for a fraction of potential
regulated traders’ transactions of 2% (left) and 4% (right)
Top panels: Price time series for the Basel II framework (gray solid line) and the Basel III
framework (dotted line) for a fraction of potential regulated traders’ transactions of 2%
(left) and 4% (right).
Mid-top panels: Return time series for the Basel II framework for the same fraction as for
the top panels.
Mid-bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the mid-top panels,
albeit for the Basel III framework.
Bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for
the time series of the regulatory capital.
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Figure 4: Analysis of the effect of an increase of Nreg from 5% to 15%
Top panels: from left to right the panels present the time series of log-price p of the Basel
II (black, dotted) and Basel III (gray) framework for a maximum fraction of 5%, 10%, and
15% of regulated traders.
Mid-top panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for
the weight of fundamentalists n f .
Mid-bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit
for the weight of chartists nc.
Bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for
the weight of regulated traders nreg.
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Figure 5: Development of the excess demand of the model with the increase in the
fraction of potential trade by regulated traders
Left panels for the Basel II framework: the top panel presents the boxplots for the
time series of the Monte Carlo simulation for – from top to bottom – the overall excess
demand, excess demand of fundamentalists, excess demand of chartists, and excess
demand of regulated traders.
Right panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left-hand panels, albeit
for the Basel III framework.
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Figure 6: Reaction of stability measures with varying Nreg
Left panels for the Basel II framework: the top panel presents the boxplots for the time
series of the Monte Carlo simulation for volatility, the middle panel for the distortion,
and the bottom panel for the Hill tail index.
Right panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left panels, albeit for
the Basel III framework.
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Figure 7: Analysis of the relative (solid) and absolute level (dotted) of regulatory capital
Left panels for the Basel II framework: the top panel presents the time series for the price
level, the middle panel for the returns, and the bottom panel for the absolute and relative
level of regulatory capital.
Right panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left panels, albeit for
the Basel III framework.
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Figure 8: Analysis of impact of the risk measures on the level of regulatory capital
Left panels for the Basel II framework: from top to bottom, the panels present the
boxplots for the time series of the Monte Carlo simulation for the 1-step Value-at-Risk,
the 60-day average of the 10-step VaR, the 60-day average of the stressed 10-step VaR,
the capital requirements (crmr) and the level of regulatory capital lrc (lrcmr).
Right panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left panels, albeit for
the Basel III framework.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the effects on financial market stability of the stressed Value-at-
Risk, the capital conservation buffer, the countercyclical buffer, and the transition period
as determined in the Basel III framework. It is shown by a heterogeneous agent model
that the stressed Value-at-Risk has a strong positive effect on financial market stability. In
turn, however both the conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer cause desta-
bilization. The influence of these two instruments is weaker than that resulting from
stressed Value-at-Risk. The long transition period has no further influence on financial
market stability.
The financial crisis that commenced in 2007 brought to light significant deficits in
the calculation of regulatory capital. Breakdowns of financial institutions due to wrong
risk assessments as seen for Lehman, formerly assessed as ”too big to fail”, or the
Kaupthing bank revealed shortcomings in the rules used to calculate regulatory capital,
thus, the Basel II regulations (Acharya et al. 2009).
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) determined a set of rules con-
cerning market risk to enable financial institutions to better withstand similar financial
crises. The main target of these rules is ”to improve the banking’s sector ability to ab-
sorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source [...]” (BCBS
2011a, 1. p.1). The increase in the minimum level regulatory capital, partly with a capital
conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer is the core element of these rules. The
transition period to implement these rules spans seven years, from 2013 to 2019.
Although some of these methods are more intended to strengthen the regulatory
capital associated with credit risk, the structure of the Basel II/III framework had a direct
effect on the other risk groups (market risk and operational risk). The overall level of reg-
ulatory capital consists of the sum of the level of regulatory capital of credit, market, and
operational risk. Hence, if one position of these risk types, such as credit risk, increases,
the financial institution could try to lower the level of regulatory capital for another risk
type, e.g. market risk, to keep the overall level of regulatory capital low. The reason is that
regulatory capital is much more expensive to acquire than loan capital. Hence, rules that
mainly affect one risk group also have an indirect effect on the other risk groups within
the framework (BCBS 2006, Crouhy et al. 2006).
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The first change following the 2007 financial crisis which can directly be associ-
ated with market risk was the introduction of the stressed Value-at-Risk. With this new
risk measure, the formula for determining market risk was adjusted (BCBS 2009). Here,
instead of increasing minimal capital requirements, as for capital conservation and the
countercyclical buffer, this instrument raises the necessary level of regulatory capital as-
sociated with a portfolio held by the financial institution. This change affects the capital
requirements for market risk for a given portfolio to a large extent since it approximately
doubles it (Bank of America 2010; Hermsen 2011).
Concerning the analysis of all these changes, it is crucial to analyze them imple-
mented together; however, the impact of single effects is also interesting. A possible in-
strument for such an analysis are heterogeneous agent models (HAMs), as described
comprehensively in Lux (2009), LeBaron (2006), Hommes (2006), Chiarella et al. (2009)
and Westerhoff (2008). Former European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet
(2010) highlighted the opportunities and challenges involved in this approach compared
to existing approaches during the financial crisis: ”When the crisis came, the serious limi-
tations of existing economic and financial models immediately became apparent. [...] I[i]n
the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools.” Focusing on HAMs, he
continued: ”We need to deal better with heterogeneity across agents and the interaction
among those heterogeneous agents. [...] Agent-based modelling dispenses with the op-
timisation assumption and allows for more complex interactions between agents. Such
approaches are worthy of our attention,” Trichet (2010).
Furthermore, heterogeneous agent models are especially appropriate when there
is a lack of empirical data which is obvious for the analysis of the effects of the Basel III
framework because it will not be implemented by 2013. Furthermore, no time series of
an appropriate length for longitudinal studies will be available in the first few years after
its implementation.
HAMs have proven reliable in other topics, such as the Tobin tax (Westerhoff/Dieci
2006; Mannaro et al. 2008), central bank interventions (Westerhoff 2003) or the Basel
II/III framework (Hermsen 2010, 2011). For the present analysis we use the Discrete
Choice Approach (DCA), first introduced in the context of a financial market model by
Brock/Hommes (1998) which was evaluated best concerning the ability to reproduce
stylized facts of financial markets by Franke/Westerhoff (2011). We test the described
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changes step by step with the model and analyze which of them is able to guarantee
more financial stability, as postulated by the BCBS (2011a, 1-3), and which of them are
unsuitable.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. First, we define financial market stability
with three well-known measures. Then, we describe the model in which the Basel III
regulations are integrated. In the next section, we explain how specific details of the
stressed Value-at-Risk, the conservation buffer, the countercyclical buffer, and the tran-
sition period are incorporated into the model and the simulation analyses. Afterwards,
we present the result of these analyses for each of these instruments and combinations
of them. Here, we use both results for one representative time series and a Monte Carlo
simulation of 100 time series. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Financial market stability
Defining financial market stability means capturing and measuring key elements of a
typical financial market time series. The same and similar measures are suggested for
policy analyses in Westerhoff (2008), Hermsen et al. (2010) and Demary (2011). We need
stability measures that describe the amplitude of returns Yt = pt − pt−1 with pt as the
log-price of a portfolio. For this purpose, we use volatility
V =
√√√√ 1
T
T
∑
t=1
(
Yt −Y
)2
. (1)
as the perhaps most well-used measure to characterize financial market stability. High
returns indicate an up and down of prices and, hence, turbulences in the financial mar-
kets (Westerhoff 2008). Hence, a lower volatility is an indicator of a more stable financial
market.
The second measure is the distortion of a financial market. Unpredictable and fre-
quent disconnections of the price from the underlying fundamentals are indicators for
bubbles and crashes on financial markets. These disconnections are defined as
D =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
| pt − p∗t |, (2)
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where p∗t is the fundamental price. The higher the price is above or below the funda-
mental price the more likely is a sharp price correction back to the fundamental price
will occur. Hence, a lower distortion indicates a more stable financial market (Westerhoff
2008).
A third measure is required to capture extreme price changes. To calculate the Hill
tail index αH we arrange returns in descending order YT > YT−1 > · · · > Yt−k > · · · > Y1,
where k is the number of returns considered in the tail of the distribution. We then obtain
the Hill tail index by
αH =
(
1
k
k
∑
i=1
(ln | YT−i+1 | − ln | YT−k |)
)−1
, (3)
with possible tail fractions of 2.5% and 5% (Lux/Ausloos 2002). The floor of the Hill tail
index constitutes the number of existing moments. With the occurrence of many extraor-
dinary profits and losses, which usually appear in connection with volatility clusters, the
Hill tail index declines. Hence, a higher Hill tail index indicates a more stable financial
market. In the simulations of Section 5, we choose a tail fraction of 5%.
Extraordinary profits and losses are considered especially problematic for financial
institutions (BCBS 2006, Brunnermeier 2009). This is obvious, in view of the new for-
mula for determining the regulatory capital for market risk. Herein, we find many terms
directly related to them (backtesting exceptions) or periods into which they are incorpo-
rated (stressed Value-at-Risk). Before looking at those instruments directly connected to
the Basel frameworks, we must first define a model with which they can be analyzed.
3 The model
The financial market model uses a Discrete Choice Approach (DCA), as introduced by
Brock/Hommes (1998). The model chosen was suggested by Franke/Westerhoff (2011).
They evaluated a number of financial market HAMs with regard to their ability to repli-
cate stylized facts of financial markets, such as volatility clusters, long memory effects
and fat tailed return distributions. The model specification chosen here was evaluated
most effectively.
A description of the model adjustments can also be found in Hermsen (2011). Here,
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the differences concerning the financial market stability of the Basel II and III frame-
works are elaborated instead of focusing on special instruments and aspects of the Basel
III framework, as in this article. The model used is an enhancement of an idea put for-
ward in Hermsen (2010). Here, another heterogeneous model, the Lux/Marchesi model
(1999/2000), was employed to explore the effects of the Basel II model. We describe the
similarities and differences in the description of the model below.
The price development is given by the log-price of the previous time step pt−1 and
its change driven by the excess demand
pt = pt−1 + µ(n
f
t−1z
f
t−1 + n
c
t−1z
c
t−1 + n
reg
t−1z
reg
t−1). (4)
As in the basic model, excess demand is determined by the proportion of chartists and
fundamentalists nc, ft−1 weighted by their demand z
c, f
t−1. Additionally, we introduce the
group of regulated traders. Their weight and excess demand are determined by nregt−1
respectively zregt−1.
Chartists’ and fundamentalists’ excess demand is determined by different mecha-
nisms. Chartists buy or sell assets based on the price trend. If the price trend indicates a
raising/decreasing market price, they buy/sell. The excess demand is added by a noise
term that captures random influences on the chartists’ demand
zct = χ(pt − pt−1) + σct ect with ect ∼ N(0, 1). (5)
Fundamentalists focus on the fundamental price p∗. If the price is above/below
the fundamental price, they expect a downward/upward price correction. As for the
chartists, their demand is supplemented by a noise term that captures random influences
on their demand:
z ft = φ(p
∗ − pt) + σ ft e ft with e ft ∼ N(0, 1). (6)
In Formulae (5) and (6), χ and φ are strictly positive reaction parameters capturing the
intensity at which agents react to the respective trading signal.
The newly introduced group of regulated traders has to be described in more de-
tail. This group of traders is instructed how to trade by regulations. They are not allowed
to use the usual chartists’ or fundamentalists’ rules. Instead they must use a trading rule
5
that is directly dependent on values such as the level of regulatory capital for market
risk lrc or the BCBS prescribed minimum level of regulatory capital lrcmin. To gain a
better understanding of the mechanism generating the excess demand of regulated
traders, the details of a time series of lrc and lrcmin are depicted in Figure 1. The up-
per panel shows threshold lrcmin, which is exceeded between trading days 3300 and 3550.
Figure 1 comes about here
If a financial institution has assets in its portfolio indicating a higher risk than lrcmin,
as is the case for the gray shaded area of Figure 1, it has to provide a higher level of
regulatory capital. However, the financial institution will try to reduce this additional
regulatory capital to a level close to lrcmin since regulatory capital is expensive compared
to loan capital. If a financial institution has high risk positions in its portfolio, it becomes
even more expensive to acquire additional regulatory capital. One solution for a financial
institution might be to reduce the risk in the portfolio by selling risky assets. This simple
consideration leads us to the excess demand generated by regulated traders:
zregt =− ρ
lrct−1 − lrcmin
lrcmin
if lrct−1 > lrcmin
zregt =0 if lrct−1 < lrcmin.
(7)
This trading rule is constructed in a similar fashion to the fundamentalists’ trading rule
(cp. Formula (6); recall that pt is formulated in logarithms.). For both, We use the rate at
which a special threshold – p∗ for fundamentalists and lrcmin for regulated traders – is
exceeded to determine the intensity of the respective group’s excess demand. Likewise,
ρ can be interpreted in the same way as the constants in Formulae (5) and (6).
If the level of regulatory capital is above the minimum required capital level, reg-
ulated traders will try to sell assets to reduce the necessary regulatory capital. As for the
fundamentalists, the more considerably the threshold is exceeded, the greater the nega-
tive demand. For regulated traders this implies the sale of risky assets. In Figure 1, we
recognize an increasing (negative) excess demand of regulated traders zreg (bottom panel)
during the period in which lrcmin is exceeded (gray shaded area of the top panel). The
highest peak of the time series of the level of regulatory capial lrc causes the highest ex-
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cess demand of regulated traders. Here, more risky assets are sold than at the beginning
of this period, when the threshold was exceeded to a lesser extent.
If the minimum capital requirements are higher than the capital requirements, as in
the case for the period before time step 3300 and after 3550, lrcmin is the regulatory capital
lrc a financial institution is obligated to hold. Regulated traders can behave according to
the trading rules in which they believe; they do not need to care about regulations. Hence,
for this case zregt = 0, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 for the respective time
periods.
Unlike than in Hermsen (2010), we use the level of regulatory capital lrc as a refer-
ence value for regulated traders directly instead of a backtesting exception. In a nutshell,
a backtesting exception occurs if an extraordinary loss occurs on one trading day. How-
ever, backtesting exceptions are only one of the values required to determine the level
of regulatory capital for market risk.1 Especially after introducing a new additional risk
measure – the stressed Value-at-Risk – into the formula to determine of capital require-
ments for market risk, which is not directly related to a backtesting exception, it seems to
be more reasonable to use lrc to determine zregt .
Going back to the formulation of the price change in Formula (4), we have to
define the weights of chartists, fundamentalists and regulated traders. Here, we use
the same principle as in Hermsen (2010). We first determine the weights of chartists
and fundamentalists according to the rules of the basic model of Brock/Hommes and
Franke/Westerhoff. We do not need regulated traders to formulate these weights since
they do not believe in the rules prescribed by the regulatory authority. Although they
have to apply regulations, they believe in chartists’ or fundamentalists’ rules. Therefore,
we add the suffix ”bel” to those rules:
n f ,belt =
1
1+ exp(−βat−1)
nc,belt =1− n f ,belt .
(8)
where β is the intensity of choice (Brock/Hommes 1998; Franke/Westerhoff 2011).
Franke/Westerhoff (2011) define at, the attractiveness index, as follows in the HPM
1In the next section, a backtesting exception and the calculation method for lrc is defined.
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model:
at =αn(n
f ,bel
t − nc,belt ) + α0 + αp(pt − p∗)2. (9)
Hence, at considers the herding behavior of agents2 (first term), the predisposition of the
former strategy (second term) and the misalignment of the price (third term). There are
αn ≥ 0 and αp ≥ 0.
After agents have chosen the trading rules in which they believe, we have to test
whether they are affected by regulations and determine the weight of regulated traders.
We stated that regulated traders are only active when the level of regulatory capital ex-
ceeds the minimum level of regulatory capital (lrct−1 > lrcmin; cp. Formula (10)). Here,
we are faced with the problem of a lack of data on how many traders sell assets accord-
ing to regulations. We therefore define a maximum fraction of regulated traders Nreg who
behave according to regulations per day3. But why do we define it as the maximum frac-
tion?
We assume that the weights of chartists and fundamentalists determine the per-
centages of Nreg (if we have 80% fundamentalists and 20% chartists, we also have 80%
regulated traders who believe in fundamentalists’ rules and 20% regulated traders who
believe in chartists’ rules). If all agents – chartists and fundamentalists – have to ap-
ply regulations, the fraction of regulated traders nregt is indeed N
reg. But if, for instance,
chartist regulated traders want to sell more assets than prescribed by the regulations
(zct > z
reg
t ), they will do so. They are then able to behave according to their conviction
and to apply the regulations at the same time. Therefore, they are then chartist traders
and not regulated traders. Of course, the same principle is applied if fundamentalist reg-
ulated traders wish to sell more assets (z ft > z
reg
t ). If both groups want to sell more assets
than determined by the zregt , the fraction of regulated traders can be even zero, although
the lrcmin is exceeded. These considerations can be summed up in the following formula
2Interesting contributions concerning herding behavior in agent-based models can be found in Irle et al.
(2011) and Alfarano/Milakovic´ (2009)
3In the following simulation study, this fraction Nreg is varied to obtain reliable results
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for determining the weight of regulated traders:
nregt = N
reg if lrct−1 > lrcmin and zct > z
reg
t and z
f
t > z
reg
t
nregt = n
c
t ·Nreg if lrct−1 > lrcmin and zct > zregt and z ft < zregt
nregt = n
f
t ·Nreg if lrct−1 > lrcmin and zct < zregt and z ft > zregt
nregt = 0 if lrct−1 < lrcmin or
if lrct−1 > lrcmin and zct < z
reg
t and z
f
t < z
reg
t .
(10)
The true weights of the fundamentalists and chartists have to be adjusted by the
respective group of regulated traders, applying the same case distinction.
n f ,ct = n
f ,c,bel
t (1− nregt ) if lrct−1 > lrcmin and z f ,ct > zregt
n ft = n
f ,bel
t (1− nregt ); nct = nc,belt if lrct−1 > lrcmin and z ft > zregt and zct < zregt
nct = n
c,bel
t (1− nregt ); n ft = n f ,belt if lrct−1 > lrcmin and z ft < zregt and zct > zregt
n f ;ct = 0 if lrct−1 < lrcmin or
if lrct−1 > lrcmin and zct < z
reg
t and z
f
t < z
reg
t .
(11)
We proceed by explaining the instruments proposed by the BCBS to strengthen
the financial institutions’ ability to sustain financial crises and incorporate these changes
into the model introduced above. We then analyze the effects these instruments have on
financial market stability, as defined in Section 2.
4 Instruments introduced by the BCBS and their integration
into the model
In this section, we describe the instruments introduced by the BCBS to improve finan-
cial market stability, as defined in the previous section. In general, virtually all of the
instruments aim to raise the level of regulatory capital. However, we have to differenti-
ate between an increase in the level of regulatory capital for market risk, lrc, and a raise
of the the minimum required level of regulatory capital, lrcmin. The first is used to inte-
grate stressed Value-at-Risk; the second is used to introduce the capital conservation and
countercyclical buffer. Only the transition period of seven years is not associated with
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an increase in regulatory capital. Before we explain the instruments in detail, we should
bear in mind the structure of the Basel II/III framework.
The overall level of regulatory capital consists of the sum of the level of regulatory
capital of the risk types credit, market, and operational risk. Since we explore the effect
of regulations on financial markets, we focus mainly on market risk defined as ”the risk
of change in the value of a financial position due to changes in the value of the under-
lying components on which that position depends,” McNeil et al. (2005, p. 2). Roughly
spoken, credit risk considers the risk that a counterparty fails to repay loans to the finan-
cial institution. Operational risk captures losses caused by failures of internal processes,
employees, or systems of the financial institution or related customers. According to their
definition, credit and operational risk influence different areas of the activities of a finan-
cial institution to market risk. However, since many of its activities often depend on one
another, there are, of course, interdependencies between the three risk groups (Marrison
2002, McNeil et al. 2005).
4.1 Stressed Value-at-Risk (sVaR)
The capital requirements in period t for market risk crt of a financial institution are cal-
culated by
crt = max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 VaR0.99(10|t− i), VaR0.99(10|t)
)
, (12)
where VaR0.99(10|t− i) is the 99%-VaR of the (cumulative) loss distribution of the next 10
periods (days) and h is a multiplier. Dependent on the result of a backtesting procedure
(cp. Annex 10 in BCBS (2006)), the multiplier is chosen from a range between h = 3 and
h = 4 (Stahl 1997). This level of regulatory capital for market risk is increased to a large
extent by integrating the stressed Value-at-Risk (sVaR), described in BCBS (2009, 2011b).
An additional term is added to Formula (12), which can then be described by
crt = max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 VaR0.99(10|t− i), VaR0.99(10|t)
)
+
max
(
h
60 ∑
60
i=1 sVaR0.99(10|t− i), sVaR0.99(10|t)
)
,
(13)
where sVaR0.99(10|t− i) is the 99%-sVaR of the (cumulative) loss distribution of the next
10 periods (days). The stressed Value-at-Risk is calculated based on a ”12-month period
of significant financial stress” (BCBS 2009). All other aspects regarding the calculation
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of the stressed Value-at-Risk remain the same as in the calculation of the Value-at-Risk
(BCBS 2009, 2011b). The level of regulatory capital for market risk lrct is calculated by
dividing crt and by portfolio value p. So, we obtain
lrct =
crt
exp(pt)
. (14)
The BCBS does not prescribe financial institutions a specific model for calculating of the
Value-at-Risk . Hence, we use models commonly used in practice to obtain a quite real-
istic picture of the practical implications of the instruments introduced in Basel III. The
Value-at-Risk is calculated according to Reiss/Thomas (2007) using the return distribu-
tion. They define the τ-step VaR at time t, VaRα(τ|t), as required for Formulae (12) and
(13) for a portfolio value given at time t with Vt and the quantile of the (cumulative)
τ-step return distribution at time t with Qα(τ|t) by4
VaR1−α(τ|t) = Vt (1− exp ((Qα(τ|t))) . (15)
Since we carry out a univariate analysis, we use Vt = exp(pt) with pt calculated using
Formula (4). Now we can define a backtesting exception. A backtesting exception occurs
if the loss associated with the 1-step-Value-at-Risk at a 99%-level VaR0.99(1|t) is exceeded.
This incident occurs on average 2.5 times a year (1% of 250 trading days). If it happens
more frequently, crt is additionally increased by a raising factor h in Formulae (12) and
(13). The backtesting exception was used in Hermsen (2010) as a threshold for the reg-
ulated traders’ trading rule of Formula (10). If we look at Formula (13), we can see that
the construct of the stressed Value-at-Risk does not correspond directly to the backtesting
exception since it is usually simply determined using a completely different time period.
Furthermore, since we have to compare the results from Formulae (12) and (13), we re-
quire to have a common benchmark. Therefore, it is necessary to directly use the level of
regulatory capital as defined in (14).
The risk measure Value-at-Risk is required in both Formulae (12) and (13). Various
methods are applied to calculate this risk measure. These models differ with regard to as-
sumptions of the return distribution or the weighting of (recent) historical observations,
4The bold τ in the formula symbolizes the return distribution for the time period from t to τ days. In the
case of the Basel II/III framework, the BCBS prescribes τ = 10 days.
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for instance. An overview over the models used to calculate the VaR is given in the ap-
pendix. Here, we describe how (Qα(τ|t)) is calculated to obtain the Value-at-Risk using
Formula (15).
According to Homburg/Scherpereel (2005), who surveyed German banks concern-
ing the Value-at-Risk models used, the approaches of the appendix are wide-ranging.
We assume that each approach is used by one third of regulated traders. Thus, Nreg =
Nhv +Nhs +New of Formula (10) can be specified in the following manner.
Nhv;hs;ew =
1
3
Nreg if lrchv;hs;ewt−1 > lrcmin
Nhv;hs;ew = 0 if lrchv;hs;ewt−1 < lrcmin.
(16)
Hereby, Nhv are regulated traders who use historical volatility. Nhs and New describe the
same for historical simulation and the EWMA model, respectively. lrchv;hs;ewt describes the
associated level of regulatory capital for market risk calculated by the respective method.
In addition to aiming to increase the direct level of regulatory capital for market risk, the
BCBS uses an increase in the minimum level of regulatory capital for both the conserva-
tion and countercyclical buffer, described in the following subsections.
4.2 The conservation buffer
By introducing a capital conservation buffer, the minimum level of regulatory capital is
raised from 8% to rates of 8.625%/9.25%/9.875%/10.5% from 2015 to 2019 (BCBS 2011a;
Annex 4). This capital conservation buffer should assure that financial institutions use
their common equity to strengthen their capital base instead of paying high dividends
and compensation payments in financial crises (BCBS 2011a; 26-28).
The increase in the overall minimum capital requirements has an impact on all
risk groups. It is difficult to state which risk group is mainly affected. We can guess that
the capital requirement for operational risk may be constant. However, the complexity of
Basel III increases, which may increase the probability of (internal) system failures. Credit
risk and market risk are doubtlessly affected. Hence, we assume the relative, percentage
increase of the overall level of regulatory capital and add this factor to the minimum
regulatory capital requirements of all risk types. In our model, this aspect is incorpo-
rated by increasing lrcmin of Formulae (10) and (16) after 250 time steps (one year) in
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the simulations with the respective factor. Since our model allows a univariate analysis,
diversification aspects that blur our results are not considered. We therefore have to as-
sume higher rates of minimum capital requirements (20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%) to deploy
our analyses since lrcmin = 8% is exceeded at every time step for this reason. We raise
the assumed rates of minimum capital requirements by factors of 0.625/8, 0.625/8.625,
0.625/9.25, 0.625/9.875, 0.625/10.5 which is equal to the factors by which the BCBS raises
lrcmin. Thus, we gain an impression of the impact an increase in lrcmin by such a factor
has.
In this way, we can mimic the intention associated with this instrument. This is
often useful if the real aspect cannot be replicated directly. Direct modeling is not possible
due to the complexity of both Basel II and III frameworks. However, we have to find a
solution to capture what might happen if the conservation buffer is implemented and,
furthermore, the extent to which it influences financial markets compared to the other
instruments introduced. It is also important to bear this consideration in mind when
integrating the countercyclical buffer into the model.
4.3 The countercyclical buffer
The countercyclical buffer was introduced to build a buffer in periods when the eco-
nomic situation is sound to ”ensure the banking system has a buffer of capital to protect
it against future losses” (BCBS 2011a, 137). The losses during a downturn of the econ-
omy are associated with excess credit growth by the BCBS (2010b, 2011a). Furthermore,
the BCBS highlights the regulatory capital requirements to meet the macro-financial en-
vironment in an adequate manner. Financial markets are an important component of the
macro-financial environment and indicate upturns and downturns quite reliably (West-
erhoff 2011).
Although the BCBS links upturns and downturns to the increase and decline in
system-wide risk measured by credit growth, the associated increase in regulatory capital
is not solely added to the level of regulatory capital for credit risk, but to the overall level
of regulatory capital. Hence, regulatory capital for market risk is also greatly affected by
the countercyclical buffer.
We have to consider the countercyclical buffer in our model, which is dependent on
market risk, if we want to test the impact of the Basel III framework on financial markets.
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But how should we do this? The BCBS identifies extremely large losses as being espe-
cially problematic in periods of downturns (BCBS 2011a, 136). Since downturns of the
economy and of financial markets are correlated and the BCBS links the countercyclical
buffer to an increase system-wide risk (BCBS 2011a, 137), we have to find an adequate
measure. We need an approximation of ”excess aggregate credit growth” – the measure
actually used by national authorities to issue or cancel the buffer on a quarterly basis
(BCBS 2010b). The BCBS (2010b) and Drehmann et al. (2010) suggest a credit-to-GDP gap
to build up a buffer. However, since the variables needed are not included in our financial
market model, we have to find an approximation with the variables given in our model,
hence, losses due to price decays. Concerning the identification of the transition of good
times to bad times in which the buffer should be released, Drehmann et al. (2010) state
that two criteria are important: aggregate gross losses at banks and credit contractions in
the banking sector. We have to focus on aggregate gross losses at banks. For this measure,
Drehmann et al. even link credit and market risk together: ”An ideal measure of aggre-
gate gross losses would capture all sources of losses independent of whether those arise
from credit, market, or other risks,” Drehmann et al. (2010, p. 6). However, they argue
that such a measure is hard to define.
We have to assume here that aggregate gross losses are connected to losses asso-
ciated with the portfolio held by the financial institution, hence, a price decay, since we
cannot replicate the whole complexity of the Basel III framework with our model. Here,
we focus on the impact on our financial market and not on credit risk issues here.
Looking at a typical price and return time series presented in the top part of Figures
2 and 3, we recognize that increasing market risk, represented by an increasing volatil-
ity of returns and Value-at-Risk, occurs together with extraordinary losses (cp. the large
volatility clusters at time steps 2000 and 3500 in Figures 2 and 3). For simplification rea-
sons, we set the threshold of an extraordinary loss to a loss of 2% on one day. If this loss is
realized more than twice in one quarter, we assume a period of stress for financial institu-
tions, in which system-wide risk increases such that the countercyclical buffer is canceled
by the regulatory authority. In periods when such an extremely large loss does not occur
that frequently, additional capital requirements, such as the countercyclical buffer, are
demanded by the national regulatory authority, to be prepared for times of crisis.
The bottom-left panels of Figures 2 and 3 reveal that the countercyclical buffer is
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indeed canceled during crashes and additional regulatory capital is held during calm
periods with financial market stability. It seems to be a good approximation to model the
impact of the countercyclical buffer on financial market stability.
Just as we implemented the capital conservation buffer with lrcmin (cp. Formulae
(10) and (16)) into our model, we raise lrcmin if we observe a maximum of two extremely
large losses quarterly as defined above. In the other case, if more than two extremely large
losses are observed, lrcmin is not raised. This procedure is visualized using the dotted line
in the bottom-left panels of Figures 2 and 3.
The ”stairs” from time steps 5500 to 6500 in lrcmin represent the transition period in
which the stepwise integration of the conservation buffer is implemented. The transition
period is described in the next subsection.
4.4 The transition period
During the transition period from 2013 to 2019, minimum regulatory capital require-
ments are raised stepwise from 8% to 10.5%. Here, in the first phase until 2015, the quality
of the regulatory capital is increased. Thereafter, the quantity of regulatory capital is also
increased stepwise by implementing the capital conservation buffer (BCBS 2010a).
This stepwise increase may also have an effect on financial market stability, since
the minimum capital requirements are adjusted, regardless of whether there are times of
high volatility or downturns of the economy in these periods. Slovik/Cournede (2011)
also consider the transition period to be a critical period. However, they investigated the
influence for macroeconomic variables and not for financial market stability. It is there-
fore important to analyze the impact of this stepwise rise over a period of five years. The
stepwise increase is easy to implement in the model. We simply have to adjust lrcmin (cp.
Formulae (10) and (16)) at the specified time steps for this purpose. This procedure is in
line with integrating capital conservation and the countercyclical buffer into the model.
In the next section, we analyze whether or not the instruments described lead to a
stabilization of the financial market according to the stability measures introduced. For
this purpose, we first describe the characteristics of one typical time series, as shown in
Figures 2 and 3, and then highlight the results of a Monte Carlo simulation with 100 of
those time series in Section 4. The structure of this section follows that of the previous
section.
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5 Simulation results
The time series depicted in Figures 2 and 3 contain 10000 observations. The first 1500
observations (six years) were neglected in the calculation of the initial values for the risk
measures ((stressed) Value-at-Risk), the capital requirements and the level of regulatory
capital. The time series for varying proportions of regulated traders are simulated with
the same random variables for the noise terms. This enables us to obtain the pure effect
caused by adding or excluding the respective instrument, because the other settings and
parameters remain constant. Concerning the other constants and parameters, we use the
same setting as in Franke/Westerhoff (2011)5. For the additional parameter ρ of the reg-
ulated traders’ trading rule in Formula (10), we use the same value as for the reaction
parameter of fundamentalists φ. Hence, we set ρ = φ. The reason for this is the simulta-
neous modeling of both trading rules, as described in Section 3.
Three time periods are highlighted in Figures 2 and 3. The first and third shaded
areas show the end of periods for which the minimum level of regulatory capital is con-
stant. The first area represents the basic setting of the minimum level of regulatory capital
lrcmin. The third shaded area shows lrcmin raised by 35%. We choose the end of those time
periods to consider stable dynamics of the model not influenced by initial settings or the
transition period, which is represented by the second shaded area in the figures. As the
transition period is a five-year period (1250 observations), the first and third shaded areas
contain the same number of observations, enabling the three time periods to be compared
one another.
The upper panels represent the price development, whereas the bottom two panels
of the upper part of both figures show the return time series. The upper return time series
displays the situation for an unregulated time series (basic) and the bottom one for a
situation where maximum 4% of the regulated traders (Nreg) are affected by regulations.
The bottom part of both figures shows the time series for the level of regulatory capital
for market risk lrc and the minimum level of regulatory capital lrcmin for each of the used
VaR approaches used by the financial institutions.
We require both figures to analyze the effects of the instruments. In Figure 2, all
time series are computed using incorporated stressed Value-at-Risk to calculate capital
5These values are p∗ = 0, φ = 0.12, χ = 1.5, α0 = −0.336, αn = 1.839, αp = 19.671, σ f = 0.708, σc = 2.147
and the reaction parameter of the regulated traders ρ = 0.12.
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requirements cr (Formula (13)). In Figure 3, we use the former regulation with Formula
(12) to calculate cr. The findings concerning the stressed Value-at-Risk are described in
Sections 5.1.
The impact of the capital conservation buffer (Section 5.2) is investigated by com-
paring shaded areas 1 and 3 with one another. We can therefore conclude which effects
the increase in the regulatory capital has.
The countercyclical buffer (Section 5.3) is added to the left-hand panels of Figures
2 and 3. This effect is ”switched off” in the right-hand panels . The existence of this effect
can be identified by the different time series of the minimum level of regulatory capital
in the bottom part of the figures.
For the consequences resulting from the transition period (Section 4.4), we require
the shaded area 2. We can compare this time period with shaded areas 1 and 3 for which
the minimum level of regulatory capital was quite constant for hundreds of time steps.
For the time series depicted, we can state an obviously reduced number of volatility
clusters for using stressed Value-at-Risk and a reduced volatility in shaded area 3 com-
pared to areas 1 and 2. Another aspect is the similarity of the direct counterparts in the
left- and right-hand panels, which may be evidence of a low impact of the countercyclical
buffer in both Figures 2 and 3.
The mechanism causing the changes in the model are analyzed in Hermsen (2011).
In short, the overall excess demand does not change considerably if we incorporate reg-
ulated traders. A small reduction of d occurs compared to the basic model only for time
series with the stressed Value-at-Risk . However, the fluctuation of the excess demand in
the respective groups is more significant. For higher Nreg fundamentalists become more
dominant than chartists. This keeps the price closer to its fundamentals. However, the ab-
solute excess demand of chartists also increases, which may heighten the risk of crashes.
The intensity of the changes in excess demand, and which of these effects is dominant is
decisive for the influence on the stability measures6.
However, we have to explore more than one time series to obtain reliable results for
our presumptions. For this purpose, we simulate 100 time series for different proportions
of regulated traders in a Monte Carlo simulation. The results, presented in Figures 4 to 7,
6However, for (unrealistic) large Nreg, the sales of regulated traders become dominating, leading to very
large crashes. This case is discussed in Hermsen (2011). In this article, we set Nreg to a range in which the
dynamics remain stable.
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will be explained in the description of the impact of the instruments introduced.
5.1 Stressed Value-at-Risk
From left to right, the results for time periods 1 to 3 are presented in Figure 4. This means
that the left-hand panels show the results for the basic minimum level of regulatory cap-
ital lrcmin, the middle panels the transition period for which lrcmin is increased stepwise,
and the right-hand panels present a situation for which lrcmin was raised to the new level
after a time period of 3000 time steps, which complies with about 12 years (the time pe-
riods are visualized in Figures 2 and 3 with the shaded areas). There are three parts in
Figure 4 separated by horizontal lines.
From top to bottom, the results are given for each of the stability measures volatil-
ity, distortion, and the Hill tail index. The top lines of each part show the results calcu-
lated using the stressed Value-at-Risk implemented, hence, cr and lrc are calculated us-
ing Formula (13). In the bottom lines of each part, we use Formula (12) without stressed
Value-at-Risk to calculate these values.
The boxplots can be interpreted as follow: the left- and right-hand borders of the
box represent the 25% and 75% percentile of the 100 time series concerning volatility,
distortion and the Hill tail index. The vertical line in the box is the median of the stabil-
ity measures’ values and the point is the mean of the 100*1250=125,000 observations of
each shaded area (cp. Figures 2 and 2). The horizontal line shows the range of the stabil-
ity measures’ values. From bottom to top, the boxplots visualize the 100 time series for
maximum proportions of 0% to 5% regulated traders.
The analysis indicates a stabilization of the financial market following the intro-
duction of the stressed Value-at-Risk7. Comparing the upper lines with sVaR of each of
the parts of Figure 4 with the bottom parts without sVaR, we identify a clear stabilization
achieved following the implementation of this instrument. Looking at volatility in the
upper part, we see a clear decline in volatility with increasing Nreg for each time period.
This effect is even more significant for distortion in the middle part. In the bottom part,
the value for the Hill index increases for each time period, indicating less extreme profits
and losses. All stability measures point to a stabilization of the financial market following
7According to BCBS (2011c), different methods can be used to calculate Value-at-Risk and stressed Value-
at-Risk. In the paper, we always use the same method to calculate both. Since the results do not differ
considerably regarding stressed Value-at-Risk, this assumption does not affect the results significantly.
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the integration of stressed Value-at-Risk.8
How the dynamics of the model is affected by the stressed Value-at-Risk is de-
scribed in great detail in Hermsen (2011) 9. To describe the intuition behind this, the
introduction of the stressed Value-at-Risk leads more frequently to a regulation of the fi-
nancial market and to a higher excess demand of fundamentalists, which drives the price
back to its fundamental value. The stressed Value-at-Risk raises the level of regulatory
capital more frequently over the minimum level of regulatory capital (although it was
raised by capital conservation and countercyclical buffer), which enforces the use of reg-
ulations. We have to differentiate between two cases to sketch the mechanism – one if the
price is above the fundamental value and the other if the price is below it.
If the price is above the fundamental value, regulations usually become increas-
ingly important in times of large positive returns. The reason for this is that these returns
cause increasing risk, measured by the Value-at-Risk, and, hence, an increasing level of
regulatory capital (cp. Formula (14)). Additionally, regulations cause negative excess de-
mand in the market and the large positive returns decline compared to a situation with-
out regulations. The trading signal of chartists declines, causing a decline in the group
of chartists. The reduced amplitude of positive returns and faster reversion to the funda-
mental value due to the larger excess demand of fundamentalists and regulated traders
reduces volatility and, especially, distortion. Extraordinarily large losses are reduced by
the negative excess demand of regulated traders.
If the price is below the fundamental value, a greater number of larger negative
returns cause regulations to be applied more intensively. Large negative returns have the
same effect regarding Value-at-Risk and the level of regulatory capital as large positive
returns. Regulations enforce the price decay. This strengthens the group of fundamental-
ists who believe in a reversion to the fundamental value. The weight of chartists, which
declines anyway if the price falls, becomes even smaller compared to an unregulated
financial market. The higher fraction of fundamentalists drives the price back to the fun-
damental value in small steps, damped by regulated traders, which reduces distortion
and volatility and heightens the Hill tail index.
8We present the results without implementing a countercyclical buffer. However, very similar results can
be observed with implemented countercyclical buffer.
9Here is additionally explained which dangers a too high fraction of regulated traders have. A too strong
regulation can cause severe crashes.
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5.2 The conservation buffer
The effect of the conservation buffer is analyzed in Figure 5 and Table 1. We first look
at Figure 5, where we find boxplots for all three time periods (cp. shaded areas of
Figure 2). The boxplots are presented for a situation in which the stressed Value-at-Risk
is implemented (but without a countercyclical buffer, which is discussed in the next
section), since we know its stabilizing effect from Section 4.1. The left-hand panels show
a situation with maximum 2% fraction of regulated traders, the right panels with a
maximum Nreg = 5%.
Figure 5 comes about here
We compare time periods 1 (bottom boxplot) and 3 (top boxplot) because for time
period 3 the relative increase in the basic level of regulatory capital is conducted as de-
scribed in Section 4.2 (time period 2 in the figure will be considered in the following
Section 4.4). For volatility (top panels), we cannot see a strong change for the low fraction
of regulated traders in the market. For the higher fraction, however, volatility increases
if the conservation buffer is implemented. For the other two stability measures, we rec-
ognize more stable results if the conservation buffer is excluded for both fractions: the
distortion is lower and the Hill tail index higher for time period 1. But are these effects
significant? Do these results hold if we change the basic level of regulatory capital chosen
with lrcmin = 0.3 to this point in the article, as in Figures 2 and 3?
For this purpose, we have to analyze Table 1. For each of the proportions of
regulated traders, there is a p-value for a T-Test given10. In the top part of the table, the
basic level of regulatory capital is given by 0.2 (we can picture this by reducing lrcmin
to 0.2 in the bottom parts of Figures 2 and 3). In the middle part, we present the level
previously used in the analysis with lrcmin = 0.3. In the bottom part (on the next page),
lrcmin is raised to 0.4. In the second (stressed Value-at-Risk (sVaR)) and third column
(countercyclical buffer (cb)), we see which instruments are included or excluded.
10We test whether the mean value µ of the respective stability measure indicates a more stable value in
period 1 (p1) compared to period 3 (p3) for the 100 time series of the Monte Carlo simulation. For this
purpose, we test hypothesis H0 : µp1 ≥ µp3 against H1 : µp1 < µp3 ⇐⇒ µdiff = µp3 − µp1 > 0 with
(µ̂diff − µdiff)/σ̂pooled;diff) ·
√
T1 + T2 − 2 as.∼ N (0, 1) since T1 = T2 = 100. The p-value for this test is
given in Table 1. Since a stabilized financial market is associated with µp1 > µp3 for the Hill tail index,
we test H0 : µp1 ≤ µp3 against H1 : µp1 > µp3 for this stability measure.
20
Table 1 comes about here
Concerning volatility, the values are not significant for lower fractions of regulated
traders. For higher values, we obtain significant values for included sVaR, but only for
lower basic lrcmin levels (cp. top two lines of the top and middle part of Table 1).
Distortion increases with the conservation buffer, independent of the use of the
countercyclical buffer, even with proportions of 2% of regulated traders. For lower levels
of lrcmin of 0.2 and 0.3, this also holds if sVaR is included.
The p-values of the Hill tail index are often not significant. This indicates a minor
influence of the countercyclical buffer on the occurrence of extreme profits and losses.
There are some exceptions, however. For high Nreg when sVar is included and cb ex-
cluded, the Hill tail index even indicates an increase in extraordinary profits and losses
for all lrcmin levels.
Summing up this subsection, introducing the conservation buffer does not have
such a strong influence on financial market stability as the stressed Value-at-Risk. In con-
trast to the first instrument explored, however, especially for distortion, it has a signif-
icant destabilizing effect. It is virtually impossible to reduce volatility and the presence
of extraordinary profits and losses by using this instrument. For higher Nreg when sVaR
is implemented, the stability measures of volatility and the Hill tail index even indicate
a destabilization for the conservation buffer. It could be that the temporary increase in
additional minimum capital requirements, as suggested by the BCBS with the counter-
cyclical buffer, has a stabilizing effect.
The reason for the slight increase in distortion is that the positive effect of the higher
level of regulatory capital on the model dynamics caused by the stressed Value-at-Risk
is reduced. As described at the end of the previous subsection, a higher level of regula-
tory capital stabilizes the financial market with additional negative excess demand when
sharp price changes occur. A higher minimum level of regulatory capital reduces the gap
between lrc and lrcmin and disposes of some of the stabilizing excess demand of regulated
traders. This additionally dampens the greater influence of fundamentalists, hamping the
rapid reversion to the fundamental value. Therefore, distortion increases slightly.
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5.3 The countercyclical buffer
This aspect is analyzed in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 6 consists of three parts: as usual, the
top part stands for volatility, the middle part for distortion, and the bottom part for the
Hill tail index. In each part, the top panels visualize a situation with sVaR and the bottom
panels a situation without sVaR for constant Nreg = 4%. The results for time periods 1
and 3 are presented in the left- and right-hand panels, respectively. In each panel, there
are two boxplots for each basic level of regulatory capital lrcmin ∈ {0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4}
(cp. the ordinates of Figure 6 which are denoted by ”basic lrcmin”). The top and bottom
boxplots show a situation with and without a countercyclical buffer (cb). A statisti-
cally significant higher value for the time series without cb is indicated by the light
(0.9 < p̂ < 0.99) and dark-gray (p̂ > 0.99) colors of the boxplots11.
Figure 6 comes about here.
The first finding is that the countercyclical buffer has virtually no effect on finan-
cial market stability if the sVaR is excluded. The bottom panels of each part indicate no
significant difference concerning the top and bottom boxplot.
However, the result is different if sVaR is implemented, as in the top panels
of each part. Independent of the lrcmin level for each stability measure, we obtain a
destabilizing effect of the countercyclical buffer. The mean, median, and quartiles of all
the top boxplots with implemented cb are right-hand compared to the bottom panels
without cb for volatility and distortion. Many of the differences for volatility and most
of them for distortion are statistically significant. This can be interpreted as an increase
in volatility and distortion with cb. For the Hill tail index, the statistics mentioned visu-
alized by the boxplots are left-hand. Especially for time period 3, we obtain statistically
significant differences. This indicates more extraordinary profits and losses with the cb.
Are these results significant and valid for other Nreg? This topic is highlighted in Figure 7.
Figure 7 comes about here
11We use a very similar test to test in the previous section. We now define µdiff = µno cb − µcb > 0 with
µ(no) cb as the mean of the 100 time series with(out) a countercyclical buffer.
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The figure is structured somewhat differently to the previous figure (because we
also need it in the next section to the analyses of the transition period). The left- and
right-hand panels are for situations with a maximum proportion of 2% and 5% regulated
traders, respectively, for a situation with lrcmin = 0.3 (in the previous Figure 6 we did not
see any strong effect concerning the difference between included or excluded cb caused
by variation of the lrcmin level. Hence, we can keep it constant). For each time period,
we have – as in the previous figure for each lrcmin level – the top boxplot where cb is
implemented and the bottom where it is not implemented. The significance levels are
also marked as in the previous figure.
For lower proportions of regulated traders, we do not identify any statistically sig-
nificant difference, as the left panels indicate. However, for higher proportions of reg-
ulated traders we have significant results, especially for volatility and distortion. The
occurrence of extraordinary profits and losses is only weakly affected by the counter-
cyclical buffer. Given that this was one of the main reasons for introducing the counter-
cyclical buffer, it seems to have failed its purpose. The increase in volatility shown in both
Figures 6 and 7 is also a problematic result. The pure increase in the minimum levels of
regulatory capital lrcmin do not seem to be an applicable instrument to increase financial
market stability. This result is yielded by both the analysis of capital conservation and the
countercyclical buffer. Concerning the model dynamics, the slight increase in distortion
for the countercyclical buffer can be explained in the same way as described previously
for the capital conservation buffer.
5.4 The transition period
The transition period is characterized by stepwise increased levels of minimum capital
requirements lrcmin (cp. the shaded area for time period 2 in Figures 2 and 3). The effect
of this instrument can be examined by Figures 4, 5 and 7 from Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
Looking first at the middle panels (from left to right) of Figure 4, we are unable to
identify any strong differences in the results compared to periods 1 and 3. The boxplots
have a similar position concerning mean, median, quartiles, and range. The stepwise
transition to the new capital requirements does not seem to have a significant influence
on volatility, distortion or extraordinary profits and losses. This can be ascertained by
Figures 5 and 7 for other proportions of regulated traders. We do not obtain significantly
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different results compared to time periods 1 and 3 for neither a proportion of 2% or 5%
of regulated traders. However, the characteristics of the boxplots are sometimes more
similar to period 1. If there are significant differences between period 1 and 3, the mean
for the time series of the respective stability measure is between the respective values for
the other two time periods (as for volatility and the Hill tail index for Nreg = 5% in Figure
7).
These results show that the results described in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 can be adapted
to the transition period. In the next subsection we summarize and interpret the results of
this section.
5.5 Discussion of the impact of the instruments
Before we discuss the results, it is important to summarize the essential differences con-
cerning the three instruments introduced by the BCBS to stabilize financial markets. The
first, the stressed Value-at-Risk, is an instrument especially formulated for market risk.
It affects only the level of regulated capital for market risk lrc. In other words, the reg-
ulatory capital associated with this special risk type concerning a portfolio held by the
financial institution, for instance, is changed.
The other two instruments – conservation and countercyclical buffer – are simulta-
neously aimed at all risk types. For these, the capital requirements relating to a special
asset or portfolio are not raised. Both instruments increase the overall minimum level for
regulatory capital lrcmin for all risk types credit, market, and operational risk at a special
rate. The financial institution may decide to which risk types these changes are assigned.
We assume that the minimum level for regulatory capital used for market risk is raised
by the rate at which the overall minimum level of regulatory capital is raised.
The result is that the stressed Value-at-Risk has the deepest impact on financial
market stability. Concerning all stability measures – volatility, distortion, and Hill tail
index – we identify a stabilizing influence. The impact of conservation and countercycli-
cal buffer is lower. Furthermore, neither create the desired effect intended by the BCBS
to stabilize financial markets. For higher fractions, even a significant destabilization can
be measured. A pure increase in the minimum capital requirements – permanently, as
for the conservation buffer, or temporarily, as for the countercyclical buffer – are not ef-
fective for reducing bubbles and crashes. The most stable period analyzed is period 1
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without conservation and countercyclical buffer, but with the implementation of stressed
Value-at-Risk.
Hence, the main finding of the simulation study is that direct regulations influenc-
ing the calculation of regulatory capital connected to a special risk be associated with a
financial institutions’ assets, such as the introduction of the stressed Value-at-Risk, seems
to be an effective way to enhance financial market stability. The relatively imprecise com-
mon increase of minimum capital requirements for all risk types have proven to be not
very effective, sometimes even creating contrary effects for both the conservation and the
countercyclical buffer.
6 Conclusion
In a heterogeneous agent model by Franke/Westerhoff based on Brock/Hommes’ Dis-
crete Choice Approach, we integrated mechanisms to test the instruments proposed by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). We explored their effect on finan-
cial market stability, measured by volatility, distortion, and the Hill tail index. The new
instruments which are mainly relevant for market risk are the stressed Value-at-Risk, the
capital conservation buffer, the countercyclical buffer and the long transition period of
seven years in which the instruments are adopted stepwise.
The stressed Value-at-Risk is the only instrument that can be solely connected to
market risk and which directly increases the level of regulatory capital associated with
assets held by a financial institution. The effect is a clear stabilization, indicated by a
decline in volatility, distortion and an occurrence of extraordinary profits and losses. The
two instruments which have to be deployed to all risk types of the Basel III framework
– conservation and the countercyclical buffer – raise the minimum capital requirements
regardless of the risk situation. They do not have a stabilizing effect. In turn, they create
greater distortion. Sometimes both may destabilize the financial market for high fractions
of regulated traders in the market, also concerning volatility and the Hill tail index and
hence, extraordinary losses. However, the strongest impact on financial market stability
is caused by the stressed Value-at-Risk. Its quite positive influence is slightly weakened
by the other two instruments. All instruments implemented together led to a stabilized
financial market. The transition period does not affect the above-mentioned findings.
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Challenges for further research may focus on the different risk types. First, it might
be interesting if the observed larger effect resulting from raising the level of regulatory
capital associated with the assets held by a financial institution compared to an increase
in the minimal capital requirements can also be observed for credit risk. For credit risk,
which is also calculated using the risk measure Value-at-Risk, a kind of stressed Value-at-
Risk can be added to the calculation formula, as proposed for market risk. Here, the reg-
ulation authority may define a special credit risk portfolio consisting to a certain extent
of toxic assets so that financial institutions are also well-prepared for periods of stress
concerning credit risk. This might be more effective than raising minimum capital re-
quirements.
In addition, since the risk groups credit, market and operational risk add up to the
overall level of regulatory capital it would be interesting to have a model comprising
them all. That way, the financial institution may also lower or raise credit risk to react
on changes in market risk and vice versa. To reach this target, we do not only need time
series for shares, but also for credit derivatives, governments bonds and mortgage loans.
For many assets belonging to credit risk, it will even be difficult to calculate a present
value.
Here, it might be necessary to take preliminary steps before obtaining a large model
that is able to shed light on the (dangers of) the interconnectedness of the different risk
types and their influence on financial markets, as well as the real economy. In view of
the actual financial crises in that these issues are inweaved into a structure which is very
hard to comprehend and control, such a model would be useful. Concerning the inter-
connectedness and influence of regulations on financial markets, this article might be a
first step in this direction.
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Appendix: Value-at-Risk models
Historical volatility approach (hv)
The first approach can be directly deviated from the Basel II framework (BCBS 2006, 2009,
718 (LXXVI) (c) and (f)); Danielsson et al. 1998), since it suggests the square root of time
rule. The basic model to calculate returns yi is formulated as
yi = µ + ui. (17)
An assumption of the very simple historical volatility approach is ui =
σei with ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1). As a consequence of the normal distribution for the α-quantile it
follows, due to the additivity property, that
Qα(τ|t) = τµ + zα
√
τσ. (18)
We then need the result of Formula (18) to be able to calculate the Value-at-Risk with
Formula (15).
Historical simulation (hs)
Applying the historical simulation, we arrange the returns in descending order. The α-
quantile of y(n), y(n−1), . . . , y(n (1−α)), . . . , y(1) where y(n) ≤ . . . ≤ y(1), which we use to
determine VaRα(1|t), is the smallest value y(n (1−α)) not exceeding n (1− α), so that
Qα(1|t) = y(n (1−α)). (19)
To calculate the τ-step VaR, a bootstrap approach with τ · 5000 observations is used.
The VaRα(τ|t) can be determined from the 5000 cumulated ten-step returns in an analo-
gous manner to that in (19). The Value-at-Risk is calculated using (15).
Exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) approach (ew)
The exponential weighted moving average model (EWMA) following Zangari (1996) is
also often used by financial institutions (Holton 2003). The weight placed on the most
recent observation is higher, and declines for prior observations. In the basic model
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yi = µ + ui with ui = σiei and ei
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1), i = 1, . . . , t− 1, t, (20)
the conditional volatility at time t is modeled by
E[u2i+1|t] = E[(yi+1 − µ)2|t] = ht with ĥ1|t = (1− λ)u2t + λĥt. (21)
We assume ui ∼ N (0, σ2) for the estimation of the one-step VaR. If we replace σ2 with
ĥ1|t and assume that µ = 0, we obtain
ŷ1|t ∼ N (0, ĥ1|t) and
ŷ1|t√
ĥ1|t
∼ N (0, 1),
respectively, and further Qα(1|t) = zα
√
ĥ1|t.
Since ĥ1|t is the best estimation for ut+τ, it follows
Qα(τ|t) = zα
√
τĥ1|t.
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Basic level of regulatory capital = 0.2
Stability p-value of the difference test
measure sVaR cb 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Volatility x x 0.0934 0.4873 0.7356 0.9472* 0.9595* 0.8484
x 0.0934 0.5817 0.8252 0.9827* 0.9830* 0.9691*
x 0.0934 0.2351 0.2136 0.3388 0.1123 0.1021
0.0934 0.2264 0.2461 0.2897 0.1715 0.2453
Distortion x x 0.7720 0.8250 0.9198* 0.9674* 0.9840* 0.9885*
x 0.7720 0.8838 0.9935* 0.9975** 0.9990** 0.9999**
x 0.7720 0.8583 0.9144* 0.9069* 0.9301* 0.9787*
0.7720 0.8701 0.9263* 0.9374* 0.9714* 0.9842*
Hill tail index x x 0.4565 0.8825 0.5158 0.7676 0.9837* 0.9106*
x 0.4565 0.8575 0.5400 0.9946** 0.9852* 0.9640*
x 0.4565 0.4439 0.4216 0.3287 0.4937 0.5265
0.4565 0.4906 0.4393 0.4255 0.4553 0.5363
Basic level of regulatory capital = 0.3
Stability p-value of the difference test
measure sVaR cb 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Volatility x x 0.0934 0.2627 0.5922 0.5652 0.8861 0.9311*
x 0.0934 0.4182 0.5439 0.7552 0.9838* 0.9816*
x 0.0934 0.1317 0.1802 0.2317 0.2053 0.1995
0.0934 0.1353 0.2236 0.2430 0.2067 0.2388
Distortion x x 0.7720 0.8311 0.8758 0.9554* 0.9821* 0.9850*
x 0.7720 0.7354 0.8076 0.9768* 0.9913** 0.9931**
x 0.7720 0.8621 0.9109* 0.9240* 0.9367* 0.9508*
0.7720 0.8657 0.9171* 0.9303* 0.9429* 0.9593*
Hill tail index x x 0.4565 0.5038 0.7574 0.5422 0.4424 0.8505
x 0.4565 0.7080 0.7080 0.3610 0.8960 0.9944**
x 0.4565 0.4740 0.4818 0.4768 0.6171 0.6603
0.4565 0.4361 0.4749 0.5256 0.6178 0.6589
to be continued on the next page
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Basic level of regulatory capital = 0.4
Stability p-value of the difference test
measure sVaR cb 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Volatility x x 0.0934 0.3276 0.5293 0.6185 0.6016 0.8023
x 0.0934 0.3220 0.4779 0.4092 0.5646 0.8986
x 0.0934 0.0741 0.0884 0.0919 0.0962 0.1011
0.0934 0.0842 0.0893 0.0935 0.0996 0.1075
Distortion x x 0.7720 0.8881 0.9083* 0.9690* 0.9931** 0.9998**
x 0.7720 0.8736 0.9499* 0.9873* 0.9994** 0.9981**
x 0.7720 0.7885 0.8073 0.8151 0.8193 0.8232
0.7720 0.8034 0.8114 0.8197 0.8244 0.8288
Hill tail index x x 0.4565 0.5192 0.5575 0.7018 0.8965 0.7885
x 0.4565 0.3915 0.8741 0.8077 0.6444 0.9433*
x 0.4565 0.4840 0.4224 0.4063 0.3754 0.3581
0.4565 0.4621 0.4256 0.3745 0.3458 0.3628
*: significant with 0.9< p-value<0.99; ** significant with p-value>0.99
Table 1: Results of the Monte Carlo simulation for the
conservation buffer
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Figure 1: Generation of the excess demand of regulated traders zreg
Top panel: Detail of the time series of the level of regulatory capital (lrct) and the minimum level of
regulatory capital (lrcmin).
Bottom panel: Detail of the time series of regulated traders’ excess demand (zreg) resulting from lrcmin and
lrct from the top panel.
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Figure 2: Analysis of regulations with the use of stressed Value-at-Risk
Left-hand panels with the countercyclical buffer: from top to bottom the panels present the time series of the
price, the return time series without regulations, the return time series for Nreg = 4% and the (minimum)
level of regulatory capital for the VaR approaches – historical volatility (hv), historical simulation (hs) and
EWMA (ew).
Right-hand panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left-hand panels, albeit without the
countercyclical buffer.
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Figure 3: Analysis of regulations without the use of stressed Value-at-Risk
Left-hand panels with the countercyclical buffer: from top to bottom the panels present the time series of the
price, the return time series without regulations, the return time series for Nreg = 4% and the (minimum)
level of regulatory capital for the VaR approaches – historical volatility (hv), historical simulation (hs) and
EWMA (EW).
Right-hand panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the left-hand panels, albeit without the
countercyclical buffer.
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Figure 4: Analysis of financial market stability influenced by the stressed Value-at-Risk
Top part: from left to right, the panels present the boxplots for the time series of the Monte Carlo simulation
for volatility with increasing minimum level of regulatory capital in time periods 1 to 3 for implemented
(top line) and non-implemented (bottom line) stressed VaR. The countercyclical buffer is not considered.
Middle part: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for distortion.
Bottom part: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for the Hill tail index.
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Figure 5: Analysis of financial market stability influenced by the conservation buffer
Top panels: from left to right the panels present boxplots for the time series of the Monte Carlo simulation
for volatility with a fraction of Nreg = 2% and 5%. The stressed Value-at-Risk is considered, but the
countercyclical buffer is not. The basic level of regulatory capital is 0.3.
Middle panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for distortion.
Bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for the Hill tail index.
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Figure 6: Analysis of financial market stability influenced by the countercyclical buffer
Top part: from left to right, the panels present boxplots for the time series of the Monte Carlo simulation for
volatility for time periods 1 and 3. The basic level of regulatory capital (lrcmin) is varied. The countercyclical
buffer is not considered in the top boxplots and considered in the bottom boxplots for each lrcmin level. In
the top/bottom line, the stressed Value-at-Risk is included/excluded.
Middle part: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for distortion.
Bottom part: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit for the Hill tail index.
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Figure 7: Analysis of the effect of the countercyclical buffer with the stressed VaR
implemented
Top panels: from left to right the panels present the boxplots for the time series of the Monte Carlo
simulation for the volatility, distortion and the Hill tail index for a maximum proportion of 2% of regulated
traders for a situation with (bottom boxplot for each time period) and without (top boxplot of each time
period) a countercyclical buffer.
Bottom panels: these panels are interpreted in the same way as the top panels, albeit with a maximum
proportion of 5% of regulated traders.
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